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6 
Abstract 
In the twenty-first century, the issue of privacy—particularly the privacy of 
individuals with regard to their personal information and effects—has become highly 
contested terrain, producing a crisis that affects both national and global social 
formations. This crisis, or problematic, characterizes a particular historical 
conjuncture I term the namespace.   
Using cultural studies and the theory of articulation, I map the emergent ways that 
the namespace articulates economic, juridical, political, cultural, and technological 
forces, materials, practices and protocols. The cohesive articulation of the namespace 
requires that privacy be reframed in ways that make its diminution seem natural and 
inevitable. In the popular media, privacy is often depicted as the price we pay as 
citizens and consumers for security and convenience, respectively. This discursive 
ideological shift supports and underwrites the interests of state and corporate actors 
who leverage the ubiquitous network of digitally connected devices to engender a new 
regime of informational surveillance, or dataveillance. The widespread practice of 
dataveillance represents a strengthening of the hegemonic relations between these 
actors—each shares an interest in promoting an emerging surveillance society, a 
burgeoning security politics, and a growing information economy—that further 
empowers them to capture and store the personal information of citizens/consumers.   
In characterizing these shifts and the resulting crisis, I also identify points of 
articulation vulnerable to rearticulation and suggest strategies for transforming the 
namespace in ways that might empower stronger protections for privacy and related 
civil rights. 
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Chapter 1. The Problematic of Privacy 
 
1.1 Privacy in Crisis 
 
In the 1999 episode “The Short List” of the Emmy Award-winning television show 
The West Wing, U.S. President Bartlet (Martin Sheen) and his advisors are rethinking 
their initial choice for a Supreme Court nominee based on their discovery that the 
nominee does not recognize privacy as a guarantee of the United States Constitution. 
Deputy Communications Director Sam Seaborn (Rob Lowe) argues the importance 
of nominating a different judge—one with a stronger belief in privacy rights for 
citizens, particularly in light of the shifting technological landscape:  
 
It’s not just about abortion, it’s about the next twenty to thirty years. 
The twenties and thirties it was about the role of government. The 
fifties and sixties it was civil rights. The next two decades are going to 
be privacy. I’m talking about the internet. I’m talking about cell 
phones. I’m talking about health records and who’s gay and who’s not. 
And moreover, in a country born on the will of being free, what could 
be more fundamental than this?  
 
What The West Wing so presciently foregrounded is the degree to which changes to 
privacy law and policy, economic and cultural structures and practices wrought in and 
through new technologies would become a central concern, for some the central 
concern, in an increasingly connected, information-dense, global space of networked 
computer media—in short, a privacy crisis. As Google’s privacy disclaimer, so 
unwittingly pregnant-with-meaning, recently put it: “We’re changing our privacy 
policy. This stuff matters.” 
 
Of course, if an anxious concern over the too-easy sacrifice of privacy remains a 
ubiquitous and familiar theme in our modern social imaginaries1, some concept of the 
importance of privacy has deep historical roots in western discourse. In various forms 
privacy remains one of the most architectonic and abiding concerns stretching back 
through western civilization. The oft-cited warning by Roman poet Juvenal, for 
example, Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes2, indexes a number of closely related concepts 
such as wealth, power, transparency, autonomy, liberty, security, and especially 
privacy, which still resonate with us today. In fact, it is Juvenal’s warning that Brian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This is particularly evinced in the dystopic literature of the last century. See, for 
example, Bellamy (1898), Zamyatin (1924), Huxley (1932), Boye (1940), Orwell 
(1949), Bradbury (1953), Burgess (1962), Gibson (1984), and Vinge (2006). 
2 But who will watch the watchmen? 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
8 
Clifton, Google’s former Head of Web Analytics, invokes when asked in an 
interview, What central question should drive the current privacy debate? “For me,” 
he answers, “the important debate is ‘who is monitoring the monitors’” (question 6, 
para. 1). Privacy has long proven a concept central to our thinking about the ordering 
of bodies and spaces, citizens and states, beginning with Aristotle’s early distinction 
between a political public sphere and a private domestic sphere, evolving toward 
contemporary understandings in the late Roman period, and emerging fully as a 
distinct social good in what Arendt calls the “modern age.”3  
 
Historically, privacy represents a bedrock economic, social, and political value in the 
United States, through its connection to the concept of freedom of autonomy—the 
right to make fundamental decisions about one’s religion, politics, education, and 
especially the disposition of one’s home and family affairs. Privacy’s strong connection 
to freedom and liberty is represented in the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves 
with regard to our public and private selves. “The idea of man in control of his own 
private sphere,” observe Kennedy and Alderman (1997), “has always been a basic 
organizing principle of American society. At America’s birth, we adopted from our 
English ancestors the belief that a man’s home is his castle and that man is king of 
that domain and, by extension, the whole of his private life…[T]he rugged, solitary 
individual was celebrated on the American frontier, in business, and in literature and 
popular entertainment, and became an integral part of American mythology” (p. 152). 
This narrative continues today, although, as I argue in chapter two, the myth of the 
“rugged, solitary individual” has in fact come to oppose the strong right to privacy 
that it once supported.    
 
While privacy remains central to American life today through its connection to the 
notion of liberty, explicit references to privacy are not found in the U.S. Constitution. 
With regard to privacy, the Bill of Rights includes explicit protections against 
government intrusion in the form of two specific rights: the right to make 
fundamental decisions for oneself, and the right to avoid disclosure of personal 
matters. Like the fictional justice from The West Wing, above, Chief Justice John 
Roberts was challenged at length about his interpretation of constitutional guarantees 
of privacy. During his 2007 confirmation hearing, Roberts declared that although not 
acknowledged per se,4 a penumbral right to privacy is constitutionally protected under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For more on the transformation from pre-modern to modern understandings of 
private and public, see Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958).	  
4 While not explicitly addressed in the U.S. Constitution, many states constitutions 
explicitly guarantee a right to privacy, including Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington 
(Lenz, 1997). 
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the First Amendment (securing the right to free exercise of religion, and prohibiting 
the government’s establishment of religion), the Third Amendment (securing one’s 
home against the quartering of troops), and the Fourth Amendment (securing a 
person, their house, papers, and effects against unwarranted search). Many jurists also 
recognize additional privacy provisions in the Fifth Amendment (securing personal 
information through the protection against self incrimination), the Ninth 
Amendment (protecting the possibility of other unenumerated rights), and the 
Fourteenth Amendment (protecting infringement of one’s liberty without due 
process).  
 
Privacy protections also derive from legislation and a significant body of tort law. 
Anchoring the latter is Warren and Brandeis’ Harvard Law Review article, “The 
Right to Privacy” (1890), which problematized the popularity of the emerging snap-
photography technology first made available by Eastman Kodak in 1884. Warren and 
Brandeis were the first to address, jurisprudentially, the need to protect individual 
privacy from an emerging ‘social medium’ populated by overly avid amateurs 
photographers. These “Kodak fiends,” as they came to be known, threatened to 
invade the “sacred precincts of domestic life,” argued Brandeis and Warren (p. 195). 
Citing an abbreviated version of Cooley’s definition of privacy as the “right to be let 
alone,”5 the article sparked a small body of case law bolstering personal privacy rights 
over the next decades. However, it was Prosser’s 1960 article “Privacy” which revived 
attention to personal privacy law by gathering and delineating extant case law into 
four distinct torts: intrusion (the invasion of another’s solitude); private facts (the 
publication of a private citizen’s personal information not of public concern); false 
light (the portrayal, typically but not necessarily negative, of a person in a misleading 
way); and appropriation (the damaging use of another’s name or likeness without their 
consent). Although Prosser’s taxonomy encouraged, over time, a far larger body of 
case law supporting personal privacy, the type and extent of privacy protections 
continue to vary because tort-law is state-specific. Even in states that do offer similar 
protections with regard to particular privacy rights, these rights may be interpreted 
differently. For example, in 2011 the California Supreme Court ruled that police may 
search the contents of any arrested person’s password-protected cell phone. The Ohio 
Supreme Court, however, has rejected the right of law enforcement officers to search 
the phones of arrested individuals, arguing that the use of a password grants 
protections analogous to those who use a physical safe—an added level of protection 
for which law enforcement officers must obtain an additional, specific search warrant 
(Gahran, 2013). Each state thus represents a unique context from within which 
privacy must be continually negotiated. Personal privacy rights are, in each case, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  “The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let 
alone” (Brandeis & Warren, 1890, p. 29).	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
10 
weighed against the possibility of other stronger rights, or societal interest compelling 
enough to trump individual privacy rights. 
 
Thus, while privacy is putatively recognized as a social good and, in many cases, a 
legal right, the specific nature and value of privacy continue to be vigorously debated 
and legislated. Since the publication of Warren and Brandeis’ article over a century 
ago, their definition of privacy has become but one of many competing for primacy. 
For example, as Allen points out, “If privacy simply meant ‘being let alone’, any form 
of offensive or harmful conduct directed toward another person could be 
characterized as a violation of personal privacy. A punch in the nose would be a 
privacy invasion as much as a peep in the bedroom” (1988, p. 7). Attempting to 
navigate the muddled state of contemporary privacy research, Solove (2005) 
delineates some of the disparate ways in which theorists have tried to define it: as “the 
right to be let alone,” as “limited access to the self,” as “secrecy,” as “control over 
personal information,” as “personhood—the protection of one’s personality, 
individuality, and dignity,” and as “intimacy—control over, or limited access to, one’s 
intimate relationships or aspects of life” (p. 13). Defining privacy is notoriously 
difficult, he explains, because privacy is both communally and contextually defined. 
For these and other reasons, privacy remains for some theorists “nebulous…too vague 
and unwieldy a concept to perform useful analytical work” (Wacks, 2010, p. xi). 
Ultimately, admits Solove, while a concept crucial to social organization, privacy 
continues to resemble a “concept in disarray” (p. 8). “It seems as though everybody is 
talking about ‘privacy’ but it is not clear exactly what they are talking about” (Solove, 
2008, p. 5).  It would seem not much has changed since Alan Westin’s seminal 
Privacy and Freedom (1967) in which he proclaimed, “Few values so fundamental to 
society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory” (p. 7).  
 
Despite an acknowledged difficulty in reaching agreement about the nature and value 
of privacy, an overwhelming and growing number of voices register urgent concern 
over the use, by state and commercial actors, of invasive new information-based 
surveillance technologies and practices associated with what has been termed, 
variously, the computer age, the digital age, the information age, the network society, and 
so on. Whichever term you prefer to characterize the highly technologized 
contemporary socio-historical moment, privacy argues Frau-Meigs, “has emerged as 
one of the salient issues of the twentieth century…[and] most researchers 
acknowledge that [it] is eroding in cyberspace” (2010, p. 80). This claim is supported 
by a 2008 Pew Internet & American Life Project survey in which nearly 1,200 
leading Internet activists, builders, commentators, and stakeholders were asked to 
predict the effect of transparency and diminished privacy on the social, political and 
economic changes wrought by the Internet by the year 2020. At least half the 
respondents agreed that privacy is either changing and/or becoming scarce, pointing 
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to emerging digital technologies of surveillance as a significant factor.  
 
Though scholars are divided as to the nature and value of privacy in its various 
contexts, Nissenbaum (2010) points out that the danger of lingering too long in 
definitional stasis:  “Believing that one must define or provide an account of privacy 
before one can systematically address critical challenges can thwart further progress” 
(p. 2). As my focus here is on informational privacy, I rely on Westin’s definition of 
privacy, in which he defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967, p. 158). I have chosen 
Westin’s definition because its focus on informational privacy allows me a careful but 
decisive start to mapping the privacy crisis with regard to the changing nature of 
informational privacy in our contemporary historical conjuncture. 
 
1.2 The Emerging Surveillance Society 
 
“To participate in modern society,” writes David Lyon, “is to be under electronic 
surveillance” (1994, p. 4). Large-scale political, economic and cultural transformations 
have been associated with what Lyon and others have termed the “surveillance 
society,” including: the global spread of western capitalism, the emergence of an 
‘information’ economy, the displacement of the social-welfare state with the ‘security’ 
state, as well as a broad technological and cultural convergence in which we move 
from relatively unidirectional electronic and other communication and media devices 
to a society of multi-directional, constantly communicating, ubiquitous, networked 
“smart” devices. For these reasons and others, the diminution of privacy under 
emerging surveillance regimes represents, according to Lyon, “the single most 
controversial and potentially alarming social issue prompted by the massive expansion 
of computer power in human affairs” (1994, p. 11). These transformations both drive 
and are driven by a significant reorganization of the structures and functions of the 
first version of the World Wide Web (Web) and correspond to radical advances in 
computer chip size, speed, data storage capacity, and reduced manufacturing costs, 
leading to the global ubiquity of the networked computing device. To put it 
somewhat reductively, where early iterations of the Web connected hobbyists, 
academics, and later mainstream consumers through networks of stationary desktop 
digital computers, the contemporary technological and cultural configuration that 
underwrites our current Web—often referred to as Web 2.0—represents a paradigm 
shift toward the articulation of new protocols, policies, and practices of ubiquitous 
computing, and a culture of openness, transparency, sharing, and collectivity through 
constant connectivity. Tim O’Reilly, who coined the term, describes it in this way: 
 
Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices; 
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Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic 
advantages of that platform: delivering software as a continually-
updated service that gets better the more people use it, consuming and 
remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while 
providing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by 
others, creating network effects through an “architecture of 
participation,” and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to 
deliver rich user experiences. (para. 1) 
 
This explains why in an increasing number of technologically developing countries, 
we constitute ourselves and our communities in part through our use of personal blogs 
(e.g., Blogger, LivePress, Wordpress), professional blogs (e.g., Boing Boing, Gawker, 
Lifehacker, Mashable), micro-and videoblogs (e.g., Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram), 
Massively Multiplayer Online games (e.g., EverQuest, World of Warcraft), social 
bookmarking sites (e.g., Delicious, DIGG, Pinterest Reddit, StumbleUpon, Twitter), 
video sharing sites (e.g., Vimeo, YouTube), social networking (e.g., Facebook, 
LinkedIn, MySpace, Orkut), location tracking (Loopt, Foursquare), crowdsourcing 
platforms (e.g., Kickstarter, RocketHub, Wikipedia) as well as hundreds of 
commercial sites from Amazon to Zazzle. We text. We email. Many of us consume 
music, literature and other forms of entertainment in digital forms, we buy and sell in 
digital forms, we report very many of every movement and thought online—in a 
word, we share immensely more personal data than we have in the past through 
digital devices. The preponderance of these new media are economically incentivized 
to privilege and promote sophisticated forms of surreptitious surveillance, including 
location tracking, the recording and databanking of personal information, all of which 
feed the newest form of hyperconsumerism—behavioral prediction of consumers 
through statistical modeling. Thus, in our increasingly technologized social landscape, 
the emerging imperative to share everything online represents both new possibilities 
for community, and new pitfalls for privacy.  
 
While increasing numbers of contemporary critics spark concern over this surveillance 
society in which our lives are collected and recorded in massive databanks, serious 
concerns over the profound effects of digital computers on informational privacy are 
roughly coterminous with the birth of programmable computers around the middle of 
the twentieth century and the emergence of networked computing which followed. In 
an article in The Atlantic, jurist Arthur Miller reviewed the proposal for a National 
Data Center, the first large-scale databanking of citizens’ personal and public 
information in a centralized digital repository. Writing in 1967, two years before the 
existence of the first packet-switching digital network and internet-precursor 
ARPANET, Miller predicted a future remarkably like our own: “Computer systems 
will be tied together by television, satellites, and lasers, and we will move large 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
13 
quantities of information over vast distances in imperceptible units of time” (p. 52). 
The national data center would, he warned, combine with the “numerous subsystems 
or satellites” owned both by state governments and perhaps private organizations to 
form the “heart of a government surveillance system that would lay bare our finance, 
our associations, or our mental and physical health to government inquisitors or even 
to casual observers” (pp. 53-54). Without federal regulation, databanking proposed a 
radical new threat, warned Miller: The collection, by “relatively unskilled and 
unimaginative people who lack discrimination and sensitivity,” of ever greater 
amounts of de-contextualized but essentially indelible data collected in personal or 
professional digital dossiers which, through either simple data corruption or the 
intervention by those with malicious intent, might have catastrophic consequences to 
one’s life (p. 54). Moreover, cultural assumptions about the infallibility of data, as well 
as hierarchies of control, access, and ownership could prevent citizens’ awareness of 
inaccuracies or corruption in their own dossiers and/or prevent them from emending 
them.  
 
If Miller’s scenario seems all too familiar, it is because the practice of databanking and 
of dataveillance, has become not only possible but standard practice for both state and 
federal governments, innumerable corporations, and even individual citizens. Debates 
over the diminution of informational privacy are thus often characterized by rising 
concerns over the development of an emerging “dossier society,” whereby personal 
information from myriad networked computer “databanks” can be joined to create 
totalizing and readily accessible personal portfolios with sometimes deleterious effects 
for individuals’ personal and professional lives. Roger Clarke termed this powerful 
new form of data-driven surveillance “dataveillance” (1988, p. 500). Popular 
treatments of the rise of dataveillance have treated surveillance in “colorful, at times 
even hysterical, fashion,” argued Clarke, resulting in a “visionary, yet paranoiac 
‘literature of alarm’” (p. 498). Dataveillance, can be defined as use of networked 
computers to systematically collect information and/or communication about a 
person, persons, their associates, associations, and activities in order to document, 
predict, or promote/deter particular actions or behaviors. Dataveillance thus 
represents the possibility of new and powerful forms of electronic surveillance in 
which computer systems aggregate and analyze personal data. Whereas early forms of 
electronic surveillance represented an extension of the methods of visual and aural 
surveillance (e.g., binoculars, parabolic microphones, telephone wiretaps), 
dataveillance opens radically new possibilities of privacy violation. Clarke takes a 
balanced approach to dataveillance, however, suggesting that dataveillance need not 
lead to the tyranny of totalitarianism, as certain types of surveillance have always been 
necessary to the safety and stability of the state and that through proper regulation, 
dataveillance ultimately represents a social good.  
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While it is objectively true that many surveillance practices are necessary to the 
functioning of families, communities, organizations and governments, some studies 
have shown that predictive algorithms can use ostensibly innocuous data such as 
‘Likes’ shared on the Facebook platform to predict with great accuracy: age, ethnicity, 
gender, happiness, intelligence, parental separation, personality traits, political views, 
religious views, sexual orientation, and the use of addictive substances (Kosinski, 
Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013). Similarly, the work of Acquisti and Gross (2009) 
supports the concern that statistical modeling of interconnected data sets may allow 
for privacy violation on a grand scale. By using the dataset that emerges from 
combining information from the publicly-available Social Security Administration’s 
Death Master File and an individual’s birthplace and birthdate available from any 
number of publicly-available databanks and/or social networks, they were able to 
algorithmically predict narrow ranges of numbers corresponding to social security 
numbers of large numbers of citizens. “Such findings,” they explain, “highlight the 
hidden privacy costs of widespread information dissemination and the complex 
interactions among multiple data sources in modern information economies” (p. 
10975). The algorithmic prediction of social security numbers opens up a range of 
problems, including not least among them, identity theft. Predictive demography has 
also led to problems such as redlining, the practice whereby statistics are used to name 
particular groups who are then victimized by predatory commercial pricing, or the 
denial of goods or services such as health insurance. It’s logical to infer, then, that as 
these systems grow in the volume and type of data capture, and as the ability of 
computers to process powerful predictive modeling grows, so does the potential for 
privacy violation, with effects ranging from personal embarrassment, to the loss of 
reputation and/or employment, to, in some cases, even death. 
 
With the emerging popularity of the social networking paradigm, the popular media 
has become rife with moving accounts of the dangers of sharing private information 
on public social networks. There have been a rash of suicides among teens attributed 
to the Web publication of personal details. For eighteen year-old Rutgers freshman 
Taylor Clementi, for example, the humiliation of the Web publication of video of his 
intimacy with another male student6 ended in Clementi’s suicidal leap from the 
George Washington Bridge. The potential for serious privacy violation in digitally 
interconnected spaces is why, suggests Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, Marc Rotenberg, privacy may be “the top concern” for 
consumers of new media products and services. Nissenbaum also sees privacy as “one 
of the most enduring social issues associated with digital electronic information 
technologies” (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 3). The now global embrace of social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The footage was taken surreptitiously through a hidden webcam and broadcast on a 
social media platform by Clementi’s then college roommate Dharun Ravi. 	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networking points to a larger challenge to privacy, then, in that consumers are 
encouraged to share large amounts of information about themselves with global 
multinational corporations such as Google and Facebook for the “free” services they 
provide. These services come at a cost, however, requiring consumers to enter into 
new and complex personal, professional, and sometimes financial relations with these 
organizations. Many critics also recognize that Web services which offer ostensibly 
free services in exchange for personal data are, in fact, receiving implicit payment in 
the exactly the form of currency that drives the information economy—information. 
A few of the data surreptitiously collected from users by these databanks include one’s 
daily schedule and/or travel itinerary, search activity, personal and professional 
affiliations, the content of one’s communication with others, academic affiliations, 
native language, and any other languages one speaks, images of one and one’s social 
circle, and one’s purchases. This tracking is supported by large-scale consumer 
ignorance of the extent and types of tracking taking place. The blurring of private and 
public produced by this popularity of social networking also raises a host of questions 
about the legal rights of those who live online with regard to intellectual property and 
especially privacy. For example, while information classified by the user as ‘public’ has 
for some time been allowed as evidence in legal proceedings, more and more judges 
have recently begun to allow information posted on social networks and classified 
‘private’ to be used as evidence at trial. The benefits of social networking are thus 
balanced by the problem confronting millions globally, argues Jeffrey Rosen—the 
question of “how best to live our lives in a world where the Internet records 
everything and forgets nothing” (2010, para. 2).  
 
As each of Miller’s predictions have been fulfilled, this growing privacy crisis has 
come to pervade both the popular and academic media. “We have to recognize and 
address the problem of web-based information disclosure before we reach a point of 
crisis—a point that I believe is rapidly approaching,” worries Conti (2006, p. xv). 
“Privacy itself is in jeopardy,” worries Nissenbaum, “not merely in one or another 
instance but under attack as a general societal value” (2010, p. 6). “The manner in 
which information is collected, stored, exchanged, and used has changed forever,” 
agrees Wacks, “and with it, the character of the threats to individual privacy” (2010, 
p. ix). Because of the global pervasion of dataveillance, the privacy crisis has become 
global as well. That crisis is undergirded by a steady stream of data communicated by 
ubiquitous, sophisticated information and communication technologies (ICTs) such 
as cell phones, tablets, laptops, and other ‘smart’ digital devices.7  The anxiety over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For Lievrouw and Livingstone (2002), the term ICT denotes a relationship between 
particular artifacts, practices and social arrangements, which have transformed global 
practices in a number of ways. Specifically, the spread of networked information and 
communications technologies which leverage an increasingly global, relatively unified 
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our seemingly diminished privacy rights at the hands of governments and private 
corporations has only intensified after the September 11, 2001 (9-11) terrorist 
attacks. Many critics see the terrorist attacks of 9-11 as the impetus for the rapidly 
burgeoning $3-5 billion industry in surveillance technology (Horwitz, Asokan, & 
Tate, 2011). Moreover, in the decade following the attacks, attendance at the 
surveillance tradeshow nicknamed the “Wiretapper’s Ball” has grown by 40 times, to 
host over 1,500 participants currently. The most recent tradeshow was attended by 
representatives from at least 35 U.S. federal agencies (Elgin, 2011).  
 
The U.S. government’s laws and policies surrounding surveilling its own citizens have 
been the sites of intense ideological struggle, both historically and again very recently. 
In fact, as I write this, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration is struggling to 
re-legitimize its leadership in the area of domestic and foreign security policy in the 
face of a mounting wave of privacy-related scandals that has energized public protests. 
This crisis of authority is the product of the articulation of multiple individual crises 
with regard to the violation of constitutional guarantees: Early and sustained critique 
over initial discovery of, and continuing failure to close the Guantanamo Bay Prison 
facilities have raised questions of due process violations by the government. These 
combine with critiques over the discovery of a U.S. attack drone program which raises 
questions about the president’s power to avoid due process and perform political 
assassination. Lastly, the recent re-discovery8 of widespread direct and indirect 
blanket surveillance of U.S. citizens’ telecommunications data and metadata by the 
National Security Administration (NSA) has sparked a singularly strong and focused 
public showing of antagonism in the popular media for the Obama administration, 
and the government in-general. 
 
1.3 Conjunctural Analysis and the Problematic of Privacy 
 
This burgeoning array of privacy violations, and especially the responses to it, suggest 
that privacy has become what cultural studies theorists term a problematic.  A 
problematic is “usually lived (but not necessarily experienced per se) as a social crisis 
of sorts…when [particular] instabilities and contradictions appear at almost every 
point in the social formation and when [those] struggles become visible and self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
network of computing and other analog and digital information processing 
technologies, has engendered fundamental shifts, both positive and negative, across 
the articulation of behavioral, cultural, economic, institutional, and political and 
technological facets of the social formation (p. 1).    
8	  The same discovery was made during the Bush administration. However, likely due 
to the recentness of the 9-11 attacks, the story gained much less traction than it has 
during the Obama administration (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005).	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conscious” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 41). Problematics emerge from a unique historical 
context and constitute a “conjuncture,” which describes a social formation which has 
become “fractured and conflictual, along multiple axes, planes, and scales, constantly 
in search of temporary balances or structural stabilities through a variety of practices 
and processes of struggle and negotiation. It is the complex product of multiple lines 
of force, determination, and resistance” (Grossberg, 2010, pp. 40-41). A conjuncture 
is neither historically given nor entirely constructed by the critic. The critic must 
carefully map the historical context, attending to what he or she sees as those 
particular lines of force and determination that seem to best explain the emergence of 
a particular problematic or problematics.  
 
We can understand the concept of conjuncture by examining Jesse Schell’s Visions of 
the Gamepocalypse (2010), in which he offers a map of an emerging conjuncture he 
terms the “gamespace,” a technologically powered form of fast capitalism in which 
play becomes the socially ubiquitous point of articulation connecting an information 
economy and networked dataveillance practices. For Schell, powerful new technologies 
(e.g., ubiquitous computing, information communication technologies, wi-fi and 
cellular networks, enhanced sensor and screen technologies, biometrics, geo-tracking, 
cloud computing, corporate and government databanking, and digital dossiers) will 
articulate to new cultural forms and practices (e.g., shifting definitions of ownership, 
authenticity, and privacy, the blurring of work and play distinctions, the pervasion of 
play into virtually all sites of cultural production and economic consumption, the 
embrace of social networking), as well as to new economic forms and practices  (e.g., the 
pervasion of virtually all sites of cultural production by net-enabled consumer 
incentivization, micro-tracking, a shift to quantifiable extrinsic rewards, adver-
gaming, the pervasion of human dreams by advertisers through what he calls “REM-
tertainment,” and ubiquitous gaming aimed at training consumers to notice 
advertisements). The gamespace emerges through the interconnection of these 
particular subjectivities, ideologies, affects, technologies, cultural and economic 
practices, etc., which combine to produce radically new social designs, resulting in, 
among other things, the blurring of work and leisure driven by commercial trans-
media information conglomerates promoting whole-life tracking for economic profit. 
 
However, an historical context may yield multiple conjunctures, and each 
conjuncture, multiple problematics. Schell’s choice to name this conjuncture the 
“gamespace” represents his recognition of the emergence of a ‘ludic’ problematic, 
wherein the struggle to redefine the relation of work and leisure can be seen as 
articulated to cultural and economic imperatives. My mapping work here draws upon 
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a majority of the same elements of Schell’s conjuncture9 (i.e., ubicomp, digital 
dossiers, consumer incentivization, etc.), but is focused on the problematic of 
informational privacy as it is transformed through its articulation to regimes of 
technologically-empowered surveillance. While both conjunctures emerge from the 
same socio-historical context and investigate the emergence of highly technologized 
forms of culture and deeply cultural technologies and their significance for social 
structures, I connect to Schell’s focus on commercial actors with an economic interest 
in the diminution or transformation of privacy those state actors with a parallel 
political interests. Although I concede that the changing work-leisure balance is a 
recognizable feature and perhaps even an impetus for the conjuncture I map, the 
pervasion of play into socio-cultural life, at least as Schell envisions it, cannot happen 
without a transformation of privacy driving and driven by the cultural, economic, and 
political embrace of radical transparency. 
 
Changes to the social and cultural, political and economic nature and value of privacy 
(i.e., particularly the diminution of privacy), thus represent the requisite and perhaps 
single-most-powerful change constituting the conjuncture I map here. For reasons I 
elaborate below, and playing on the pithiness of Schell’s moniker, I term this 
conjuncture the namespace. I offer the term tentatively and advisedly, as the 
technocultural complexity of our current moment is especially resistant to 
terminological boundaries. As Resmini and Rosati (2011) point out, no term 
adequately captures the complexity of our current social-historical context, in which 
the economic, political, cultural, and technological are so completely imbricated and 
mutually constitutive: “We can call it ubiquitous computing, the Internet of things, 
Web Cubed, or the Intertwingularity. We can talk about smart things, sensor Webs, 
product-service systems, and collaborative consumption. But none of these labels 
begins to describe the extraordinary diversity of the ambient, pervasive, mobile, social, 
real-time mashups unfolding before our very eyes…But as we wander blindly in this 
landscape of vernacular chaos, one thing is clear: we need a new map” (p. xi). The 
namespace thus represents a proposed map of the complex conjuncture which I see as 
the articulation of economic, juridico-political, and ideological elements, including 
but not limited to the following: the rise of ubiquitous computing, including the 
widespread availability of wi-fi and cellular technologies connecting ICTs (e.g., 
laptops, ‘smart’ phones, and tablets); powerful advances in screen and sensor 
technologies which both promote the social and communal uses of ICTs and enable a 
radically invasive new surveillance regime; juridical and political forces, laws, policies 
and practices driving cultural imperatives toward an open public/closed state in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  It does not share, however, Schell’s imaginary “REM-tertainment,” as I mean to 
keep my conjunctural analysis grounded by extant cultural and technical practices and 
apparatuses and ideologies. 	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continuing ‘war on terror’, including the multi-agency sharing of databases of citizen’s 
digital dossiers; the articulation of technical and economic forces in the shift to cloud 
computing, corporate and government databanking and dataveillance, and 
staggeringly detailed but secret personal digital dossiers; the emergence of a new 
Web-based advertising paradigm driven by consumer incentivized micro-tracking and 
the corollary forms of fast capitalism built around ‘information’ economies. Each of 
these and many other elements of the Web 2.0 world involve—require, we are told—
a tradeoff between stronger forms of personal privacy and security and convenience.  
 
1.4 The Namespace 
 
The namespace thus describes a space of concerted effort by both corporate and state 
actors to reimagine privacy in weaker forms that promote a burgeoning information 
economy, and a rising security state, respectively, driven by practices of dataveillance. 
Privacy in the namespace is thus part of two interlocking binaries deployed by the 
state and commercial sectors, respectively: privacy vs. security, and privacy vs. 
convenience. The namespace, similar to what Siva Vaidhyanathan (2008) terms the 
“nonopticon,” represents an effort to control people not through direct coercion, but 
through dividualizing them to the point that they can be accurately named by the 
behaviors their data reveals and predicts about them: 
 
Even the state wants us to be ourselves. It wants subversive and 
potentially dangerous people to reveal themselves through their habits 
and social connections, not slink away in the dark to avoid obvious 
surveillance. After all, the Stasi lost in its efforts to control the East 
German people, despite exacting long-lasting damage to both the 
observers and the observed. Our state does not want social or cultural 
conformity. Domination does not demand it. The state wants to ferret 
out and punish the ne'er-do-wells and hooligans among us and limit 
due process along the way. 
Everyone in the namespace (i.e., everyone with a digital identity) must be named, i.e., 
discovered/identified, categorized, quantified, quantized, dividualized, tracked, traded 
or sold in the interests of national security and economic prosperity. As Luke (2006) 
argues, the Web can also be seen as a space of political domination for states, a 
“governmentality engine” in which the subaltern publics represent “subpolitical 
assemblies of informatics artifacts” to be manipulated (p. 526). Under such a regime, 
privacy remains a primary locus for the re-articulation of socio-cultural forms 
constructed in and through emerging forms of surveillance. That rearticulation is 
having both positive and negative consequences for individuals who correspond to 
these “information artifacts.” I explore privacy in the namespace along three levels of 
the social formation, the ideological, juridico-political, and economic, specifically 
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examining popular discourse surrounding the changing nature of privacy, law and 
policy defining and interpreting privacy rights, and the economic practices and 
protocols which shape the new information economy.   
 
Though I delineate each level of the social formation into its own chapter, each level 
overlaps with and influences the others in multiple directions and intensities. 
Technological advances, for example, may be driven by social-cultural shifts which are 
themselves encouraged by economic forces enabled or resisted by jurists or politicians, 
leading to new law and policy enforcing technological restrictions, further leading to 
new or transformed techno-cultural forms. Likewise, economic forces may elevate 
political practices which drive the development of particular technologies, resulting in 
a cultural groundswell encouraging an economic boycott enacted with the help of 
social media which results in political regime change. And so on. The important 
thing to remember is that relations, phenomena, agents in each social formation 
interrelate in what Althusser describes as overdetermined—that is to say, no single 
force, phenomenon, or agent in the social formation is totally determinant of another, 
but each exists in a complex relation with varying strengths, intensities and durations 
with regard to each of the others.10 A conjuncture thus represents a heterogeneous 
“unity in difference,” formed in and by “forms of coalition…rather than a battle 
between two completely distinguishable and separable camps” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 
42). While privacy represents a point of crisis, then, I don’t want to suggest here that 
reactions to changes in privacy are somehow unified, coherent, or singularly critical. 
Conjunctural analysis requires understanding a conjuncture as a space of ideological 
struggle. That struggle takes place, according to Gramsci, through the alignment of 
political ‘blocs’ which take their unity from the contingent and temporary alignment 
of actors across a range of political and other commitments. In order to map the 
namespace, the theorist must carefully note the multiplicity of voices and perspectives 
in the privacy debate which emerge from a variety of political orientations. 
 
And in fact, it is certainly not the case that all theorists completely reject a diminution 
of personal privacy. Some argue that the adoption of too conservative an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For a fuller discussion of Althusser’s understanding of social determination, see his 
essay “Contradiction and Overdetermination” in For Marx (1965). I have relied on 
Gramsci’s work in this area, which Althusser praises in a footnote to that essay: 
“[Gramsci] touch[es] on all the basic problems of Italian and European history: 
economic, social, political and cultural. There are also some completely original and 
in some cases genial insights into the problem, basic today, of the superstructures. 
Also, as always with true discoveries, there are new concepts, for example, hegemony: 
a remarkable example of a theoretical solution in outline to the problems of the 
interpenetration of the economic and the political” (1965/2005, p. 114).	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understanding of personal privacy may conceal domestic forms of oppression; may 
contravene or compromise national security; may hinder economic flows, particularly 
with regard to the emerging information economy; may limit the rights of 
individuals, corporations or the state; may violate the norms of particular 
communities; or may lead to forms of historical revisionism. Some argue that a more 
traditional notion of privacy is incompatible with the technologies which make up a 
completely integrated networked society. Others argue that privacy must be sacrificed 
in the name of both political and economic security. For example, the “privacy crisis” 
has a manufactured air for writer Jonathan Franzen, with “all the finger-pointing and 
paranoia of a good old American scare” (2003, p. 40). Public Parts: How Sharing in the 
Digital Age Improves the Way We Work and Live (2010) represented Jarvis’ paean to the 
new “ethic of openness” he terms “publicness.” And in a Wired article aptly entitled 
“Get Over It,” Jeff Jarvis likewise critiques what he calls the “political press frenzy” 
which he claims has been manufactured by an over-zealous media: “It’s not privacy 
that concerns me now…I fear our supposed privacy crisis…could result in our missing 
many of the opportunities the net affords to connect with each other” (2011b, para 2). 
Potentially invasive facial recognition technologies might be used, he insists, to “find 
missing people…(or terrorists)” (2011b, para. 3). Abandoning equivocation 
altogether, Peter Cashmore, founder and CEO of Mashable.com, is famous for 
declaring “Privacy is dead, and social media holds the smoking gun” (2009, para. 5). 
And of course, Cashmore merely echoes Scott McNealy, former CEO of Sun 
Microsystems, whom a decade before had famously observed, “You have zero privacy 
anyway—get over it!” (Sprenger, 1999, para. 1). What all this suggests is that, even 
lacking a clear consensus on the precise definition of a legally-, culturally- and 
politically protean term, there is a social crisis at hand, in the form of ideological 
struggle, centered on the changing nature and value of privacy. While cavalier 
statements made by Schmidt, Cashmore, McNealy, and others suggesting that the 
surveillance society is a fait accompli may contribute to the public’s rising concern 
over privacy, they also certainly point to the fact of a widespread continuing and 
spirited debate—in a word, a problematic.  
 
1. 5 Radical Contextualism and Articulation 
 
If we are to weigh arguments fairly, we require a critical methodology with a 
sophisticated and nuanced understanding of social determination with which we can 
map the ideological, political, economic and technological forces in play—particularly 
if we are to contribute in any meaningfully way in the political struggle to ensure a 
society in which privacy policies ensure the greatest social justice and the preserve the 
constitutionally protected rights (and those as yet unenumerated) of individuals. This 
dissertation contributes to that project, and to the growing literature on privacy, 
by understanding the struggle which constitutes that crisis in terms of cultural studies’ 
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concept of “radical contextualism.” Radical contextualism can be understood as the 
claim that any carefully mapped conjuncture represents a complex of specific, but 
never pre-determined or guaranteed “articulations,” formed by lines of force and 
determination across the economic, ideological, and juridico-political levels of the 
social formation (Grossberg, 2010, p. 20). The object of study in conjunctural analysis 
is thus never isolable to a particular text, event, subjectivity, or discourse, but takes as 
its object “a structured assemblage of practices—a cultural formation, a discursive 
regime…located in overlapping formations of everyday life (as an organized plane of 
modern power) and social and institutional structures” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 25).  
 
Cultural studies thus recognizes social formations as dynamic, radically contextual, 
contingent, overdetermined, non-necessary unities, and articulation names both its 
theory, its practice, and its object of study. Hall defines an articulation as “the form of 
the connection that can make a unity of two [or more] different elements, under 
certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and 
essential for all time…it has no necessary, intrinsic, trans-historical belongingness. Its 
meaning—political and ideological—comes precisely from its position within a 
formation” (qtd. in Chen & Morley, 1996, p. 142). The practice of articulation thus 
involves laying bare the contingent and heterogeneous elements that constitute 
conjunctural articulations for the purpose of intervening in them, and through 
disarticulating and rearticulating particular, and particularly important lines of force, 
reconstituting the conjuncture and changing the nature of the historical context itself. 
The theory and practice of articulation thus offers us a sophisticated way to both map 
and intervene in power and its effects among and between the various levels of a social 
formation. Rearticulation does not represent a ‘step forward’ in a grand narrative of 
progress, but represents the disconnection and reconnection of contingent and non-
necessary elements whose relation may be manipulated in the interests of certain 
positions of power. The goal of the critical work of the articulation theorist—the 
rearticulation of conjunctural relations—thus represents the hope, but never the 
necessary guarantee, of greater social justice. For this reason, the critic must carefully 
map the conjuncture for those nodes which afford dis- and rearticulation, in the hope 
of transformative political change.  
 
The namespace represents a conjuncture in which we find the articulation of state and 
corporate actors to information economic forces and structures, to the ideological 
formation of individuals as citizens and consumers, to the emerging technologies of 
ubiquitous networked digital communication technologies. This conjuncture opens 
progressive possibilities for transparency, connection, community, individual 
expression. As it is currently articulated, however, those benefits increasingly come at 
the cost of individual privacy rights. By mapping the namespace as an active socio-
political process in which we may hope to intervene, I attempt to recognize those 
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lines of force and determination open to change in order to once again 
rearticulate/reassert stronger privacy protections, foregrounding and prioritizing them 
in this nascent namespace conjuncture, while also maintaining its progressive 
possibilities.  
 
An accurate understanding of the ways in which contemporary technology articulates 
to social, economic, and political elements is crucial to accurately mapping the 
namespace. Although I argue that dataveillance, as currently deployed, may represent 
a radically different, new and powerful form of surveillance producing and produced 
by new social designs, and that such practices correspond to a powerful new 
technologies, I am not espousing a technological determinism in which networked 
computers have singularly produced a radical historical break which can be addressed 
with uni-lateral or uni-dimensional approaches. Thinking with articulation helps us 
imagine how social, political, and economic relations might be differently arranged, 
and to resist more reductive understandings of the relation between technology and 
culture, such as Nicholas Negroponte’s famous declaration in Being Digital (1995), 
“Like a force of nature, the digital age cannot be denied or stopped” (p. 229). I reject 
any approach that ‘solves for privacy’ merely through proper technological safeguards, 
or through stricter legislative oversight. My use of articulation theory to map this 
conjuncture instead foregrounds the need, described by Slack and Wise in their book 
Culture and Technology (2005), to understand culture and technology together, to 
support and further their demand for “a model and a vocabulary that brings 
technology fully into the concept of culture” (p. 5). In their primer, they use the term 
“technological culture” to recognize that technology is and has always been cultural, 
culture always technological, and that neither technology nor culture stands as the 
sole causal agent in any social formation—both technology and culture, so imbricated, 
are inseparable for any theorist of social formations. This perspective lies at the heart 
of how cultural studies understands social formations. Cultural studies’ radical 
contextualism represents a rereading of the Marxist model of determination, 
accepting as it does the importance of a non-necessary and contingent 
correspondence between ideology, social/cultural structures, and material relations of 
production, including, of course, technology. It understands each of these levels as 
imbricated and mutually constitutive, mutually determinant. In The Long Revolution 
(1961), Raymond Williams describes it as follows. It is worth quoting at length:   
 
We have got into the habit…of asking about these relationships in a 
standard form: “what is the relation of this art to this society?” But 
“society,” in this question, is a specious whole. If the art is part of 
society, there is no solid whole, outside it, to which…we concede 
priority. The art is there, as an activity, with the production, the 
trading, the politics, the raising of families. To study the relations 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
24 
adequately we must study them actively, seeing all the activities as 
particular and contemporary forms of human energy. It is then not a 
question of relating the art to the society, but of studying all the 
activities and their interrelations, without any concession of priority to 
any one of them we may choose to abstract….I would then define the 
theory of culture as the study of the relationships between elements in 
a whole way of life. The analysis of culture is the attempt to discover 
the nature of the organization which is the complex of these 
relationships. (1961/2001, p. 61-63) 
 
There is no culture and art, argues Williams. There is no culture and technology, 
argue Slack and Wise. These ‘individual’ elements, frequently abstracted and 
separated either through ignorance or for the sake of convenience, must be thought in 
terms of articulations. In each of the three chapters which follow, then, I explore 
those particularly tendential lines of force at work across the ideological, political, and 
economic levels of the social formation, respectively. 
 
In chapter two, I use the work of Gramsci to powerfully extend Marx’s theory of 
ideological struggle at the level of the conjuncture. Using Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony I explore the popular media’s role in helping to construct a narrative of 
privacy that serves the interests of the dominant political bloc. This political bloc 
articulates the ruling-class fractions in the form of state and corporate actors, to 
subordinate/subaltern class fractions made up, broadly, of  citizen-consumers who are 
persuaded to trade privacy for security and/or convenience. I look specifically at the 
discursive constructions of the changing nature and value of privacy in examples from 
popular news, film and video game entertainments, explicating the various ways in 
which popular media narratives of technocultural privacy draw on a cultural fund of 
values, visual and textual tropes, and generally accepted understandings which 
Gramsci terms “common sense,” in ways that attempt to make natural and inevitable 
the use of surveillance by corporate and state actors.    
 
In chapter three, I take the state as the locus for an historicized examination of the 
ideological struggle over informational privacy at the juridico-political level. I examine 
the rise of the Total Information Awareness program, and examine its role in 
producing the nascent security state of our present conjuncture. I also explore the way 
in which the terrorist attacks of 9-11 produced a moment of expansive hegemony, 
leading to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and other pieces of legislation 
that have systematically dismantled a significant number of those privacy protections 
established over the last 125 years. 
 
In chapter four, I take the commercial sector as the locus for an examination of a 
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fundamental technical and economic shift toward an ‘information’ economy powering 
the consumer Web today, and the challenges it poses to personal privacy. I look 
specifically at the way in which the two largest social networking corporations, 
Facebook and Google, lead technical and cultural innovation in databanking and 
dataveillance, articulated to a new advertising paradigm (targeted marketing), and the 
embrace of the technocultural form of social connectivity, ambient findability, which 
underwrites and emerges from the rising information economy.  
 
Having mapped the articulation between public (state) and private (commercial) 
actors, I conclude by exploring what actions might be taken to engage in the privacy 
crisis at first the individual level, and finally the conjunctural level. I offer short-term 
and long-term, individual and collective possibilities for intervening in and 
rearticulating the namespace in ways that take advantage of the hegemonic crisis, the 
crisis of moral and intellectual leadership, which is now beginning to reveal cracks 
and fissures. These ‘dominant’ state and corporate actors, desperate to regain 
legitimate hegemonic leadership, may be pressured, I argue, to make concessions with 
regard to restoring increasingly diminishing privacy rights. The namespace, I 
conclude, is in fact ripe for rearticulation.  
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Chapter 2. A New Public Narrative of Privacy 
 
2.1 Privacy in the Popular Media 
 
In the previous chapter I described the conjuncture I term the namespace and argued 
that it represents an articulation of particularly tendential lines of force in the form of 
particular discourses, laws and policies, economic conditions and practices, and 
technical codes and protocols. Each of these serves as a point of articulation between 
the dominant social bloc (an articulation of social fractions in the form of state and 
corporate actors), and the subordinate social fraction (a broad public of what I term 
citizen-consumers for which communication and other cultural and social structures are 
largely mediated by networked digital computer technologies). This articulation, 
which has emerged to dominate the namespace, at least in the U.S., is one in which 
the dominant social fraction overwhelmingly sets the terms of the debate on many 
social issues, including the diminution of certain civil rights previously enjoyed by the 
subordinate social fraction. This is especially true of privacy, which has been 
successfully reframed as a double-binary in which the diminution of privacy is 
necessary to maintain the balance between both security and privacy, and convenience 
and privacy. In this chapter, I examine the ideological nature of the struggle to 
maintain that articulation, and the cost it has to personal privacy as it plays out in the 
discursive practices of the popular media.  
 
It is putatively understood, particularly in developed western countries, that while the 
mass media represent a heterogeneous symbolic field, the news media generally draws 
from and helps reify a broadly shared set of cultural, social, and political values and 
assumptions. “It is here [in the news, advertising, and entertainment media] that 
dominant interpretations of reality and cultural values become stamped upon, or 
‘anchored within’ the media products sold to the public in the form of news, 
entertainment, and culture. Hence, by providing the basis of a shared symbolic 
universe, the mass media ultimately foster a common (if contested and unstable) 
culture as a lived system of meanings and values” (Marmura, 2010, p. 6). Cultural 
values, beliefs, understandings, and assumptions are never immutable, but those 
which are particularly tenacious often move into the realm of ‘common sense’ where 
they have particular staying power. We draw upon these ready-made truths for the 
stories (both fiction and non-fiction) we tell ourselves about ourselves in the popular 
media. For this reason, it is important to recognize the role of news and popular 
entertainments in the struggle to [re-]frame the nature and value of privacy in the 
namespace. The popular media represent a particularly important force in this 
conjuncture, and must be examined if we are to engage with the ways in which people 
think, feel, and act with regards to the privacy crisis.  
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Below, I examine the way in which particular elements from that common symbolic 
fund are mobilized in particular popular media (i.e., news, film, and digital video 
games), underwriting the articulation of dominant and subordinate social fractions 
described above, through a tendency to draw on commonsensical understandings in 
describing or depicting the relation of technology to privacy and social control. 
Examining influential exemplars of the way we portray informational privacy and 
privacy violation in news and entertainment media, I draw out a ubiquitous and 
particularly tenacious narrative which naturalizes the vision of a society in which the 
diminution of informational privacy is a juggernaut that may not be resisted, but only 
fought from within by those who have mastered it by first accepting and inhabiting it. 
The question of whether we might resist the adoption of particular technologies and 
practices constituting a particular surveillance regime is often elided entirely in this 
narrative. In each popular medium I describe below, privacy violation is often 
understood in terms of overly-reductive literary tropes and narrative commonplaces 
which pit individuals against a monolithic state or corporate entity; little allowance is 
made in this narrative for the complex nature of social determination, nor for the role 
of public consent in underwriting the diminution of its own privacy rights. The story 
of privacy crisis in this narrative is an action-adventure in which, in the process of 
being hailed as the hero who fights for his or her privacy and other civil rights, 
individuals are necessarily subjected to a disempowering regime of technological 
surveillance they are required to accept in order to marshal any agency, any resistance 
to it at all.  
 
2.2 Ideology and Common Sense 
 
Before moving on to the discursive analysis of news and popular entertainments, I 
must define what I mean by ‘ideology’ and how I understand its role in political 
struggle. Though the term enjoys wide use in both critical-theoretical and popular 
discourses, uses of the term in each area diverge significantly. As Raymond Williams 
notes in Keywords (1983), in popular parlance ideology continues to denote an illusory 
understanding of real socio-economic relations, material conditions, facts, etc. “[I]n 
popular argument…[s]ensible people rely on experience…or have a philosophy; silly 
people rely on ideology” (p. 157). While Marx’s view of ideology was more complex 
than this, this sense of ideology as false corresponds to that typically attributed to a 
classical or vulgar Marxism. In the field of cultural studies, the work of Antonio 
Gramsci has been central to reshaping the terrain of the Marxist problematic, 
contributing a more nuanced understanding of political power, social determination, 
and ideological struggle for advanced capitalist societies. A brief review of these 
concepts will help clarify the uses to which I mean to put them, here.   
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Marx embraces ideology as a concept central to the analysis of the social formation by 
positing an historical materialism in which societies are structured according to 
material conditions rather than philosophical ideas.  
 
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite 
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these 
relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development 
of their material powers of production. The sum total of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—
the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.  The 
mode of production in material life determines the general character of 
the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the 
contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness…In 
considering such transformations the distinction should always be 
made between the material transformation of the economic conditions 
of production which can be determined with the precision of natural 
science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in 
short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict 
and fight it out. (1859/1904, p. 11-12)  
 
For Marx, a society’s forces of production (the labor power, materials, and 
technologies—this technology, these machines, these human bodies, etc.) determine 
its relations of production (the social relations specific to modes of production—these 
working hours, these gendered working spaces, this wage variance, etc.), which 
together form the economic base of a society. The economic base, for Marx, 
determines the superstructure of a social formation, i.e., the social, political, legal, 
religious, and metapysical spheres of a society. The superstructure in turn produces a 
dominant ideology which functions to reproduce the material conditions of 
production. 
 
Industrial capitalism, the economic form which for Marx most alienates humanity, 
thus emerges from material conditions which pit the bourgeoisie (dominant, capital-
owning, ruling class) against the proletariat (subordinate, labor-owning, working 
class). Under this system, workers’ labor only increases the capitalist’s wealth as it 
increases the division of labor, alienation,  and impoverishment of the worker. 
Ideology thus represents for Marx, a “false consciousness” functioning 
propagandistically at the superstructural level, and wielded by the ruling class to 
conceal the exploitative nature of economic structures under capitalism, by providing 
simplified and compartmentalized models of society which privilege the capitalist 
project. Though these structures are highly exploitative, ideology works to persuade 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
the proletariat that capitalism represents the highest stage of civilization, the rational 
ordering of an industrial society through which they might progress toward entering, 
ultimately, the ruling class.  
 
The work of Antonio Gramsci powerfully extends and complicates Marx’s 
understanding of social determination, particularly with regard to the mechanism of 
ideology in social determination, expanding and enriching the relation between the 
state and civil society. Gramsci, rejects Marx’s class-correspondence, seeing the state 
in coordinated relation to a host of other institutions in civil society. Arguing that the 
ruling class need not correspond to a single equivalent ideology allows Gramsci to 
reject universal class conflict as a necessary condition of every state, recognizing 
instead that particular socio-historical conjunctures may produce provisional alliances, 
or “blocs,” through bridging particular social fractions. The ruling bloc unites a variety 
of dominant social actors with varying political and ideological commitments. 
However, to win power, this ruling bloc must articulate to subordinate or subaltern 
social fractions, which must be persuaded to locate their own interests within the 
larger set of interests established and carefully maintained by the dominant bloc. 
Gramsci (1934) thus framed political power as a continuum of coercive and 
ideological methods of control. “The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in 
two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group 
dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps 
even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups…it subsequently becomes 
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must 
continue to ‘lead’ as well” (1934/1971, p. 57-58). Though sometimes necessary to the 
ruling bloc, coercive power is far less productive than ideological leadership and may 
in fact undermine its authority to lead.  
 
Ideologies are built, Gramsci argues, upon two “floors,” or levels of abstraction in the 
social formation. At the philosophical level, ideologies may be coherently elaborated. 
However, philosophically-elaborated and -unified ideologies are only effective when 
they engage with and ideally transform the more established and accepted ideologies 
at work in popular thought, against which they must contend. Gramsci is concerned 
with the power of popular thought as an historical force, and understands it as central 
to the production of political leadership. This “chaotic aggregate of disparate 
conceptions,” i.e., maxims, folkways, received truths, ‘homespun’ wisdom, etc., 
Gramsci calls “common sense” (1934/1971, p. 324). Common sense is thus both a 
resource for and a central terrain for ideological struggle. When not specifically 
“arbitrary, rationalistic, or ‘willed’,” ideologies are simply requisite, functioning to 
“‘organize’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (1934/1971, p. 377). In the U.S., 
common sense is mobilized powerfully through popular media, though Gramsci 
recognizes it at work in “everything which influences or is able to influence public 
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opinion, directly or indirectly…libraries, schools, associations and clubs of various 
kinds, even architecture and the layout and names of streets” (1934/1971, p. 15).  
 
From this complex rereading of Marx’s concept of ideology, Gramsci develops his 
concept of “hegemony.” Hegemony describes a process of ideological struggle 
resulting in a period of political stasis, rare in practice, in which, successfully 
articulating the subordinate social fraction to itself, the dominant bloc secures for 
itself—always temporarily and contingently—a moment of political settlement which 
allows it to frame itself as the natural and inevitable moral and intellectual leader in 
the social formation. In Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order 
(Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1979), Hall et al. offer a succinct but 
thorough description:  
 
When a ruling-class alliance [or bloc] has achieved an undisputed 
authority and sway over all the levels of its organization—when it 
masters the political struggle, protects and extends the need of capital, 
leads authoritatively in the civil and ideological spheres, and 
commands the restraining forces of the coercive apparatuses of the 
state in its defence—when it achieves all this on the basis of 
consent…we can speak of the establishment of a period of hegemony 
or hegemonic domination. Thus what the consensus really means is 
that a particular…[bloc] shapes the whole direction of social life in its 
image…it encloses the material, mental and social universe of the 
subordinated classes, for a time, within its horizon. It naturalizes itself, 
so that everything appears ‘naturally’ to favour its continued 
domination. But, because this domination has been secured…on the 
basis of a wide consensus…that domination not only seems universal 
(what everybody wants) and legitimate (not won by coercive force), but 
its basis in exploitation actually disappears from view. Consensus is not 
the opposite—it is the complementary face of domination. (p. 216) 
 
Hegemony may never be understood as a decisive, totalizing, or final victory by the 
dominant bloc, but is rather a temporary and precarious preponderance of influence 
in the balance of forces that make up a particular historical conjuncture. The 
dominant bloc must agree to particular concessions and compromises to win the 
consent of the subordinate bloc; this, though, necessarily alters the project of the 
dominant bloc. This contingent and temporary alignment of interests must be 
maintained continually, through both discursive and material means, as the dominant 
bloc works ceaselessly to negate or diminish the interests of other competing groups, 
while depicting their own goals as commensurate with the values and needs of the 
subordinated bloc. Hegemony must finally be understood, then, as the briefest stasis 
in a process of extended struggle, derived from the successful attempt by the ruling 
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bloc to set the intellectual and moral shape of a particular socio-historical context, 
allowing it to successfully define, redefine, or resolve the nature and meaning of 
particular conjunctures and problematics that may emerge.  
 
The 9-11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. produced a unique moment of hegemony, 
producing a conjuncture overwhelmingly defined by the problematic of national 
security. The security crisis is coterminous with a concerted and multi-headed “war 
on terror,” prompting legislation and other policies and practices which aimed to 
bolster national security at the cost of personal privacy. Thanks in part to the 
devastating nature of the attacks, the state was able to easily obtain the consent of a 
public only too relieved to trade privacy for security. Roughly a decade later, however, 
citizen-consumers face a fundamentally different conjuncture in which the 
problematic has shifted from a crisis of security to a crisis of privacy. The 
security/privacy binary appears to turn on its head, as it were. The articulation of 
particularly influential events and conditions such as the global economic collapse, the 
largest U.S. debt in history produced in part by two failed wars and the perpetual “war 
on terror” campaign, the deleterious effects of partisan political gridlock, and the 
demonstrable willingness of the state to violate constitutional rights of due process 
(e.g., the failings of Abu Graib, and Guantanamo Bay) and other civil rights such as 
privacy (e.g., the discovery of blanket domestic surveillance by the NSA), among 
others, have led to a rapidly diminishing public faith in the government. This 
demonstrable failure of moral and intellectual leadership has weakened the consent of 
the subordinate bloc to suffer what it now understands as illegitimate invasions of its 
privacy and other civil rights. However, while these and other factors help to 
foreground the emerging privacy problematic in the popular news and 
entertainments, it often remains characterized by the narratives and symbols that 
serve the dominant power interests. The ideological underpinnings of this 
commonsensical narrative must be carefully mapped if we are to insist on more 
nuanced accounts.    
 
2.3 Privacy in the News  
 
My project here is not to make an exhaustive study of the news, but to draw attention 
to the ideological dimension of the construction of news accounts with regard to the 
way in which they support the hegemony of the dominant bloc. While there is no 
single monolithic, narrative—a growing number of powerful interests produce 
counter-narratives which foreground the need for a strong right to personal 
informational privacy—I focus here on the dominance and ubiquity of a particular 
narrative in the news which, while ostensibly bemoaning privacy violation, actually 
works to naturalize privacy’s diminution. This narrative encourages the news media to 
describe the privacy problematic in simple, unreflexive, commonsensical terms which 
wittingly or unwittingly underwrite the politics of an American surveillance state.  
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To say the news is socially constructed to favor a dominant politics is not, however, to 
place it in knowing collusion or political alignment with dominant ideologies. Rather, 
by drawing on professional codes, tropes, metaphors, and ways of seeing (and not 
seeing) established in a cultural fund of ‘common sense’ on offer in public discourses, 
the news is structurally predisposed to reinforce dominant ways of seeing. What is 
produced and presented to the public as news derives from the media’s process of 
selectively defining what is newsworthy. When selecting what is newsworthy, 
journalists face an imperative to make events interesting, comprehensible, and 
meaningful to a relatively wide public. They do so, in part, by drawing on this shared 
fund or repertoire of metaphors, simple narrative structures, ‘truthy’ facts, commonly-
held beliefs and values, and other figurative language densely packed with meaning. 
Common sense, that body of ready-to-hand explanatory elements, represents, 
according to Gramsci, an accumulated, sedimented record of other more elaborated 
philosophies which were once more systematized and contextualized, but have 
become decontextualized and reified, ultimately transformed into simply ‘sense’, 
which by virtue of being reduced and decontextualized, allows for greater 
identification by varied audiences. However, by readily employing and accepting 
commonsensical characterizations, the media and public remain mired in discussions 
of privacy in which the terms of the debate are often informed by symbolic 
representations of the now-reified politics by the dominant bloc. Hall et al. describe 
the structural relation in this way:  
 
There is of course no simple consensus, even here, as to the nature, 
causes and extent of the crisis. But the over-all tendency is for the way 
the crisis has been ideologically constructed by the dominant 
ideologies to win consent in the media, and thus to constitute the 
substantive basis in ‘reality’ to which public opinion continually refers. 
In this way, by ‘consenting’ to the view of the crisis which has won 
credibility in the echelons of power, popular consciousness is also won 
to support…the measures of control and containment which this 
vision of social reality entails. (Hall et al., 1979, p. 220-221)  
 
For example, when looking to an authority on the significance of cloud-computing 
technology, the popular press will naturally select an author such as Google Chairman 
Eric Schmidt. As a spokesman for one of the wealthiest and most successful global 
multi-national Web service/cloud computing businesses, he represents a putative 
authority on the subject, and what Hall et al. term a “primary definer” (p. 62)—those 
cultural spokespersons drawn upon by the media to define the outer boundaries of 
sense.  A book such as Schmidt’s The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, 
Nations and Business (2013), co-authored with Director of Google Ideas, Jared 
Cohen, is useful for understanding the technologically determinist arguments made 
by certain commercial actors—that traditional notions of privacy and anonymity are 
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economically stifling, militarily dangerous, and culturally quaint, among others. Julian 
Assange described the book as a “startlingly clear and provocative blueprint for 
technocratic imperialism,” as essentially a manifesto defining “a new idiom for United 
States global power in the 21st century,” and a thinly veiled marketing statement for a 
global communications mega-corporation to define itself as “America’s geopolitical 
visionary” (para. 1). Not only the argument of the book itself, but in fact, the 
testimonials on the book jacket from politicians such as former U.K. prime minister 
Tony Blair, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former CIA Director 
Michael Hayden, immediately rhetorically align the authors’ politics with those state 
actors known for favoring a policy of total information awareness, which I discuss in 
chapter three.  
 
However, this process of reductive transformation, as more elaborate theories make 
their way into the public fund of common sense, is a largely unconscious process. By 
selecting and reproducing the ideological positions of the primary definers (those 
“‘accredited sources’” with access to the media), “the media stand in a position of 
structured subordination [emphasis added] to the primary definers” (Hall et al., 1979, 
p. 59). In this way, common sense indirectly underwrites the social construction of 
the news media, and offers powerful, if often unintended, support to the hegemony of 
the ruling bloc whose influence on the media, when not direct, persists structurally. 
To be sure—a dominant bloc does not merely supply the subordinate bloc with a 
particular ideology, nor does the subordinate bloc wholly adopt the dominant 
ideology. Instead ruling ideologies establish the limits of the sense and structure of 
meaning which bound the lived relations of the subordinate bloc. “Hence, in action as 
well as in thought, [members of the subordinate bloc] are constantly disciplined by 
them” (Hall et al., 1979, p. 154).   
 
2.4 Big Brother as Common Sense State 
 
With regard to the privacy crisis, an important way in which the news media 
underwrite the power of the dominant bloc is through overwhelmingly framing the 
privacy debate in vague but Orwellian terms, most often through employing the trope 
of “Big Brother” or referencing the author whose name has become an adjective 
(“Orwellian”) synonymous with the surveillance society. While it’s true that many 
understandings of the relation of culture, technology, and social control compete in 
the popular media, “Big Brother,” as the culturally recognizable symbol of the 
machinery of total surveillance from George Orwell’s dystopic novel Nineteen Eighty-
Four (1992), is by far the most ubiquitous narrative invoked in the popular media to 
frame discussions of the violation of informational privacy. “[T]he influence of 1984 
has been felt far beyond the merely literary. The metaphor of ‘Big Brother’, now 
expresses a profound cultural fear in areas quite remote from what Orwell originally 
had in mind” writes Lyon (1994, p. 11). For example, after revelations in June that 
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the government has engaged in broad, warrantless surveillance of phone and email 
metadata for hundreds of thousands of customers of telecommunications giants 
Google, Facebook, AT&T, Verizon, and others, sales of the novel spiked 5,000 
percent for online bookseller Amazon.com (Riley, 2013, para 4.). Moreover, in 
responding to the scandal, President Obama, too, framed the question in Orwellian 
terms: “In the abstract, you can complain about Big Brother and how this is a 
potential program run amok, but when you actually look at the details, then I think 
we've struck the right balance” (“Obama’s Remarks,” 2013).  
 
In fact, the number of articles and books which in some way reference Big Brother in 
framing privacy (particularly with regard to technological surveillance) is so large, 
ranging across a wide array of discourses in the popular media, that I can offer only a 
brief sketch of it here. Inaugural member of the field of surveillance studies, David 
Lyon observes: “When I tell people that I am studying surveillance, and in particular 
investigating the ways that our personal details are stored in computer databases, the 
most common reaction is to invoke Orwell; ‘This must be a study of ‘Big Brother’” 
(1994, p. 57). Fox News’ Sean Hannity moralizes, “Big Brother is monitoring your 
every move, whether it be online or on the telephone…This is America, and as law-
abiding citizens, you have a right to privacy” (qtd. in Gibney, 2013). “The way some 
people see it,” warns popular television personality Katie Couric, “Big Brother is 
watching and his name is Google.” “You are being watched,” writes privacy scholar 
Raymond Wacks, “The ubiquity of Big Brother no longer shocks” (2010, p. 1). “Of 
course, technology has been tracking what people do for years,” writes Thomas Goetz 
in a recent issue of Wired, with “top-down, Big Brother techniques” (2011, para. 16). 
And as Adam Bessie worries in Truthout, youth in this country, so smitten with social 
networking, don’t recognize the real threat of a Big Brother attack on their privacy, 
represented by the omnipresent surveillance like that in Orwell’s novel: “‘OMG, 
Winston, chill out’, one of my undergrads might languidly sigh, while at the same 
time deftly posting the big weekend plans on Facebook under her desk” (2010, para 
3).  
 
A search for “Big Brother” filtered for “privacy” on the Amazon.com site returns more 
than 100 books, in which some authors, such as John McGrath in Loving Big Brother: 
Surveillance Culture and Performance Space (2004), argue for the positive effects of 
privacy diminution: “[S]urveillance has proliferated not least because we desire it—we 
enjoy it, play with it, use it for comfort” (p. vii)1. Others like Mark Dice, in Big 
Brother: The Orwellian Nightmare Come True (2011), worry that surveillance 
                                               
1 The title of McGrath’s book actually references the television show Big Brother. 
However, the show, in which contestants agree to be confined to a house in which 
they are constantly surveilled by hidden cameras, obviously indexes Orwell’s novel in 
its title and premise. 
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technologies and practices threaten to “make our world just as horrific or even worse 
than the world George Orwell described” (p. 2). A search of NPR’s website returns 
512 results, with titles such as, “Self-Tracking: Becoming Your Own Big Brother,” 
“Inside Big Brother’s Watchful Eye,” and “Is Big Brother Listening?” A search of the 
New York Times returns over 11,000 results, with titles such as “Big Brother is Us,” 
“Court Asks if ‘Big Brother’ is Spelled GPS,” and “Is Big Brother Coming, or Is He 
Here?” A search of CNN produced over 5,500 results, with titles such as “Big Brother 
Awards Highlight Privacy Complaints”2 and “Will Big Brother Track You by Cell 
Phone?” Forbes registers 114 results, with titles such as “Dear Conspiricists, Big 
Brother Uses Big Data,” and “Big Brother 2.0: What If the NSA Adopts Facebook’s 
‘Hacker Way’?” A search of Wired magazine yields over 5,000 results, with titles such 
as, “Big Brother is Watching You Shop,” “Another Tool for Big Brother,” and “Big 
Brother is Watching Your Travel Habits.” A search of The Atlantic produces 702 
article results; The Economist, 50 results; Newsweek, 62 results; Mother Jones, 24 
results; Popular Science, 1,160 results; Time Magazine, 107 results; The Wall Street 
Journal, 550 results. Put simply, work on privacy in the popular media is shot through 
with the trope of Big Brother.  
 
Privacy violation and Big Brother are frequently linked visually, as well. For example, 
the recent image on the Guardian Web site which links to an article on NSA 
whistleblower Edward Snowden is a black and white photo of George Orwell sitting 
at his typewriter. Semiotically, this familiar image of Orwell is meant to link 
Snowden’s revelations of the NSA’s snooping to Orwell’s dystopic classic, lending it 
similar gravitas. By linking Snowden to Orwell directly, Snowden is represented by 
association as an heroic chronicler and harbinger of the looming surveillance society. 
One of the most creative visual invocations of Big Brother can be seen in the way the 
popular web comic Joy of Tech semiotically binds Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to 
Big Brother through intertextually referencing Apple’s now famous Orwellian 
Macintosh commercial from the 1984 Olympics, directed by Ridley Scott (Nitrozac 
& Snaggy, 2009). Apple’s original commercial depicts a futuristic scene of ideological 
indoctrination, as the massive face of Big Brother booms out from a telescreen: “We 
are one people, with one will, one resolve, one cause,” to an audience of grey-pallored 
drones who stare silently as one in their uniform grey jumpsuits. Suddenly a brightly 
dressed woman runs on screen to hurl a hammer into the telescreen. Its destruction 
awakens the audience from their ideological slumber as the commercial’s announcer 
intones: “On January 24th, Apple Computer will introduce Macintosh. And you’ll see 
                                               
2 In fact, one of awards offered for those who most egregiously violate privacy by the 
international privacy watchdog Privacy International (mentioned in the previous 
chapter) is the “Orwell,” a golden statue of a boot stamping on a human head—the 
very image the character of O’Brien uses to characterize the future of human 
civilization for Winston, in the end of the novel (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 280).  
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why 1984 won’t be like Nineteen Eighty-Four.” In the Joy of Tech comic, however, it is 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s face which looms large on the screen as, to similarly 
disaffected drones, he extols: “Greetings citizens of Facebookia. This is our land, a 
land of people and of privacy! That’s why we have new privacy guidelines! From now 
on, by default, all your information is available to everyone on the internet. To remain 
private, share everything with everyone!” The rhetorical figure (παραδοξοσ) so 
brilliantly used in Nineteen Eighty-Four , “WAR IS PEACE”; “IGNORANCE IS 
STRENGTH”; “FREEDOM IS SLAVERY,” is displayed across Zuckerberg’s face 
as: “PRIVACY IS SOCIABLENESS,” “SECRECY IS SHARING,” “PERSONAL 
IS PUBLIC.”  
 
It has become, then, “pretty clear what everyone mean[s] by the phrase ‘Big Brother’,” 
explains McGrath (2004), “they [mean] invasion of privacy,” particularly at the hands 
of a panoply of powerful new surveillance technologies and practices (p. vii). 
Moreover, Big Brother and the various other Orwellian tropes have become so 
ubiquitous in popular media treatments that some critics have taken to praising their 
absence. The sheer number of references to Big Brother in the popular media reify its 
authority as a framework for understanding privacy with regard to social control such 
that even critics who reject an Orwellian frame are required to acknowledge it or 
reject it outright. For example, in reviewing Landau’s Surveillance or Security? The 
Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (2011), Rothke is moved to praise 
Landau for not invoking Orwell: “Surveillance or Security? is one of the most 
pragmatic books on the topic in that the author never once uses the term Big Brother. 
Far too many books on privacy and surveillance are filled with hysteria and hyperbole 
and the threat of an Orwellian society.” In an editorial by Mashable CEO Pete 
Cashmore, Orwell’s novel is described as “incredibly prescient yet woefully incorrect,” 
and our present historical moment as both “reminiscent of Orwell’s vision and 
radically at odds with it” (Cashmore, 2012, para. 1). In his New York Times Magazine 
article “Little Brother is Watching,” Kirn rejects references to Orwell out of hand, 
calling Nineteen Eighty-Four “a quaint scenario, grossly simplistic and deeply 
melodramatic” (2010, para. 2). While describing Nineteen Eighty-Four as “grossly 
simplistic” and “deeply melodramatic” seems to me a grossly simplistic reading of a 
novel generally recognized as a classic work of dystopic literature, it raises an apt 
question: Just why do critics in the popular media cling so to the glower of a Big 
Brother who, having failed to manifest in our own present moment, has little critical 
purchase in contemporary privacy debates?  
 
The answer to this question is complex and multi-faceted. First, the novel’s standing 
as a literary classic results from a rhetorical pathos which brilliantly addresses the 
historical conjuncture from within which it emerges and to which it responds. Lane 
describes the overwhelming cultural appeal of Big Brother as “a creation so plausible 
and so frightening that he instantly took his place alongside other literary metaphors 
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for human ingenuity run amok” (2011, p. 141). Orwell’s novel speaks to an 
historically established anxious concern over the transfer of our dearest rights and 
freedoms to governments which, through powerful technologies of surveillance and 
control, strip citizens of fundamental human rights. Many see a direct causal 
connection between the emergence of the technologies and practices of pervasive 
social surveillance and the rise of totalitarianism—Orwell’s novel dramatizes brilliant 
support for this argument. Set in what would be for Orwell a dystopic future, 
Nineteen Eighty-Four imagines the struggle of everyman Winston Smith against a 
rigidly totalitarian form of English Socialism3 (Ingsoc), a regime under which citizens 
have lost or abandoned their rights to free expression, personal property, and 
especially privacy. Published at the conclusion of the Second World War, the novel 
held remarkable explanatory power for a public attempting to understand the rise of 
German Fascism and its ability, through propaganda and other means of control, to 
garner widespread support for its radical political program. Orwell addresses the 
importance of ideology in the political process, noting that as Ingsoc emerged, 
citizens offered little enough resistance to the loss of their social freedoms. “[T]he 
choice for mankind lay between freedom and happiness,” explains Winston, 
“and…for the great bulk of mankind, happiness was better” (1949/1992, p. 275). This 
important aspect, the consent of the general public to have allowed the emergence of 
such a repressive regime, is often missed by the news media as Orwell’s novel is fit to 
the procrustean bed of ‘common sense’, where Big Brother, simplified to represent 
not an articulation of ideological and material forces, but the monolithic state or 
corporations, takes on a singular anthropomorphic malevolence. For a public hungry 
to understand how something as horrific as the Holocaust could have happened, the 
vastly more complex novel offers a striking explication of an articulation of the means 
of social control by what were then newly emerging surveillance and computing 
technologies. Orwell’s densely woven narrative described the extensive coordination 
across the various levels of a social formation necessary to produce such an 
unremitting form of totalitarianism. A brief review of that articulation reveals the 
complexity of Orwell’s understanding of social determination.  
 
Ingsoc was organized as the articulation of structures of political organization across 
the social formation. These were represented by four ministries. The Ministry of 
Plenty (Miniplenty) represented the economic arm. While ostensibly it ensured the 
distribution of goods and services, it ran the state-sanctioned market in a state of 
balanced, planned inefficiency. This bolstered the belief among citizens that they 
were sacrificing for the war effort. It also encouraged an illicit free market, which the 
government not only ostensibly tolerated, but employed to surveil those who 
patronized it.  
                                               
3 According to the book by Immanuel Goldstein, Ingsoc is technically organized as a 
form of oligarchic collectivism (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 214).  
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The Ministry of Love (Minilove) represented the juridico-political arm. It fulfilled 
the first of the two primary goals of the State, the ability to surveil and predict the 
thoughts of every citizen. The State had abolished all laws but one, “the essential 
crime that contained all others in itself. Thoughtcrime they called it” (Orwell, 
1949/1992, p. 21) and it consisted simply in having thoughts against the party. While 
the machineries of surveillance included standard police patrols, far more terrifying 
were the ubiquitous telescreens which both surveilled citizens and broadcast 
propaganda unceasingly. Citizens were terrorized by the constant monitoring which 
might reveal one’s thoughtcrime, interpellated by the watchful symbolic gaze of Big 
Brother not only from the telescreens but from the media which surrounded them, 
“on coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners, on posters, and on the 
wrapping of a cigarette packet—everywhere. Always the eyes watching you and the 
voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in 
the bath or in bed—no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic 
centimetres inside your skull” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 29).  
 
The Ministry of Peace (Minipax) represented the military arm. Minipax fulfilled the 
second of the two primary goals of the State, to ensure perpetual global war between 
itself and the states of Eastasia, and Eurasia. Perpetual war was supported by a 
military industrial complex which had purposefully abandoned technological advance 
in favor of a tri-state balance of military strength. Perpetual war thus allowed the 
State to ideologically unite the people as one against an imaginary enemy traitor, in 
the form of racialized other Immanuel Goldstein, “the commander of a vast shadowy 
army, an underground network of conspirators dedicated to the overthrow of the 
state” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 15).  
 
Perhaps the most important was the Ministry of Truth (Minitrue), which represented 
the state-controlled media arm. It was charged with encouraging political orthodoxy 
through the ideological interpellation of citizens by all means of discourse, 
communication, and signification. Minitrue had many functions, including producing 
political propaganda, and editing or “rectifying” historical documents by changing 
facts, figures, and the truth of historical events. “All history was a palimpsest, scraped 
clean and reinscribed exactly as often as necessary” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 42). The 
primary goal of Minitrue was its project to revise the English language, creating an 
ideologically pure version called “Newspeak,” which would eliminate political 
unorthodoxy through the removal of words and concepts that were revolutionary, 
eventually obviating the need for machineries of surveillance themselves. All media, 
all acts of communication and signification were bound to the war effort, supported 
by the Ministry of Truth in the creation of everything from patriotic youth 
organizations, to posters depicting threatening racially-stereotyped enemy soldiers, to 
endless effigies, lectures, meetings, military parades and processions, novels, rumors, 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
slogans, songs, speeches, telescreen programs and films, and waxwork displays. The 
“Two-minutes Hate,” for example, provided an outlet for direct and focused 
aggression which had taken the place of social and cultural connections which might 
organize individuals in collectives no longer possible. They had replaced privacy, love, 
friendship with mechanistic and superficial emotions such as fear, hatred and pain 
(Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 32). The propaganda machine represented a cultural force in 
the breakdown of institutions which might offer citizens anything but the state. 
Children were alienated from their parents through early enlistment in the “Spies” 
where they learned the techniques of spying on adults. Young adults were also 
constrained by membership in similarly focused state-sponsored organizations as the 
“Youth League” and the “Junior Anti-sex League.” While prostitution was tacitly 
encouraged by the party as “an outlet for instincts which could not be altogether 
suppressed” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 68), romantic sex and the creation of families for 
other than procreation had been discouraged. This breakdown of the family, and 
romantic relations functioned to isolate individuals from each other and to articulate 
them solely and constantly to the State. This party view of sex was “rubbed into every 
Party member from childhood onwards” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 69).  Elimination of 
affect through removal of familial bonds was in part replaced by the state-sponsored 
opiate “Victory Gin.” 
 
Orwell’s detailed, horrific description of a model of total social control that perfectly 
integrates the economic, juridico-political, military, and especially ideological levels, 
may explain why it is Orwell’s Big Brother who has emerged as our ubiquitous 
cultural shorthand for privacy violation, and not the “Well-Doer” from the less well-
known but important dystopian precursor to Nineteen Eighty-Four, Zamiatin’s We 
(1924). Like Orwell’s novel, We understands political domination as the integration 
of economic, cultural, political, and technological forces, and in fact, the plot and 
setting of We are strikingly similar to those of Nineteen Eighty-Four: In the novel’s 
“United State,” citizens abandon personal and familial identities for state-issued 
numbers; they consume propagandist music and art; they relinquish nearly all private 
property and privacy; and they find themselves surveilled and hailed by a singular 
ideological figurehead. We describes very similar discursive and symbolic practices to 
Nineteen Eighty-Four for inscribing political orthodoxy, including similar techniques 
of surveillance and social control. “Normally,” exclaims Zamiatin’s narrator placidly, 
“we lie surrounded by transparent walls which seem to be knitted of sparkling air; we 
live beneath the eyes of everyone, always bathed in light. We have nothing to conceal 
from one another; besides, this mode of living makes the difficult and exalted task of 
the Guardians much easier” (Zamiatin, 1924/1983, p. 18). However, whereas We 
emphasizes a warped love story doomed by the dystopia which contextualizes it, 
Nineteen Eighty-Four represents a political meditation in which the love story 
provides only the impetus for the protagonist to begin his exploration. Likewise, 
whereas the Well-Doer of We offered an analog for Italian fascist Mussolini, the 
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figure of Big Brother offered an easily identifiable analog for the demagogues such as 
Stalin and Hitler whose atrocities were historically unparalleled. In short, Orwell’s 
novel could be described as a work of literary political philosophy that tackles the 
difficult question of social determination—of how such a dystopia might come into 
being and be organized. To theorize such an architecture of control he invokes 
Bentham’s model of social control, the Panopticon, of which I have more to say 
below. Orwell’s novel thus helped describe for the public at the middle of the 
twentieth century the brave new world wherein vast computer databanks were not 
merely a dystopic prognostication, but the harbinger of an emerging reality. Published 
a quarter century before Orwell’s novel, Zamiatin’s descriptions of the technological 
means of total surveillance and total social control must have read like fanciful 
predictions. If Zamiatin’s novel seemed prescient in anticipating technological and 
cultural changes, Orwell’s novel reflected the terrifying probability of changes 
introduced by the co-terminous introduction of the first programmable computer.4  
 
The novel has continued relevance for us in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, as well, anticipating technological and cultural changes in our own time that 
have made possible many of the troubling synergies Orwell could only then imagine. 
Lane notes that with the rise of digital networked computing in the late twentieth 
century, Big Brother and the concept of the Orwellian state becomes “a veritable 
mantra” for civil libertarians and those interested in challenging the emerging 
practices of databanking and dataveillance (Lane, 2011, p. 220). For contemporary 
critics, at least three techno-cultural developments in the Orwellian social formation 
are held up as disturbingly predictive of changes we are witnessing in our own time. 
First, the state of perpetual war that was used to justify the violation of basic human 
rights in Orwell’s dystopia are offered in similar support for the denial of basic civil 
rights during our own extended conflicts, e.g., the “cold war,” the “war on drugs,” and 
the “war on terror.” Second, the development of the telescreen is frequently compared 
to the development of computers and especially ICTs, which are already used to track 
our location, and to mine and record what we often think of as personal data. Third, 
the Orwellian concept of “thoughtcrime” could only emerge in tandem with the use 
of predictive algorithms, such as those now employed by both the government and 
consumer entities. Many critics rightly discern the way in which the first line of force 
legitimizes and strengthens the second and third.  
 
While the literary quality and technological prescience of the novel are acknowledged, 
there are fundamental reasons to challenge its value as a useful model of social control 
in understanding the contemporary privacy crisis. To imagine a direct analogy 
between Orwell’s model of social determination and our own is problematic in several 
                                               
4 Nineteen Eighty-Four was published in 1949, two years after the initial military 
service date of the Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer (ENIAC). 
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fundamental ways. First, Orwell’s novel represents a fictional account of a society 
ordered according to the principles of a social design proposed by English 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham, termed the “panopticon.” The panopticon was 
introduced by Bentham in 1791 as an architectural design for prisons, hospitals, and 
schools. It was designed as a circular building with inward-facing cells ringing the 
circumference, illuminated so as to be seen by a central watchtower. From within the 
central watchtower, shielded from the sight of those on the periphery, overseers 
surveil the inhabitants, each separated into his or her individual cell. This total, 
continual, and visible but unverifiable surveillance of individual inmates by an 
unknown, seeing but unseen principal was designed to eliminate the myriad negative 
effects produced by traditional dungeons, which locked the masses away together in 
dark spaces. It produces instead a machinery of light and vision in which omnipresent 
surveillance inculcates in the inmate the terror of an omnipotent overseer who might 
intervene punitively at any moment. The separation of individual from individual was 
designed to eliminate contagion in patients, collusion in prisoners, chatter and 
cheating in students, and productivity-limiting distraction in workers (Bentham, 
1791/2011, p. 29).  
 
Whether experimenting with punishments for prisoners, new efficiencies for workers, 
or new pedagogies for students, Bentham’s panopticon thus offered the overseer a 
laboratory for the study, creation, alteration, and elimination of human behavior. Nor 
were the overseers themselves immune to the imperious gaze of this “machinery of 
furtive power….[this] concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes,” as 
their conduct and worth might too be read at any time in the condition and progress 
of their charges (Foucault, 1975/1995, pp. 202-204). The panopticon thus serves as a 
laboratory for power, observes Foucault, a “cruel, ingenious cage…a mechanism of 
power reduced to its ideal form” (1975/1995, p. 205). The efficacy of that power lay 
in its ability to use architectural structures and geometrical principles to induce, 
through an omnipresent psychological terror, self-control in its subjects: “[I]ts 
strength is that it never intervenes, [power] is exercised spontaneously and without 
noise…Because without any physical instrument other than architecture and 
geometry, it acts directly on individuals; it gives ‘power of mind over mind’” 
(1975/1995, p. 206). 
 
The social world described in the novel evinces each of the central mechanisms of the 
panopticon: constant but unverifiable surveillance, the ideological interpellation of citizens 
by powerfully repressive political orthodoxies, the isolation of the individual and 
erosion of familial and other traditional communal forms: “With the development of 
television, and the technical advance which made it possible to receive and transmit 
simultaneously on the same instrument, private life came to an end. Every 
citizen…could be kept for twenty-four hours a day under the eyes of the police and in the 
sound of official propaganda, with all other channels of communication closed. [emphasis 
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added] The possibility of enforcing not only complete obedience to the will of the 
State, but complete uniformity of opinion on all subjects, now existed for the first 
time” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 169-170). As many critics have noted, government 
surveillance in the U.S. is no direct analog for Orwell’s Ingsoc. Certainly, limited 
panoptic practices are at work in certain banks, retail stores, and other 
situations/locations in which the conspicuousness of closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
surveillance are used to deter as much as discover criminal behavior. In any case, while 
the U.K. has adopted CCTV surveillance to drive law enforcement, with estimates 
ranging from 1.85 to 4.1 million cameras deployed publicly, the system has failed to 
produce radical reductions in crime. Moreover, even with the ostensible adoption of a 
large-scale panoptic regime of surveillance, the U.K. today little resembles Orwell’s 
“Ingsoc,” in which a terrified citizenry was ceaselessly interpellated by the ubiquitous 
presence of Big Brother: “On coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners, 
on posters, and on the wrapping of a cigarette pack—everywhere.  Always the eyes 
watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, 
indoors or out of doors, in the bath or the bed—no escape.  Nothing was your own 
except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 26).  
 
In reviewing Rule’s Privacy in Peril (2007) and Solove’s The Future of Reputation: 
Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (2007), Vaidhyanathan praises both scholars 
for “avoid[ing] describing mass surveillance as a ‘Panopticon’. That too is refreshing, 
as that standard model and theory of surveillance has exhausted its utility” (2008, p. 
7). While forced to acknowledge his field’s unsuccessful attempt to move beyond the 
panoptic model entirely, Lyon posits its usefulness as complementary at best. The 
model is fundamentally flawed5, he argues, and may provide only “a diversion, a 
distraction from much more important issues that we miss at our peril through an 
obsessive fixation with the prison diagram” (Lyon, 2006, p. 9). The prison diagram 
offers a model which understands only coercion, and cannot account for willing 
participation, active agency and desire of individual subjects, complicit (wittingly or 
unwittingly) in their own disenfranchisement. Here the concept of hegemony can 
help us usefully complicate such reductive models. Ultimately, then, the panoptic 
model offers a too-simplistic, too-reductive understanding of both agency, ideological 
interpellation, and social determination. This was a primary reason the panoptic 
model met early and sustained resistance in the field of surveillance studies. 
Moreover, it was Foucault himself, in Discipline and Punish (1995), who argued that 
modern social control was in already in transition, across the social formation, from 
panoptic and other “disciplinary” regimes of surveillance and control to a new and 
                                               
5 See Lyon’s introduction to Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond 
(2006) for a brief overview of the emergence of critical resistance to the panoptic 
model in the field of surveillance studies. 
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radically decentered forms coterminous with the rise of emerging information 
technologies. 
 
Another problem represented by thinking the privacy crisis through the panoptic lens 
is that in using an Orwellian frame to describe contemporary technocultural 
arrangements we may find ourselves aligned with mechanistic models of social 
control. Mechanistic models elevate technology as the primary or sole determinant 
social force, placing technology at the center of social change. This implies that to 
understand technology, we need to begin with the technological object itself, which 
either will have inevitable, linear, and unvarying effects to which we have no real 
ability to respond (a relation of simple causality), or a varying though finite range of 
possible effects to which we may only react after the fact (a relation of symptomatic 
causality). Neither approach offers the possibility of intervention, especially on or 
before the emergence of the technologies themselves. Non-mechanistic models, on 
the other hand, foreground the context surrounding the object, and reject the notion 
of technology as either simple agent or effect. Slack (1984) delineates two primary 
non-mechanistic models, both of which recognize the co-constitutive nature of 
technology and culture: “expressive causality” and “articulation and assemblage.”  
However, while expressive causality recognizes the effects of the whole of a structure 
on the elements which constitute it, it posits the latter phenomena as the expression 
of the intrinsic essence of the former. In this framework, society “evolves” according 
to an essential and controlling single logic, with the cultural and social manifestations 
reflective of that essence. This allows journalists to draw overly simplistic conclusions 
about the relation between ideology, and cultural, technological, political, and 
economic forces, and thus to imagine and report reduced possibilities for political 
resistance. For Rule (2007), for example, the erosion of privacy is the simple 
expression of the nature of such technological systems: “[T]he capacities of 
computing systems to absorb, analyze, transmit and use personal data are bound 
gradually to find their ultimate expression, until no personal data is safe from 
incorporation” and the only defense against this technological juggernaut, according 
to Rule, is a system of laws and policies which might constrain it, “laws and policies 
that ‘just say no’ to endless extensions of institutional surveillance” (p. xv). But this 
type of thinking assumes too linear a model. Instead, by understanding culture and 
technology in our present historical conjuncture as related through processes of 
articulation—and especially disarticulation and rearticulation—we are able to address 
the question of how the relation of culture and technology might be otherwise.  
 
Ultimately, in framing privacy violation as the story of resistance to the various 
apparatuses of a Big Brother (whether corporation or state), one is decidedly not 
telling the story of agency as a property of systems. One is telling the story of heroic 
individuals, and not of negotiation and prolonged hegemonic struggle in which 
individuals are persuaded to consent to trade personal privacy for convenience and 
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security. The Panoptic/Orwellian model of social control, and the commonsensical 
allusion to Big Brother which has come to be a shorthand for it, encourages only a 
linear determinist vision of power as coercion, rather than a vision of power as the 
property of articulations which come together in the seductive dreams of citizen-
consumers. “The era when factories and troops were the decisive order-sustaining 
institution is (at least in our part of the world) over,” writes Bauman (1998), “but so 
is, as well, panoptical power as the main vehicle of social integration, and normative 
regulation as the major strategy of order-maintenance. The great majority of people—
men as well as women—are today integrated through seduction rather than policing, 
advertising rather than indoctrinating, need-creation rather than normative 
regulation” (p. 4). Put more simply, the surveillance society which emerges will not 
be, as is usually predicted, an Orwellian totalitarianism, but more Huxleyan, argues 
Schell (2010), “more like Brave New World, where technology controls us because it is 
so pleasurable.”  
 
The panoptic frame also supports the dominant bloc in offering a convenient straw 
man. The claims of Orwellian domination can be waved away persuasively by state 
and corporate actors—after all, most Americans do not fear being disappeared by a 
faceless Big Brother. Commonsensical analogies which attempt to understand our 
contemporary privacy crisis through the Orwellian lens are thus both understandable 
as a strategic response, and problematic in the extreme. While Orwell’s description 
fails in its inability to offer a theory of ideology that accounts for agency and 
resistance, this is precisely the rhetorical power of the novel for critics—the widely 
acknowledged rhetorical power of Orwell’s horrific tale which offers critics a 
trope/shorthand, already dense with cultural meaning, for explaining the dangers of 
unchecked surveillance. Orwell’s dystopic society is so tightly integrated, so perfectly 
engineered, its technologies of surveillance and ideological domination so pervasive, 
that there exists no possibility for individual agency or resistance. From the first 
moments of the novel, Winston himself admits as much. “You might dodge 
successfully for a while, even for years, but sooner or later they were bound to get you” 
(Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 21). As readers of the novel we witness the utter destruction 
of his human identity, and are interpellated to experience the powerlessness of a 
subjection under panoptic surveillance.  
 
Unfortunately, the real power in our contemporary surveillance regime comes not 
from a dominant coercive, visible but unverifiable panoptic surveillance, but 
surreptitious surveillance which tirelessly and secretly measures the digital footprint of 
a majority of citizens. This action-adventure narrative in which individuals are 
compared to Orwell’s everyman protagonist serves the government in transforming a 
complex articulation of forces and architectures into a monolithic “Big Brother” who 
cannot easily be practically ‘grasped’ for political action, but who can conveniently be 
discursively waved away, and in fact, often repackaged as a form of individual agency. 
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Big Brother, through its invocation of the panoptic model, thus represents a 
distraction, agrees Boyne (2000), which severely mitigates critics ability to think with 
articulation about the troubling, emerging surveillance regimes: “The idea of a 
disciplinary, Panoptical society came to constitute the default background of much 
social and cultural analysis through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Analyses of the 
historical development and current functioning of private organizations, whose 
reception was reinforced by a cultural imaginary feeding off conspiracy theoretic 
journalism and a wave of paranoia entertainments emerging from the film industry, 
came to focus on the operation and significance of surveillance and control 
mechanisms, while on the other hand, discussions of social policy and the welfare 
state have, for the most part, taken the necessity of surveillance and information so 
much for granted that it is hardly even discussed” (p. 293). “The tendency,” agrees 
Frau-Meigs, “to see privacy as protection from intrusive government, with much less 
emphasis on intrusive commercial third parties, goes together with the ingrained 
belief that the individual, construed as a code user, is empowered to resist in the face 
of enormous superstructures like corporations and institutions…The shift from 
secrecy towards personal control and autonomy is presented as a means of asserting 
one’s identity and individualism” (2010, p. 94). The dominant bloc has a vested 
interest in encouraging the narrative of the rational individual everyman, for two 
reasons: It opposes the real complexity of the social structures which constitute 
dataveillance practices of the state; it helps sell products by interpellating users as 
active agents, empowered by the technologies on offer to them by commercial 
vendors. 
 
The ubiquity of Big Brother in the popular media thus represents a perfect example of 
how an elaborate or nuanced account, theory, or philosophy—i.e., the fully developed 
work of literary political philosophy, flawed though it may be, represented by 
Nineteen Eighty-Four—enters, in reduced form our cultural fund of common sense as 
an explanatory trope. Orwell’s brilliantly complex rendering of interlocking political 
forces, though problematic in its reliance on the panoptic model, is simply reduced 
metonymically to “Big Brother,” as it moves into common sense, mobilizing a 
technologically determinist, economistic, or classically Marxist, narrative of individual 
agency, and centralized social control, in which a lone everyman somehow becomes 
conscious of the illusory ideological domination of the all-powerful state and resists it 
individually. As Gramsci’s work suggests, political control in advanced western 
societies is most effective when it relies on building consensus. The Orwellian fable, 
then, as a fable in which all political agency is entirely circumscribed within the state, 
and of course is foreclosed a priori, tends to express an ideological position in which 
political action is at best Sisyphean. After all, “You can’t fight city hall,” common 
sense reassures us. 
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2.5 Privacy in Film 
 
Above, I describe a general process regarding the news media’s role in drawing from 
and depositing to a general fund of common sense. That cultural fund is constituted 
as well in and across the various discourses and genres of the popular media. Filmic 
discourse contributes to it in a somewhat different but equally important way. 
Technologically-themed fiction films often function by engendering what, in 
Becoming Biosubjects (Gerlach, Hamilton, Sullivan, & Walton, 2011) Gerlach et al. 
term a “social science fiction” (p. 4). These discursive frames from fiction and popular 
culture come to oppose current scientific and social realities of technology by offering 
us “frames and narratives within which we locate unfamiliar, underdeveloped, or as 
yet unknown6…technologies. The future possibilities of these technologies are folded 
seamlessly into their present description. In this way, the technology is mystified and 
ultimately reified, making it less amenable to critical analysis” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p. 
4). Especially in popular entertainments (e.g. blockbusters, star-vehicles, award-
winning films), this may significantly strengthen the power of the dominant 
ideologies which underwrite commonsensical, received views of technology, helping 
define for the general public the past, current, and potential future role of technology 
in society, and in the process mitigate possibilities for the re-articulation of particular 
conjunctures. “For scientists, social science fictions empower and protect their claims, 
their expertise, and their social function…for the public, social science fictions 
translate otherwise inaccessible knowledge into a set of social ramifications that can 
be recognized and negotiated” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p. 21). The practice of 
articulation represents the opposite impulse: “It aims to give people an understanding 
of the contingency of the present. If the present context did not have to be this way, if 
it was not guaranteed in advance, then it could have been otherwise, and it can be 
something different in the future” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 57). The enactment of 
reification with social science fictions obviates and/or obscures such possibilities, 
arguing that “The choice is not, then, whether we should have or use this technology, 
but rather, how to deal with its effects, as the social science fictional framing has 
rendered it already present” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p. 4). With regard to surveillance 
and privacy, argue Gerlach, et al., social science fictions exist in complementary 
relation to the political and legal work of implementing surveillance technologies and 
changing laws surrounding personal privacy, helping “ease the entry of this new 
surveillance technology into society” (Gerlach et al., 2011, p. 29). If we are able to 
think technology, culture, politics, and the economy together, we are empowered to 
see more clearly the relation between ideological and material practices. 
 
                                               
6 Their exact phrase is “unknown genetic technologies” (p. 4). I have omitted the 
word “genetic,” which is indicative only of their particular technological focus, and 
doesn’t alter the truth of their observation about technological narratives in general.   
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As an example of this fictional framing work, I want to examine a pair of films which, 
read in tandem, demonstrate the mobilization of the social science fiction I describe 
above, i.e., the lone everyman fights the monolithic state or corporation that invades 
his privacy and abrogates his rights through surveillance: Francis Ford Coppola’s The 
Conversation (1974) and Tony Scott’s Enemy of the State (1998). The Conversation, 
stars Gene Hackman as Harry Caul, a surveillance expert who stumbles onto a 
conspiracy to murder a corporate executive known as “The Director” (Robert Duvall). 
An acknowledged expert in his field Caul has devolved into an anti-social paranoiac 
because of professional guilt. His surname, ‘Caul’, denoting the protective membrane 
surrounding a fetus and symbolized by a translucent rain slicker he wears everywhere, 
represents his need to protect his privacy through insulation and isolation. While 
performing a surveillance operation for The Director (his ostensible client) he learns 
of a possible murder plot against his surveillance targets which forces him to struggle 
with his complicity in facilitating similar past murders. Although he initially 
withholds the surveillance tapes from The Director, they are eventually stolen by the 
director’s assistant. However, Caul ultimately learns that his work was used 
purposefully to bait The Director and ultimately facilitate his murder by the 
surveillance targets he thought he was protecting. At the end of the film, Caul 
receives a threatening call from the murderers, who warn: “We know that you know, 
Mr. Caul. For your own sake, don’t get involved any further. We’ll be listening to 
you.” The erasure of any and all safe space for Caul is foreshadowed earlier in the film 
when he guiltily admits that for his surveillance targets, “There’s no protection. I 
follow them wherever they go. And I can hear them.” Caul proceeds to tear up his 
apartment searching for surveillance devices. Ultimately unable to find one, he resigns 
himself to a chair amidst the ruin of his apartment and does the only thing left to 
him—play his saxophone, the only ‘noise’ left to mask his perpetually surveilled 
signal. It is the iconic image of a lost man—a surveillance expert who is no longer 
protected by his technical skills from a world making radical advances in surveillance 
with which he cannot keep pace.  
 
Nominated for three Academy Awards, and the winner of the 1974 Cannes Film 
Festival’s Palme d’Or, The Conversation represented a timely comment on the 
Watergate scandal, just two years prior, in which the Nixon administration was found 
to have broken into the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate complex 
in order to photograph documents and install audio surveillance devices. The film’s 
success is arguably due, at least in part, to its ability to make public sense of events 
that led inexorably to the first presidential resignation in history. Drawing on the 
contextual irony of the contribution of Nixon’s own surreptitious audio recordings to 
that resignation, it depicted surveillance in ultimately simple terms, as an unwieldy 
tool opening society to egregious abuses of power.  
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Nearly a quarter century later, Enemy of the State can be read as an response to the 
predictions made in The Conversation about the impending surveillance society. The 
film tells the story of everyman Robert “Bobby” Clayton Dean (Will Smith), a 
prominent Washington D.C. labor lawyer. When Dean inadvertently intercepts a zip 
disk containing footage of the secret assassination of U.S. Congressman Phillip 
Hammersley (Jason Robards), he finds himself the target of a rogue operation run by 
NSA Director-hopeful Thomas Reynolds (Jon Voight) who is determined to recover 
the evidence. It is in fact Reynolds himself who has sanctioned the assassination of 
Hammersley when he refuses to help pass the pending Telecommunications Security 
and Privacy Act. Terror mounts as Reynolds secretly employs the powerful means of 
the National Security Agency (NSA), apparently at his ready command to surveil, 
torture, and murder, in order to obtain the incriminating disk. While Dean’s former 
lover is murdered by NSA operatives, the director’s most powerful weapon is shown 
to be the data-matching algorithms which not only allow him to access Dean’s 
various digital records, but to alter them. “Let’s get into his life,” rages Reynolds. “I 
want to know about his wife; I want to know about his parents; I want to know about 
his gambling problem; his urine samples; his porno rentals; I want to use every means 
possible to get what we need.” Dean is soon on the run as a murder suspect, without 
money or other resources. There he encounters former NSA operative Edward Lyle 
(Gene Hackman), who very reluctantly agrees to help him fight the system by turning 
the NSA’s surveillance tactics against itself.   
 
Although Enemy of the State is not a direct sequel to The Conversation, it functions in 
a similar capacity, intertextually invoking a continuity between what are in fact two 
separate Hackman characters in two separate films.7 This intertextuality can be seen 
in the similar way Scott references Coppola’s characters. Like Caul from 
Conversation, Lyle from Enemy is a paranoid, anti-social surveillance expert paying an 
emotional debt of guilt; both Caul and Lyle work in nearly identical hidden 
warehouse labs; both films employ nearly identical scenes, including the signature 
scene from The Conversation, in which multiple agents work together to surveil a 
couple in a public plaza; when the NSA pulls Lyle’s digital dossier, the photo shown 
is of Hackman’s Caul from Conversation. In this way, both films work intertextually 
                                               
7 In a chapter from Race Men (1998), Hazel Carby outlines the way in which the 
many roles of actor Danny Glover, understood in aggregate, constitute the signifying 
practices of a racist politics in mainstream Hollywood film. “In [Glover’s] person 
Hollywood, in addition to producing the black male as an outcast who threatens to 
undermine the very foundations of America, adopts the black man as a sympathetic 
cypher, a means for white men to find meaning within themselves and discover the 
true meaning of their existence” (p. 190). Although not the place for it here, a similar 
study might be made of the ideological functions performed by the equally iconic 
Hackman across his various film roles. 
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to produce a powerful and diachronic map that makes claims about the changing 
technical infrastructure effecting new possibilities for surveillance, and the 
contemporary meaning of privacy.  
 
What is most fascinating about Enemy of the State is that when read as a single film, 
Lyle assumes the role of guide to Dean. When the films are read together, however, it 
becomes apparent that, when Hackman’s characters are read in contiguity, they 
describe the evoulution of an orientation to technology—one which supports the 
fundamental contemporary changes and challenges to privacy. We watch as 
Caul/Lyle (linked semiotically through common characterization of Gene Hackman) 
learns to accept, re-inhabit, and master an emerging surveillance state. Caul’s journey 
leads him, in the first film, to attempt and fail at isolation/insulation as a strategy for 
privacy protection. In the second film, forced by Dean to use his surveillance skills to 
take on the NSA, he is forced to realize that the ‘surveillance society’ is a juggernaut 
that cannot be the stopped, and that the only real protection one has is to master the 
techniques and work within the system. 
 
Unlike Coppola’s film, Enemy of the State is not a visually subtle film. Made a quarter 
century later, it assaults the audience with footage of the myriad surveillance 
technologies on offer today8 (e.g., networked satellites, GPS tracking devices, digital 
dossiers, etc.) through Scott’s trademark frenetic camera style. In the opening credits 
alone, we are bombarded with a series of jump-cuts to images of surveillance by 
short-circuit television, keyhole satellites, foot, car and helicopter pursuit, all of which 
depict the state’s electronically enhanced pursuit and apprehension of citizens. 
Surveillance technology, it tells us in these images of ‘criminals’ pursued and 
decisively apprehended, is an unstoppable force which cannot be evaded. Drawing on 
a particular commonsensical received understanding of technology, the film thus 
dramatizes the argument that the surveillance society has arrived. The dramatic foot 
and car chases, gun-play, and explosions in the film proper only underscore what each 
character affirms for us in dialogue. For example, just before his assassination, 
Hammersley warns Reynolds: “[The Telecommunications Security and Privacy Act] 
is not the first step to the surveillance society; it is the surveillance society!” To which 
Reynolds replies “Liberal hysteria!...This is the richest, most powerful nation on 
earth, and therefore the most hated. And you and I know what the average citizen 
does not: that we are at war twenty-four hours of every day. Do I have to itemize the 
number of American lives we’ve saved in the past twelve months alone with judicious 
use of surveillance intelligence?” The ‘liberal’ position is offered here only as a straw 
man—easily dismissed by Reynolds’ assassination of Hammersley which follows only 
moments later and, thanks to inadvertent surveillance, is captured on tape. Later in 
                                               
8 Though the movie was made a decade and a half ago, many of the surveillance 
techniques it depicts are still of current concern today.  
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the film, Reynolds explains: “Privacy’s been dead for 30 years because we can’t risk it.” 
Mimicking Orwell’s Winston Smith,9 though with opposite intent, he concludes: 
“The only privacy that’s left is the inside of your head and maybe that’s enough.” If 
the viewer doubts the villain’s word that the surveillance society is upon us, it is 
nevertheless affirmed by other characters in the film we are interpellated to trust. It is 
Lyle, for example, who affirms “[the government’s] been in bed with the entire 
telecommunications industry since the 40s. The old days we had to tap a wire to your 
phone line. Now a call is bouncing off a satellite, they just snatch ‘em right out of the 
air.” And in another scene, Dean’s wife affirms for the viewer: “I told you Bobby! I 
told you they had the capability!”  
 
As the film ends the televised words of a U.S. senator revise Juvenal’s words to offer 
up what might be understood as a primary argument of the film: “We knew that we 
had to monitor our enemies. We also have come to realize that we need to monitor 
the people who are monitoring them.” The senator’s words suggest an infinite 
regression of continually more powerful technological means for surveillance. At this 
point, the film effects the full thrust of its argument to accept the presence of the 
surveillance state as necessary political protection: Lyle suddenly hijacks Dean’s TV 
with a camera feed of Dean sitting on his own couch. Dean is troubled for the briefest 
moment as he realizes he’s still being surveilled. The image of him is then 
immediately replaced by a fond message from Lyle scrawled on the sand of a tropical 
beach he’s escaped to: “Wish you were here.” Dean smiles then because he knows that 
Lyle is ‘watching out’ for him—he is safe thanks to the (continuing, constant and 
vigilant) heroic actions of a technical superman protecting him through the very 
surveillance technologies that had so vexed him before. Dean and Caul, the 
alternating-complementary protagonists with whom the viewer is called to identify 
through the movie’s powerful rhetoric, have learned to work the system they cannot 
escape. The ideological effect is chilling, in some sense mirroring the final words of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four: “But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was 
finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother” (Orwell, 
1949/1992, p. 245). The ultimate question becomes not whether surveillance is 
necessary—that question has been answered for us in the strongest rhetorical 
pathos—but how to regulate and live within it.  
 
2.5 Privacy in Video Games 
 
Lastly, I want to turn to an example of the way this action-adventure narrative of 
privacy and surveillance has been successfully deployed in contemporary digital- or 
                                               
9 “Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in the 
bed—no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull 
[emphasis added]” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 26).  
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electronic video games. Since the release of the first commercial video game console 
in 1966, video games have risen to become a major component of the entertainment 
industry, with Forbes estimating that the global video game industry may reach $82 
billion this year (Gaudiosi, 2012). Not only are they a bulwark of the entertainment 
economy, they are culturally pervasive, engendering devoted fan communities, film 
adaptions, national conventions, and other forms of cultural engagement. According 
to the Entertainment Software Association (ESA), 58% of Americans play video 
games. The average gamer, who has been playing for well over a decade, is thirty years 
old (“Industry facts”). Demonstrably, filmic narrative has become a well-established 
criterion of value for players, designers, and critics of top-selling video games.10 If the 
claim holds regarding a film’s ability to ideologically interpellate a viewer, it must 
hold all the stronger for a modality in which the interpellated subject is hailed to 
more fully inhabit the subject position of the narrative by interactively shaping it. 
Many video games whose plots revolve around science-fiction scenarios in which a 
significant element of the plot involves computer technology have a hacking mechanic 
in which players complete challenges designed to represent breaking into everything 
from locked chests to digital networked computer architectures. A majority of games 
involve this mechanic, requiring players to routinely violate privacy in order to 
complete game objectives. This mechanic represents the enactment of a social science 
fiction in which surveillance is ideologically reframed as a tool enhancing the subject’s 
agency. “Surveillance is more than a tool in the maintenance of social order; it is also a 
fantasy of power…In other words, surveillance is increasingly a social science fiction, 
another form of imaginary, in which, at the push of a button, anything can be made 
visible and knowable…From this perspective, people are not under surveillance, but 
rather coded information about them is collected. As a result, the struggle between 
control and resistance becomes less important than a logic of virtualization” (Gerlach 
et al., 2011, p. 31).  
 
Lastly, then, I will examine the video game Watch Dogs (2013), in which players are 
encouraged to see individuals as “coded information” which can “at the push of a 
button”—both the virtual button of the mobile device carried by the character in-
game, and the button on the real-life game controller held by the player—“be made 
visible and knowable” by hacking into their cloud-based digital dossiers. In an 
interview with IGN, one of the lead developers of Watch Dogs, Jonathan Morin, 
describes the transformation of subject to digital-virtual object in this way: “A lot of 
                                               
10 While there has been some debate among those who theorize interactive electronic 
entertainments as to whether the ludic or narrative dimensions of video games are of 
greater cultural and critical import, it has generally come to be recognized, especially 
with the launch of the latest next generation consoles, that narrative (and specifically 
filmic) qualities are an integral part of the ludic dimension of games—that is, they are 
best theorized together. 
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games will go and invite the player to just explore the environment. Us, we’re kind of 
letting you explore human beings as well…Aiden Pierce looks at [an individual] 
around him in a different way…you can tap into [a person’s] life…[to] find new side-
quests.” 
 
Watch Dogs is a highly cinematic, open-world, third-person action-adventure game 
set in a virtually-rendered Chicago of the near-future. Well in advance of its release, 
the game has won multiple awards, taking “Biggest Surprise,” “Most Anticipated” 
and “Game of the Show” awards at the industry-leading 2012 Electronic 
Entertainment Expo. The game also won “Best PC Game,” “Best New Franchise,” 
and “Biggest Surprise” by popular gaming organization IGN. The success of the 
game is based in part on its ability to tell the currently dominant story of surveillance 
in the namespace. Beyond the game’s “obviously polished play mechanics” and 
“optimized graphics…[which] had us sitting slack jawed,” the game’s power was in its 
ability to address the problematic of privacy, according to a review in Gaming 
Excellence: “[I]t came down to a storyline that is bathed in real world possibility and 
the terrifying implications of a society that is so interconnected digitally, and the 
damage and possibilities of one man gaining control of the entire system” (Game of 
the Show, para. 1). The game tells the story of Aiden Pearce—his name puns on the 
words aiding and pierce, bespeaking his ability to penetrate the city’s surveillance to 
help those in need—a surveillance-obsessed vigilante and technical superman 
(analogous to Hackman’s Lyle character, above) who can hack a city-wide network 
called the “Central Operating System.” In order to detect and punish criminals, 
Pearce must hack into the lives of most of the characters who inhabit this world by 
using a hand-held mobile device to biometrically scan them in order to learn intimate 
personal details about their health, finances, relationships, employment, etc. Aiden 
can also use his mobile device to hack the city’s entire data and communication 
interface, tapping into individuals’ cell phones, and CCTV network—in fact he can 
effectively control any electronic device in the landscape (cranes, roadblocks, elevated 
trains, etc.). Moreover, his hacking device leverages Big Data (combining massive 
datasets and sophisticated predictive algorithms) to predict whether other non-player 
characters are likely to commit a crime.  
 
According to Morin, the game represents a response to perhaps multiple problematics 
of the namespace, but certainly privacy and control, albeit one that unwittingly 
underwrites the politics of the dominant bloc.  
 
One thing that’s interesting is that people understand what we’re 
talking about…A lot of people have been asking us where Watchdogs 
comes from? What’s the concept? Well, it’s typically beer-discussions 
about Facebook and information and what’s happening in the world, 
right? A human being is always reacting to technology in different 
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ways. Like today it’s a new way of people to express themselves 
publicly. Some people don’t like that. Like it gets harder to govern a 
given society when people have access to information that much. So 
we’re talking about those things and instead of talking about being a 
victim of that, we started to ask ourselves wouldn’t it be cool to be that 
guy? The guy who can tap into the network of information and to 
reverse engineer that conversation.  
 
What’s striking, yet predictable, is the game’s answer to that question. Based on the 
assumption that political agency resides in individuals, political resistance is equated 
with vigilantism. It’s a solution that maps perfectly to the affordances of the virtual 
video game world, at least as it is being imagined in the most popular and best-selling 
games. These games draw the same narrative of hero/anti-hero, bravely fighting an 
antagonistic, typically monolithic, omniscient, omnipotent system alone: “I wasn’t 
always this guy,” growls Pearce in the game trailer, “In this city, no one can hide from 
me. No one. They crossed a line. And for that, I will make them pay. I’ll turn their 
city against them. They think I’m a man out of control. But I’ve never had so much 
control.” Rather than depict a narrative in which characters work to radically re-
articulate the economic, cultural, political, and technological forces at work in their 
fictional world, Watch Dogs depicts a world in which one cannot imagine, nor 
demand, the type of society in which unfair surveillance practices are outlawed. Aiden 
Pearce’s hope for political resistance lies in becoming an outlaw, assuming in the 
process the dominant politics which created such a disempowering regime in the first 
place. “The tendency to see privacy as protection from intrusive government, with 
much less emphasis on intrusive commercial third parties, goes together with the 
ingrained belief that the individual, construed as a code user, is empowered to resist in 
the face of enormous superstructures like corporations and institutions…The shift 
from secrecy toward personal control and autonomy is presented as a means of 
asserting one’s identity and individualism” (Frau-Meigs, 2010,p. 94). In this way, 
Watchdogs represents a social science fiction based on the same narrative in the two 
films above, and in the Orwellian novel which informs much news media coverage of 
the privacy crisis—a narrative which through limiting the complexity of our thinking 
about the privacy crisis, limits our ability to address it in a meaningful political way.      
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the signifying practices of popular media demand 
to be interrogated as a primary locus of ideological struggle in the namespace, 
particularly with regard to one particularly tenacious model describing the relation 
between surveillance, privacy, and social control. I align with Vaidhyanathan in 
demanding “better terms, models, metaphors, and strategies to control our personal 
information” (2008, p. 3) suggesting that privacy research involve not only legal 
scholarship, but social science and media scholarship, as well. Such work demands a 
way that is both theoretically rigorous, but that mitigates or avoids altogether the 
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typical impenetrability, for lay people, of the esoteric vocabulary and other alienating 
discursive conventions of academic theory. The commonality in each of these media 
with regard to privacy and surveillance is a definition of power and agency as a thing 
to be won, rather than a property of systems, arising through articulations. Power is 
held by the all-powerful state or corporations, and resisted only by maverick 
individuals who work within its architectures, protocols, and ideologies, etc. In the 
next two chapters I examine more closely the commercial and state actors who both 
benefit from and drive the narratives, such as those described above.  
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Chapter 3. Privacy and Security in the Surveillance State 
 
3.1 Societies of Control 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed one of the ways in which popular media 
ideologically underwrites the hegemony of a dominant political bloc of powerful state 
and corporate actors which benefits from an increasing transparency that allows each 
to access the personal information of citizens and consumers. I examined the 
preponderance of a particular model of social control based on Bentham’s panopticon 
which is used to frame a majority of privacy debates in popular media. The 
overwhelming ubiquity of this narrative represents a tendency to portray the present 
privacy crisis in commonsensical, individual-oriented terms, and tends to foreground 
the state and the corporations as monolithic Big Brother entities. This narrative 
obscures the complex social, political, and economic forces at work in the diminution 
of privacy and other civil rights. Narratives of a more convenient and pleasurable 
world in which social transparency ensures security and convenience have come to 
dominate more nuanced narratives in which strong informational privacy is more than 
a quaint, antiquated value.  
 
One of the most important ways we can challenge this vision, and the hegemony of 
the security state it underwrites, is to replace this reductive model of social control 
with a more nuanced model that can account for the articulation of both private and 
public actors. For Vaidhyanathan (2008), in addition to the fact that observable 
surveillance has not demonstrably shown to discipline the behavior of individuals in a 
non-totalitarian state, the central problem with panoptic thinking is that it cannot 
account for the modes of control offered by the emergence of surveillance regimes 
powered by Web 2.0 and cloud computing, in which those surveilled often have 
limited or no awareness of the extent of state, and especially commercial, surveillance. 
This serves the interests of the dominant bloc, commercial and state actors who want 
citizen-consumers to increasingly share more and more personal information in order 
to better name and map them through the data generated by the choices manifest in 
their digital footprint. Commercial actors use that data to sell them more products. 
Governments use that data to discover those who would subvert and resist state 
control (p. 10).	  	    
 
Vaidhyanathan’s description of a mode of control driven by transparency and mobility 
invokes one of the most pervasive and important challenges to panoptic thinking—
Gilles Deleuze’s 1992 essay “Postscript on Societies of Control.” The essay focuses on 
the problematic represented in the rise of cybernetic regimes in which, through ever 
more powerful technological, economic, socio-cultural, and political means, 
governments and corporations construct elaborate systems of information 
management through which to surveil citizen-consumers in ways that facilitate a 
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dispersed new system of social control. “We don’t have to stray into science fiction to 
find a control mechanism that can fix the position of any element at any given 
moment.…The key thing is that we’re at the beginning of something new….the 
widespread progressive introduction of a new system of domination” (Deleuze 1997, 
pp. 181-2). Deleuze works forward from Foucault’s genealogical work on power and 
social control in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975), in which 
Foucault describes the modern shift from sovereign societies to the disciplinary 
societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In disciplinary societies, Foucault 
argues, individuals moved relatively contiguously and linearly from one social site to 
the next—the family, school, factory, military, hospital, and perhaps prison. These 
disciplinary sites worked to create and control individuals through ideological 
enclosure. In each site the individual was named and categorized, disciplined by a set 
of knowledges and expectations, molded by broadly standardized ideological and 
behavioral models, and punished when he or she violated site norms. The disciplinary 
society relied on ubiquitous and manifest surveillance to interpellate individuals to 
conform to these ideological molds. 
 
According to Deleuze, although Foucault never names the form of social control to 
supplant disciplinary societies, disciplinary forms represent for him fading forms 
which the emerging technological assemblages of our age indicate we are already 
moving beyond. Deleuze suggests that with the rise of digital communication 
networks and cybernetic structures of control of the mid-twentieth century we are 
moving toward a new paradigm of social control he terms the “control society.” 
Unlike disciplinary societies, control societies represent a radical blurring of the sites 
of ideological subject formation into a kind of dynamic, ubiquitous, mobile 
singularity. The control society relies on wide, now global, networks of digital 
computers to collect, store, and analyze massive datasets. The coercive drive under 
disciplinary societies to force individuals to conform to a particular mold is replaced 
by the ability of the pattern-recognition algorithm to create highly flexible systems of 
control through real-time analysis and modulation: “We’re moving toward control 
societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control 
and instant communication” (1997, p. 174). Individuals in the control society become 
dividualized into data-points which can be monitored in real-time, producing the 
cybernetic loop with influences or constrains human behavior algorithmically and 
without human intervention.   
 
In Deleuzian terms, then, the namespace represents a regime of social control 
through the pervasion of a surveillance system powerful enough to discover and/or 
assign a unique ‘name’ for each element in its network. “We no longer find ourselves 
dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividual’s’, and 
masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (1992, p. 5). Its ability to map and control 
publics is no longer based primarily on enclosure and physical surveillance, but on the 
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new form of surreptitious surveillance—dataveillance. As the global Web pervades 
ever more completely the daily lives of individuals, policies, practices, and protocols 
emerge which leverage the unique data points of each unique actor in ways that may 
also constrain and discipline its behavior. As Zadie Smith reminds us, interfaces 
validate and invalidate certain responses, disciplining members culturally about the 
most important and popular concerns, feelings, and discursive means for sharing 
them. She describes the control implicit in interfaces in “Generation Why,” her 
meditation on the Facebook phenomenon: “What is your relationship status? 
(Choose one. There can be only one answer. People need to know.) Do you have a 
‘life’? (Prove it. Post pictures.) Do you like the right sort of things? (Make a list. 
Things to like will include: movies, music, books and television, but not architecture, 
ideas, or plants.)” (2010, page 2, para. 8). Deleuze’s control society are constituted in 
and by such interfaces. 
 
Thus, although the transparency and instant social connectivity powered by ‘Big Data’ 
may often provide certain forms of security and convenience, it also enables a 
powerful new mode of social control. Big Data describes the collection, storage, and 
analytical processing of data sets so massive and complex that special software, storage 
facilities, processing power, and technical infrastructures must be developed to handle 
them. In 2012, the White House announced a Big Data Research and Development 
Initiative comprising a $200 million budget across six federal departments and 
agencies. According to the White House, the initiative will help “accelerate the pace 
of discovery in science and engineering, strengthen our national security, and 
transform teaching and learning” (Kalil, 2012, para. 1). Big Data-driven dataveillance 
also drives the commercial sector’s promotion of a culture of ambient findability, in 
which consumers are encouraged to share their personal information nearly 
everywhere and at all times. This shift is manifest in the success of myriad cybernetic 
consumer products such as the Nike FuelBand, the Jawbone UP, and the FitBit. 
These products capture, store, analyze and provide feedback on a host of biological 
data such as daily movement patterns, sleep patterns, and caloric intake. Customer 
data is stored on commercial servers where consumers can visualize their own activity 
graphically. With access to consumer data, however, these companies can continually 
refine their own sales and marketing for these and other products. The central rule 
and requirement of those institutions, practices, patterns, protocols, etc., which 
articulate to shape the namespace is the algorithmic assignation and/or discovery of 
identities in real-time. This is underwritten in part by the trend toward the 
elimination of an anonymous Web, as many Web services providers have instituted 
the requirement that all users use their real name on their networks. Commercial 
Web services providers often do so, in part, in order to map each actor’s real identity 
to an extensive collection of data points, which allows them to match those users with 
a host of products and services offered by their partners. While government privacy 
protections have been diminishing with the rise of the security state—citizens are still 
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protected from many types of government surveillance—there remain very few laws or 
policies which offer more than nugatory protections against commercial actors. For 
this very reason, commercial dataveillance practices continue to be leveraged by the 
state to enhance its own surveillance capabilities. I examine these commercial actors 
in the next chapter. In this chapter I focus my examination at the juridico-political 
level of the social formation, addressing the state’s struggle for political hegemony as 
it learns to wield this new mode of control. 
 
Before continuing, I must clarify precisely what I mean by “state actors.” At a broad 
level of abstraction, the U.S. government may be understood as unified by a shared 
interest in its own continuity, security, and prosperity. According to the Routledge 
Encylopedia of International Political Economy (2001), a state generally “mobilizes 
populations in defence of its realm; regulates, monitors, and polices conduct within 
civil society; intervenes (more or less intensively) within the economy, and regulates 
(and, in some instances, controls) the flow of information within the public sphere” 
(Hay, p. 1469). In practice, however, the three branches which make up the U.S. 
government articulate to each other in a complex system, as the popular refrain goes, 
of checks and balances. Within each of these levels, and articulated to them, exists a 
relatively heterogeneous assemblage of state actors, including various juridical, 
political, and military offices, institutions, and other organizations who often compete 
for budgetary and other resources. In practice, then, these various actors may often 
have conflicting priorities and agendas. The state actors I refer to herein is constituted 
in part by a specific articulation of powerful government interests, particularly drawn 
from within the Executive Branch and the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, who are 
dedicated to a policy of total information awareness in support of a surveillance 
regime that undergirds a nascent and likely growing security state.1 The president’s 
role as Commander-in-chief represents a powerful point of articulation joining the 
Executive Branch to the military and various intelligence agencies, unifying these 
state actors with regard to law and policy on foreign and domestic security. While this 
political fraction may be variously opposed by actors in the judiciary, legislature, and 
even by other actors in the Executive, military and intelligence communities, 
nevertheless, it is those state actors across the three branches who support the rise of 
the security state that I refer to, somewhat reductively, as “state actors,” or the “state” 
in this dissertation. In the sense that I employ it here, then, the state can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  To the question of whether the U.S. might ramp down its aggressive stance on 
security in light of massive U.S. budget shortfalls and the essential defeat of Al 
Quaeda forces, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano is reported as 
answering, simply, “no,” calling the 9-11 attacks “the signal of a change in the 
environment that we have to deal with, I think, throughout the foreseeable future” 
(Lake, 2011, para. 4).	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understood as a particularly powerful line of force in the articulation of the 
namespace.  
 
This dominant bloc of state actors approached political hegemony most closely in the 
years immediately following the 9-11 terrorist attack by asserting moral and 
intellectual leadership over a subaltern social fraction constituted by citizen-
consumers and other actors who were persuaded to consent to the diminution of 
various civil rights, including privacy, in exchange for an immediate guarantee of 
security. As the 9-11 attacks represented a strong kairotic moment for cementing 
public fears of terrorism, the historical conjuncture centering around the attacks thus 
produced a temporary settlement of forces in which consent was easily obtained by a 
terrified public. The USA PATRIOT Act2 was passed with few reservations in a 
moment of expanding hegemony, mitigating, and often overriding, nearly half a 
century of privacy protections. The Act was passed a month after the 9-11 attacks by 
a margin of 357-66 in the House and 68-1 in the senate. Speaking at the Center for 
American Progress Action Fund, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), one of only ten 
senators to vote against the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act in 2006, describes 
the effects of the Act as “the creation of an always expanding, omnipresent 
surveillance state that now chips away needlessly at the liberties and freedoms our 
founding fathers established for all of us” (Wyden, 2013, para. 11). As the work of 
Wyden and other outspoken privacy partisans indicate, changing domestic and 
international contexts over the last decade have transformed the Act’s cultural and 
political meaning for a broad majority of the public (the subordinate social fraction). 
Those individuals and organizations who are increasingly alarmed over the state’s 
surveillance overreach are increasingly vocal in resisting it. Because the PATRIOT 
Act continues to stand as a major node in the namespace conjuncture, rearticulating 
the namespace requires understanding not only the Act itself, but the conjunctural 
forces through which it emerged. 
 
3.2 The Snowden Revelations 
 
By the middle of 2013, the privacy problematic had developed to high intensity after 
revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden emerged demonstrating that the 
government had been spying on American citizens for a number of years. Working 
for Booz Allen Hamilton as an infrastructure analyst for the NSA, Snowden had 
access to a large number of classified NSA materials, many of which he revealed to 
Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald. Greenwald thereafter published several 
groundbreaking articles exposing the extent and type of surveillance being conducted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym that stands for “Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001.”	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on American citizens through the government’s ‘partnership’ with private 
corporations, as well as their efforts to undermine internet encryption standards. 
Greenwald’s first article detailed the workings of the NSA’s PRISM program through 
which the state ‘legally’ obtained both metadata3 and content from email, chat, VOIP 
telephony, and various files (text files, photographs, etc.) from as many as nine 
telecommunications providers which service the majority of communication needs for 
the world, including Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo, Verizon, T-
Mobile, and AOL (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). In an interview with Glen 
Greenwald and documentarian Laura Poitras, Snowden explains the scope of the 
NSA’s ability to collect nearly everything a user may do on the internet. According to 
Snowden, the NSA does not, practically, limit itself to the surveillance of foreign 
individuals, but collects all communications that cross U.S. networks. This represents 
a large majority of the world’s internet traffic. Through access to a variety of 
surveillance systems, such as Boundless Informant (“a global auditing system for the 
NSA’s intercept and collections system”) and PRISM (a system providing the NSA 
“direct access to the back-ends of all the systems you use to communication and store 
data”), claims Snowden, nearly “any analyst at any time can target anyone, any 
selector, anywhere” (Greenwald, MacAskill, & Poitras, 2013). Snowden’s disclosure 
of the state’s ability to read the content of assumed-private communications 
contradicts accounts by government officials, including President Obama, who 
affirmed that the data surveilled was metadata only, and Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper, who, during his testimony to the U.S. Select Committee 
on Intelligence in March, 2013, replied in the negative when asked by Senator 
Wyden: “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of 
millions of Americans?”4 On June 6, after the Snowden leaks, Clapper released a 
statement admitting that his statement before Congress had been “erroneous” (Ungar, 
2013). In addition to its PRISM program, however, further documents published in 
the Washington Post at the end of October reveal that through software codenamed 
MUSCULAR, the NSA and British GCHQ in fact continue to copy millions of 
records directly from fiber optic cables transmitting data between Yahoo and Google 
and their respective data centers. As authors Gellman and Soltani note, FISC judge 
John Bates ruled illegal under FISA and in violation of the Fourth Amendment a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Metadata is essentially data which describes data. Telephony metadata could include 
call pairs (the phone numbers of caller and receiver), caller location, date and time, 
duration of call, data amount, cost, etc. Internet metadata could include the computer 
type, applications installed, browser used, IP address, and any information stored in 
cookies. Such metadata constitutes a digital dossier for each individual, and under 
current laws, can often be repurposed, given, sold, or traded to third parties without 
consumers’ consent or awareness. 	  
4	  Clapper’s exact response was: “No sir. Not wittingly. There are cases where they 
could inadvertently perhaps collect, but not wittingly” (Ungar, 2013, para. 2).	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similar but smaller surveillance operation which copied records from cables also 
located in the U.S. (Gellman & Soltani, 2013).     
 
Even more troubling than revelations that the U.S. has been hacking the servers of 
commercial actors were revelations that the NSA has been working with commercial 
actors to build security vulnerabilities into commercial software products themselves 
(Moyer, 2013). Soon after the PRISM revelations, in a joint article by The Guardian, 
The New York Times, and ProPublica, it was reported that the U.S. intelligence 
community has been pursuing a long term strategy to undermine stable encryption 
(one of the few technologies ensuring the private and secure storage and transmission 
of data on the internet). Through its membership in the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), the NSA was able to wrangle its way to being the 
de facto author for the encryption standard—inserting its own ‘back door’ 
vulnerabilities in the process. The standard it de facto authored has been engaged by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), an umbrella organization 
comprised of 114 standards organizations. It was stated matter-of-factly in the NSA 
presentation that “For the past decade, NSA has led an aggressive, multi-pronged 
effort to break widely used internet encryption technologies,” and that cryptanalytic 
abilities of the intelligence community are now strong enough to penetrate encryption 
standards formerly thought to be impenetrable. The NSA presentation further 
revealed that, based on the 2013 budget request, under the heading “Sigint enabling,” 
the encryption-breaking program budget dwarfed the PRISM program, estimated at 
$20 million, by ten times, averaging approximately $250 million each year.5 This 
funded a variety of operations including an effort to break into 4G mobile devices and 
the investigation of possibilities for hacking the servers of Yahoo, Facebook, 
Microsoft, and Google (Naughton, 2013). As noted above, the threat of the NSA 
hacking Google and Yahoo is no longer a potential threat. It was also revealed that 
while the NSA’s Commercial Solutions Center offered companies a resource for 
testing the security of their products, they leveraged their working relation with these 
clients to discover ways to insert vulnerabilities into their products. Through this close 
collaboration with private partners and other intelligence agencies, such as Britain’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the NSA has thus taken a 
number of steps to weaken digital privacy, including compromising and modifying 
codebases in ways that, according to acknowledged security expert Bruce Schneier, 
may render encryption altogether meaningless (Talbot, 2013). “I think the most 
significant revelation,” observed Greenwald in his honorific speech for Edward 
Snowden during the 2013 Whistleblower Awards, “is that the objective of the United 
States and its closest allies in the U.K., Canada, New Zealand, and Australia is the 
elimination of privacy globally, the idea that there will be no ability on the part of any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  It’s noteworthy that the U.S. intelligence budget has grown from $30 billion before 
the 9-11 attacks, to $80 billion, less than a decade later (Naughton, 2013). 	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human beings to communicate with one another electronically without it being 
monitored, collected, analyzed, and stored by the United States Government.”  
 
Hours after the release of Snowden’s documents in The Guardian, President Obama 
held a press conference in which he acknowledged public privacy concerns and 
outlined four proposals to reform the NSA’s surveillance activities, promising to work 
with Congress to reform section 215 of the PATRIOT Act in order to develop 
greater transparency, oversight, and constraints on the use of government authority. 
Declaring “we can and must be more transparent,” the president promised to: launch 
a website to promote transparency; direct the intelligence community to find ways to 
remain as transparent as practicable; direct the Justice Department to publicize the 
legal rationale for section 215 of the PATRIOT Act; ensure that the NSA is “taking 
steps” to increase oversight through the appointment a Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Officer. This and other public outreach attempts by the Executive ostensibly 
demonstrate at least some concern with recovering political legitimacy in the eyes of a 
scandalized public (“President Obama Holds”).  
 
The state’s response was far more intransigent and cavalier when in 2005 a 
surveillance program analogous to the PRISM program was first revealed to the 
public by retired AT&T employee Mark Klein. Klein reported that his former 
employer had allowed the NSA to install a network traffic shunt on west coast 
communication hubs, including San Diego, San Jose, Los Angeles and Seattle,6 
which could assist in secretly capturing communications for millions of Americans. 
This surveillance began as early as 2001, according to undisputed documentation 
provided in Hepting v. AT&T (2006). According to Klein, this breach involved the 
construction of a special NSA-secured room in which the agency installed a Narus 
STA 6400 network traffic analyzer7 that allowed the NSA to split the network traffic 
stream, diverting millions of records to its own servers without judicial oversight or 
approval (“NSA Spying”). In early 2006, seven anonymous executives from the 
communication industry independently verified that the NSA had indeed enlisted the 
cooperation of not only AT&T, but Sprint and MCI (now Verizon). The ACLU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Snowden has since asserted the inclusion of many more hubs, nationwide.	  
7	  The Narus corporate website describes their line of cyber-security products 
somewhat ominously as “Cyber 3.0: Rise of the Machines,” invoking the title of the 
third film in the Terminator franchise, Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (2003). “To 
adapt to the future of cyber, we have to rely on machines to make fast, incisive, 
critical decisions. Narus cyber analytics solutions apply machine-based algorithms at 
the atomic metadata level. They fuse enormous volumes of data and continuously 
learn from new data dynamics for deeper, richer knowledge that provides 
contextualized, definite answers that are useful for human analysts” (Narus Solutions). 	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publicly decried the government overreach in no uncertain terms: “Regardless of the 
scale of this spying, we are facing a historic moment: the President of the United 
States has claimed a sweeping wartime power to brush aside the clear limits on his 
power set by our Constitution and laws—a chilling assertion of presidential power 
that has not been seen since Richard Nixon” (NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal).  
 
The Bush administration defended the legality of its anti-terrorism programs 
unapologetically, arguing that the events of 9-11 had represented an act of war, and 
cited the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted by Congress 
immediately following the attacks, authorizing the president to engage any and all 
methods in the defense of Americans and pursuit of the terrorists. The AUMF’s brief 
and relatively vague language gave the president sweeping powers. Specifically, the 
president was “authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons.” The most candid account of the government’s emerging 
politics of security was voiced by Vice President Cheney. Speaking on Meet the Press 
in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, he explained: “We also have to work, 
though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in 
the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done 
quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our 
intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be successful. That’s the world these folks 
operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, 
basically, to achieve our objective” (qtd. in Calderone & Froomkin, 2012). In practice, 
“use of force” has translated in part into a surveillance policy so broad that, if 
Snowden’s revelations are true, the long held prohibition against NSA and CIA 
surveillance of U.S. citizens may have tacitly and secretly been abandoned. The 
AUMF continues in effect today, undergirding the state’s efforts to enhance and grow 
its surveillance capabilities. A number of bills, including the AUMF, the Protect 
America Act, and FISA Amendments Act, and the PATRIOT Act, articulate to 
strongly empower the state to resist all but the strongest challenges to its authority to 
surveil with near-impunity. For example, in the case of Hepting, although the lower 
courts ruled in the plaintiff’s favor in 2006, it was overturned in 2009 when a federal 
judge ruled that the telecommunications companies were immune from prosecution 
under the 2008 FISA Amendments Act (FISAAA) signed into law by President G. 
W. Bush. Among other sweeping powers, the FISAAA grants the Attorney General 
the ability to dismiss such cases by simply ‘certifying’ that surveillance was legal or 
authorized by the president (EFF’s Case).  
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3.3 Total Information Awareness 
 
While the 9-11 attacks precipitated a number of radical changes underwriting the 
diminution of civil rights, the expansion of the powers of the military and the 
executive branch begins far earlier than 2001, according to Shane Harris, author of 
The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State (2010). While the dragnet 
surveillance of Americans revealed by Snowden represents the continuation of a 
surveillance initiative that had begun immediately after the 9-11 attacks, the 
instantiation of a conservative, hawkish, politics of security has been at least several 
decades in the making, argues Harris. It does not represent what Gramsci would term 
a war of manoeuvre (a sudden, decisive stroke by which a dominant force 
overwhelmingly subdues an opposing force), but rather a war of position (a steady, 
concerted and protracted ideological and structural positioning of successive 
economic, political, cultural, and technological transformations). The politics of 
security, the emergent surveillance state, and the privacy crisis we now face begins, he 
argues, in October, 1983 with the terrorist attack on the Marine Amphibious Unit at 
the Beirut International airport, in which 241 marines were killed. Upon subsequent 
investigation, it was revealed that several intelligence agencies were separately aware 
of over 100 pieces of intelligence that, had they been combined, might have helped to 
prevent the attack. In responding to this crisis, President Reagan’s Deputy National 
Security Advisor and Chairman of the National Security Council’s Crisis Pre-
planning Group, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, argued for combining the 
intelligence maintained by the various agencies to create an enormous security 
database that could help analysts predict and prevent aggressive anti-state activity. 
After several felony convictions8 relating to his participation in the Iran-Contra 
Affair, Poindexter retired from public life and military service in 1987. However, the 
events of 9-11 eventually led to Poindexter’s return to public service, and to the 
fulfillment of his belief in the phrase that would be the motto of the government 
security organization he was appointed to lead: “scientia est potentia.”9 
 
Appointed by president Bush in January 2002, Poindexter served as the director of 
DARPA’s Information Awareness Office (IAO) for nearly two years, during which 
he architected the “Total Information Awareness” program, a program designed to 
leverage the power of networked digital computers to monitor, collect, link, and 
analyze massive amounts of both transactional (e.g., travel records, phone call 
metadata) and biometric data10 (e.g., fingerprints, face and gait signatures), including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Poindexter’s convictions were overturned on appeal.	  	  
9	  “Knowledge is power.” 
10	  The types of biometric data which a computer can analyze has become truly 
staggering, including, height, weight, gender, race, myriad facial characteristics, 
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data both publicly available (data freely provided on social networks, documents in 
the public record) and privately available through either purchase11 or state-
commercial agreements (data combined from various national security agency files, 
medical records, financial records, travel records, and communications such as email, 
chat, VOIP, etc.). The project also became an umbrella integrating many of the 
surveillance-related IAO and DARPA projects including: Genoa and Genoa II 
(developing information decision systems for utilizing big data to make real time 
assessments for intelligence analysts); Genisys (developing electronic tools for linking 
heterogeneous data sources together to create massive data-banks); Evidence 
Extraction and Link Discovery and Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment 
(developing automated tools for extrapolating links between and patterns for 
predicting likely terrorist suspects across multiple public and private databases); 
Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization (developing 
tools enabling the interpretive and critical processing of human language by machine 
algorithm); Human Identification-at-a-Distance (developing tools to recognize 
human facial and gait biometric signatures); Bio-Surveillance (developing tools to 
detect in real-time the presence of biological pathogens). However, the program’s 
goals generated strong concerns about government overreach even after its name was 
changed in 2003 to “Terrorist Information Awareness” to appease public concern. 
Congress publicly defunded the program in August of that year (Information 
Awareness Office). 
 
Although the TIA program itself was defunded and the IAO closed, at least two core 
components of the TIA program were transferred to the office of Advanced Research 
Development Activity (ARDA), later known as the Disruptive Technology Office 
(DTO) and known today as the office of Intelligence Advanced Research Projects 
Activity (IARPA). Thanks to a provision in the Defense Department Appropriations 
Act of 2003, the TIA program could be legally broken into its constituent 
components, and these transferred to other programs (Harris 2006). The IARPA 
continues today to develop several of these core surveillance technologies, including 
tools for collecting, mining, and analyzing enormous datasets of individuals’ 
information. The programs that worried the public and led Congress to defund the 
TIA have thus continued unabated and in secret during the last decade under 
different names (Information Awareness Office). For this reason, though the official 
TIA program has technically been defunded, I use the term Total Information 
Awareness as an umbrella term describing the intelligence community’s continuing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
physiognomy, fingerprints, capillary patterns, handwriting, voice characteristics, 
keystroke dynamics, and social behavior.	  
11	  A report by the GAO as early as 2006 noted that the Justice Department and the 
Department of Homeland Security spent approximately $30 million on purchasing 
private records (“agencies not protecting privacy”). 
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reliance on Big Data as the bedrock of a new model of domestic and international 
surveillance for ensuring national security and domestic (and to some degree 
international) social control. As Nissenbaum (2010) observes, the unquestioning faith 
in Big Data analytics to resolve national security questions and enact social order is 
likely to produce a worrying spiral of information aggregation: “This faith in 
information, envisioned as an asset of enormous value, creates a virtually 
unquenchable thirst that can only be slaked by more information, fueling 
information-seeking behaviors of great ingenuity backed by determined and tenacious 
hoarding of its lodes” (p. 44). Exacerbating that spiral has been the government’s 
inability to adequately process the massiveness of the massive datasets it collects and 
stores, according to Harris. The sheer amount of data has encouraged the state to 
develop a long range policy which includes, on one level, capturing as much data as it 
can, while simultaneously working on breaking and undermining encryption 
standards and developing the software analytics to eventually penetrate the 
encryptions and protections on the mass of communications they have stored: 
 
[The entire intelligence apparatus] has been geared toward collection. 
The technology to connect all these dots does not exist. There is no 
Google for all the systems that house these different kinds of data…It 
has become the default position of the intelligence community to 
collect as much information as possible for the broad purposes of 
defending against terrorism and other national security threats and to 
put off the more complicated task of trying to make sense of it. And in 
this arrangement, privacy and privacy protection has become a 
secondary concern. (Harris, 2012) 
 
The result of this concerted effort to leverage the power of dataveillance toward a 
policy of total information awareness can be seen, then, in the construction of the 
NSA’s Utah Data Center, a massive data storage and analysis facility located in the 
relatively remote Bluffdale, Utah. The Bluffdale facility is “in some measure, the 
realization of the ‘total information awareness’ program created during the first term 
of the Bush administration,” writes James Bamford (2012, para. 5). Experts estimate 
the center will hold anywhere from several exabytes to a yottabyte12 of information—
space it will use to store information obtained from myriad inputs including 
surveillance satellites, overseas surveillance posts, and those public and private data 
sources described above and in the following chapter.  
 
The Utah Data Center is the direct descendant of the intelligence program 
codenamed “Stellar Wind,” authorized under the President’s Surveillance Program 
(PSP) enacted by G. W. Bush in late 2001. The majority of the enhanced powers 
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  The largest memory standard yet proposed—one septillion bytes.	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granted by the PSP remain classified, however it is publicly known that the PSP 
allowed the NSA to bypass the FISA courts and conduct warrantless electronic 
surveillance as long as certain legal and factual standards were met. While these 
enhanced powers remain classified today, revealed Bamford, a report by the Offices of 
Inspector General of the Department of Defense issued in 2009 had revealed a 
pattern of evasion and misrepresentation on the part of the Bush administration and 
the NSA in the prosecution of the program that caused serious concern for a number 
of senior Department of Justice officials13, namely: The initial legal assessment of the 
program was performed by a single DOJ attorney (John Yoo) with no oversight; 
attorney Yoo’s legal interpretation was based on an incomplete understanding (likely 
from lack of access) to classified activities enumerated in the documents released to 
him; when informed by Attorney General Comey of “serious issues” raised by the 
PSP, the President simply obviated the standard practice of having the Attorney 
General certify his reauthorization, choosing to use White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales, instead. Tellingly, when those classified PSP activities termed the 
“Terrorist Surveillance Program” by the administration later were moved under the 
jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), President Bush 
chose to allow the program to expire—only to essentially replace it with the equally 
sweeping and problematic Protect American Act of 2007, which I describe below (Fine, 
2010).       
 
The details of Stellar Wind were publicly revealed by whistleblower William Binney, 
a senior NSA cryptanalyst and one of the chief architects of the agency’s digital 
surveillance infrastructure. Binney resigned in October, 2001 after more than thirty 
years with the agency on the grounds that the NSA’s data collection practices were 
unconstitutional. With the enactment of PSP, explains Binney in his sworn affidavit 
for Hepting v. NSA, “[The domestic privacy protections of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act] ceased to be an operative concern and the individual liberties 
preserved in the U.S. Constitution were no longer a consideration…I resigned from 
the NSA in late 2001. I could not stay after the NSA began purposefully violating the 
Constitution” (2012). Based on his experience, the enormous size of the proposed 
Utah Data Center (over 1 million square feet), and Klein’s testimony regarding the 
existence of the NSA’s “Narus” rooms,  Binney concludes that the NSA continues to 
engage in the indiscriminant data collection associated with dragnet warrantless 
wiretapping of both international and domestic citizens, including storing all personal 
communication. The bulk collection of communication under Stellar Wind was 
discontinued in 2011, according to Obama administration officials, but the existence 
of the Bluffdale facility, and of programs like PRISM which feed it, continue to 
contradict claims of improvemed privacy protections by the state, and intensify the 
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  In fact, several senior Department of Justice and FBI officials planned to resign in 
protest of the Bush Administration’s overreach, including Attorney General Comey.	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problematic of privacy. “We are, like, that far [holding up thumb and forefinger] from 
a turnkey totalitarian state” worries Binney (qtd. in Bamford).  
 
Harris’ argument is supported by similar conclusions drawn by political activist Noam 
Chomsky in Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda (2002), who 
draws strikingly similar connections indicating the ideological continuity between the 
Reagan, G. H. W. Bush, and G.W. Bush administrations through the continuing 
political influence of a common core of political actors. Chomsky too, argues that 
“the war on terrorism was not declared on September 11; rather it was redeclared 
[sic], using the same rhetoric as the first declaration twenty years earlier” when 
Reagan described Islamic terrorism as the new enemy of the state (p. 70). The 
ideological continuity of Poindexter’s role in the Reagan and Bush administrations 
has been made clear. However, several other key personnel solidified and carried 
forward the ideological stance that we now recognize as the continuity between 
Reagan’s foreign policy agenda and the Bush Doctrine (which I describe below). 
Donald Rumsfeld, for example—special envoy to the middle east under Reagan, was 
appointed Secretary of Defense under G. W. Bush, helping to press a doctrine of 
regime-change in the middle-east. John Negroponte, who supervised U.S. operations 
in Honduras under Reagan, was appointed Director of National Intelligence under 
Bush. And perhaps most importantly, Dick Cheney, who served as Vice President 
under G.W. Bush and was a strong voice in “selling” the revived “war on terror” after 
9-11, had in fact served as Secretary of Defense under G. H. W. Bush, Reagan’s Vice 
President. The tight articulation of these particular individuals over several 
administrations speaks to the continuity of a security politics that has been growing, 
as both Harris and Chomsky see it, for decades.   
 
Harris’ analysis of how the Total Information Awareness program came to undergird 
the mission of national security is astute work. His examination of the origins and 
effects of the Total Information Awareness program, and its descendants in state-
sponsored programs, helps explain the extant structures of surveillance and control 
today. I argue for the need to perform a similarly historicized rendition of the 
contemporary privacy problematic, in which a dominant bloc of state and corporate 
actors have attempted to woo a subaltern social fraction over the nature and value of 
privacy. The contemporary privacy problematic in fact draws it shape from shifting 
economic and technological formations roughly coterminous with the Nixon 
administrations. This lesser privacy problematic reached its zenith in the first year of 
the second Nixon administration, during which a group represented by members in 
the Executive and the intelligence community similarly betrayed its mandate to 
protect the civil liberties of the American people by employing a new and powerful 
surveillance paradigm against its political enemies. The discoveries of the Nixon 
Administration’s overreach helped fuel an examination of the nascent dataveillance 
practices in the commercial sector, albeit with mixed results. Beginning with the 
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Nixonian conjuncture may help us to understand our own contemporary conjuncture 
and perhaps even dismantle, or at least rearticulate in positive ways, the namespace. 
 
3.4 The Nascent Privacy Problematic 
 
The historical context surrounding the Watergate scandal had already seen a rising 
public concern with privacy, and the emergence of networked digital computing 
contributed to an incipient focus on privacy. The Warren court (1953-1969) was 
strongly focused on the issue of privacy. As Lane (2011) notes, the term appears in 88 
decisions in the 166 years leading up to Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 1953 
appointment to the high court, but has been featured in 642 opinions since, with 107 
decisions during the fifteen-year Warren Court (p. 156). It is generally acknowledged 
to have solidified the constitutional right to decisional privacy through the landmark 
case Griswold v. Connecticut (1965).14 The liberal Warren Court also produced or 
influenced many of the subsequent legislative and judicial milestones in defending 
and strengthening privacy rights. As I mentioned in the first chapter, William 
Prosser’s 1960 article, “Privacy,”  drew together existing case law into a framework of 
torts that helped establish privacy as a modern right. The Freedom of Information Act 
of 1966 (FOIA) ensured greater government transparency by allowing citizens to 
request authorized access to previously unreleased government documents. The 
landmark decision Katz v. United States (1967) was central in guaranteeing 
individuals a reasonable expectation of privacy, and in centering privacy around 
individuals rather than places.15 Alan Westin’s seminal article on privacy argued to 
extend this from the protection of one’s ‘person’ to information captured about one. 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the “Wiretap 
Act”) added judicial oversight for wiretapping and required that surveilled parties be 
notified after the expiration of the wiretap order. 
 
With regard to consumer privacy, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 was meant to 
address the fact that credit agencies had been operating behind the scenes, mining 
customer data with no oversight and reselling the information to third parties—credit 
companies could supply information to any state agency, commercial organization, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), in which a Connecticut statute prohibiting the 
distribution of contraceptives was struck down, was a landmark case for decisional 
privacy. It stands as precedent for another landmark decision for personal privacy, Roe 
v. Wade (1973), in which a right to privacy was guaranteed under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	  
15	  “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection…But what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (p. 
347).	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
70 
	  
individual they considered credible (Lane, p. 152). The act anticipated the Code of 
Fair Information Practices outlined formally in the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems report 
“Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens” (1973), which recommended a 
standard code governing data collection for all federal agencies, prohibiting the 
collection of personal information in secret databases, allowing individuals to discover 
the nature and uses of the data collected, disallowing the use of data outside of the 
contexts and uses for which it was collected, requiring organizations collecting data to 
ensure its reliability and, where possible, prevent its misuse, and allowing individuals 
to amend any incorrect or personally-identifying information. The Code of Fair 
Information Practices was used as a template for the Privacy Act of 1974, adding 
limits to the types of information an organization may collect and the manner in 
which it may collect it, as well as limits on the internal uses of information within and 
between organizations. The Act emerged in response to the increasing use by state 
and corporate actors of computer databases to automate and expedite the process of 
capturing, storing, and analyzing large amounts of data for large numbers of 
individuals. The Act standardized the Code for government agencies, prohibiting 
federal agencies from sharing information about individuals with other agencies 
without individuals’ express written approval, and granted individuals the right to 
inspect and amend their own records were they not accurate, relevant, timely, or 
complete.  
 
However, much like the Snowden revelations, it may have ultimately been the 
“rampant civil rights and privacy abuses of the Nixon administration,” writes Lane 
(2011), that seemed to mobilize widespread public awareness of the extent of state 
and commercial actors’ technological capability for surveillance (p. 189). The public 
examination of privacy practices in fact began during the last days of Nixon’s own 
administration. In order to appease the public uproar over the Watergate break-ins, 
President Nixon appointed Vice President Ford the Chair of the Domestic Council 
Committee on the Right of Privacy (DCCRP), charging him with investigating and 
pursuing privacy safeguards against the emergence of computer databanking. By the 
end of its four-month mandate, the committee had produced few results, although it 
had quashed a $100 million project by the General Services Administration (GSA) to 
build FEDNET—a network of mainframes linking all federal databases through a 
single interface. After Nixon’s resignation, President Ford promised publicly, “There 
will be no illegal tapping, eavesdropping, bugging, or break-ins in my administration. 
There will be hot pursuit of tough laws to prevent illegal invasions of privacy in both 
government and private activities” (qtd. in Lane, p. 190). However, when one 
considers the strength of purpose and the continuing attempt, in one form or another, 
to engender these various mega-databanks—FEDNET, the National Data Center, 
Poindexter’s proposed intelligence leviathan, and the recently operational NSA 
facility in Bluffdale, Utah—it becomes clear just how unwaveringly, over the last half-
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century, the government has moved toward a security policy founded on a network 
architecture of total information awareness.  
 
Watergate helped publicly politicize the issue of privacy and spurred Congress, over 
the next several decades, to continue to pursue both privacy protections and 
government oversight in this area, solidifying, albeit in a statutory hodge podge, the 
value of various forms of personal privacy, particularly informational privacy in digital 
modalities. The Watergate scandal prompted a number of oversight committees to 
investigate the government’s reach with regard to surveillance. The United States 
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (commonly, the “Church Committee”) thoroughly investigated 
the practices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA). The Church 
Committee found that the national intelligence agencies had engaged in break-ins, 
wiretapping, spying such as opening and recording in bulk the mail of U.S. citizens, 
and even attempting the assassination of several foreign government leaders. The 
Privacy Protection Study Committee (PPSC) established as mandated by the Privacy 
Act of 1974 confirmed the public’s concern over the rising power of the state through 
its leveraging of information provided by the credit reporting agencies was entrenched 
and, as Lane puts it, “bordered on the incestuous” (2011, p. 197). Most credit 
reporting agencies, it discovered, handed over data requested by the federal 
government freely and without warrants.  
 
“In retrospect” suggests Rule (2007), “the Watergate scandal, and the public mood it 
triggered, represented the high-water mark of privacy concern in American public 
opinion” (p. 50). Privacy law, practices, and policies have struggled valiantly since 
then to adequately address the speed of technological innovation. Ann Toth, Vice 
President of Policy and Head of Privacy for Yahoo, suggests that in our contemporary 
technology-rich environment, many state and commercial actors have adopted a 
implicit policy of ‘code first and apologize later’. Relying on either the public’s 
technological ignorance or a policy of plausible deniability, many companies may 
introduce new products and services which may not be well-scoped for privacy. 
“Fundamentally, the challenge has been [that]…technology gallops along at a pretty 
fast clip and legal institutions and government and law enforcement are sometimes 
taking advantage of the fact that we haven’t really figured it out yet…And I think 
we’re constantly trying to catch up with the pace of technology” (Glaser, 2011). 
Often, where antiquated laws have been updated or amended, those amendments 
have not adequately addressed the core problems constituted by the shifting 
technological modalities and socio-cultural conventions of the information and 
communication media landscape.  
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For example, the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988, established after the 
video rental records of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork were released publicly, 
provides strong protections for one very particular digital medium. The act makes it 
illegal for commercial video tape providers to knowingly disclose the personally 
identifiable information (PII) of their customers without that customer’s written 
consent, or a  warrant, subpoena, or court order. Regarding the purchase or rental of 
video tapes, PII may not be used in court, and must be destroyed as soon as possible 
by any third party vendor—no later than one year after its inception. Unfortunately, 
the medium of VHS and the distribution model (VHS rental stores) protected under 
the VPPA are essentially obsolete, replaced by new digital formats such as DVD 
rental and cloud-based video delivery services (e.g., Amazon, Hulu, Netflix, VUDU). 
The VPAA has not been updated to address the emergence of these media or 
distribution channels. Protections against data sharing and data-decontextualization 
that would guarantee users more than merely nominal control over their data have 
been consistently undermined and challenged by state and corporate actors. In 
contrasting these practices and prohibitions against the norms, practices, and laws at 
work in the current conjuncture with regard to informational privacy, it becomes clear 
that a mere decade later, the privacy problematic emerges in nascent form in the 
Nixon conjuncture, the shift to what would eventually become the DARPA’s Total 
Information Awareness program had already begun.  
 
The discoveries of the Church Committee of the government’s surveillance overreach 
and burgeoning powers of the military and the Executive led to the enactment of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The Act was designed to strike a 
balance between protecting the U.S. from serious anti-state aggression (e.g., terrorist 
attacks), as well as protecting the rights of U.S. citizens from warrantless surveillance 
through establishing government oversight. The Foreign Intelligence Security Act 
was passed in partial response to the abuse of various protestors, including civil rights 
advocates and those protesting the Vietnam War, by the FBI’s COINTELPRO 
program (1956-1971), which surveilled and harassed ‘subversive’ groups—those 
deemed by the FBI to be politically left of the current regime (Rule, 2007). However, 
the act granted the state extraordinary powers—establishing the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), a secret federal court established to grant warrants for the 
surveillance of agents of foreign powers, as well as U.S. citizens or permanent 
residents suspected of espionage or terrorist activity. FISA also allowed the president 
to authorize warrantless physical or electronic surveillance of up to one year of any 
non-U.S. individual, and up to 72 hours for any U.S. individual, in cases where that 
individual was a party to foreign communication. 
 
While FISA was designed to strike a balance between individuals’ right to privacy and 
the state’s ability to protect citizens, amendments to the law and the introduction of 
other laws have extended its already problematic framework to seriously endanger 
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privacy and other civil rights. The introduction of the AUMF, the PATRIOT Act 
and its reauthorizations, the President’s Surveillance Program, the Protect American 
Act, and the FISA Amendments Act have mitigated the effectiveness or obviated 
outright much of the legislation engendered in response to the Watergate scandal. 
“With the passage of the PATRIOT Act,” suggests Lane (2011). “the Bush 
administration succeeded in undermining nearly all of the scant privacy protections 
adopted by Congress over the last forty years” including Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 
1978, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (p. 248). For example, the 
PATRIOT Act broadened the definition of what constituted foreign intelligence 
investigation, amending FISA such that the court was no longer required to approve 
detailed surveillance plans. In processing the PATRIOT Act, the government relies 
on legal opinions which help with the interpretation of the law-as-written. To date, 
however, those interpretations have remained classified. Senators Mark Udall and 
Ron Wyden, who have security clearance to have read the interpretations, have 
argued that current interpretations allow for radically different prosecution of the law 
and widen surveillance freedoms beyond the intentions represented by the original 
intent of the law. The original author of The PATRIOT Act, Representative Jim 
Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin), has also stated publicly that he believes the law, as 
enacted, does not strike the responsible balance between protection and liberty it was 
original intended to (Kravets, 2011). 
 
Some of the more expansive provisions allowed by the PATRIOT Act were the 
following: It authorized the use of roving wiretaps and further validated the already 
questionable practice of pen register and trap-and-trace surveillance; it removed the 
burden on law enforcement to verify that the person speaking on a wire-tapped line 
was the person for whom the tap was authorized; it obviated the requirement that 
agents requesting a FISA warrant describe in detail their surveillance rationale—
agents are now required only to declare that records are “sought for an investigation 
to protect against international terrorism”; it allowed intelligence agents to request a 
FISA warrant for tangible items (e.g., books, documents, and other personal records) 
from business, medical, and educational institutions (including public and academic 
libraries); it provided for the use of National Security Letters, FBI administrative 
subpoenas which do not require probable cause, a warrant or approval of the FISC, 
and which bar those served from disclosing that fact of their disclosure to anyone—
including legal counsel.  
 
There were specific privacy provisions in place in the Patriot Act, including the 
requirement that government agencies who had violated privacy be held directly 
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accountable, that citizens be able to file for damages when their privacy rights were 
violated, and that Inspector General of the Department of Justice be required to 
designate an official to monitor complaints from employee of the Justice Department 
over privacy and other civil liberties violations. The law also contained sixteen sunset 
provision which specified an end-date for some of the law’s most potentially abusive 
provisions. When the Act was reauthorized by President Bush in March, 2006, it 
contained only a single improvement to civil liberties, the inclusion that parties 
prohibited from disclosing their receipt of a National Security Letter request be 
subject to judicial review. The request could only be made a year after service of the 
initial request, and the onus of proof lay on the served party to prove the government 
had acted in bad faith. The sunset provisions were ultimately struck altogether, 
codifying and extending those provisions which were most troublesome (Wyden, 
Guthrie, Dickas, & Perkins, 2006, p. 341). 
 
These powers were extended further through the Protect American Act (PAA) of 2007 
which radically increased the state’s power to surveil with near impunity. Specifically, 
the Act: grants the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence the 
power to wiretap any communication which begins or ends in a foreign country 
wherein a “significant purpose” of the activity is certified by the state as the 
surveillance of primarily foreign agents, reasonably believed to be outside the United 
States; it grants the state the right to demand data from telecommunications 
providers, and grants civil immunity to those providers retroactive to 2001.16  
 
3.5 Twenty-first Century Statecraft 
 
While the sweeping powers granted in the PSP, AUMF, PAA, and PATRIOT Act 
were enacted during the presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009), they have not 
been significantly repealed or amended during the Obama Administration. While the 
Obama administration and the G. W. Bush administration which preceded it 
ostensibly rest on fundamentally different ideologies, there is much they share with 
regard to privacy policy. The Bush Doctrine emerged ostensibly in response to the 9-
11 attacks, although as Harris and Chomsky argue, above, the neo-conservative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Smith v. Maryland (1979) established the ‘Third Party Doctrine’, which holds that 
telecommunications providers such as telephone and internet providers are ‘third 
parties’ and, as such, are not responsible for protecting the privacy of users who had 
shared their information voluntarily. This decision has been used as a precedent to 
establish the common practice that allows communication service providers to hand 
over our data to fourth parties, including the government. Third Party Doctrine has 
been successfully challenged however. In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Court 
of Appeals ruled that individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy for 
electronic communications stored or processed by third parties (Reitman, 2012).	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ideology of particular actors from the Reagan administration can be seen to emerge 
full-throated in the foreign policy of the G. W. Bush administration. The core 
elements of the Bush Doctrine are putatively understood to be expressed in the 
administration’s National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). The essence of 
the Bush Doctrine can be read in the following statement: “It is an enduring 
American principle that [the protection of Americans and American interests] 
obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of 
national power, before the threats can do grave damage” (p. 18). Variously termed 
“democratic globalism,” and “messianic universalism,” the bedrock of this doctrine is a 
U.S. exceptionalism in which U.S. security, prosperity, and the fulfillment of other 
U.S. interests require the unilateral use of political and especially military power to 
facilitate the expansion of western democracy and, where possible, regime change. 
The doctrine conflates a policy of preventative military counter-terrorism with the 
geo-political expansionism through the promotion of U.S. values in strategic regions, 
particularly the Middle East (Monten 2005). It favors preventive war and, with the 
discursive invention of “the war on terror,” arguably perpetual war (or perhaps, better, 
military conflict). While the state enjoyed a moment of hegemony after 9-11, thanks 
in large part to the galvanizing horror of the attacks, and the decisive leadership of the 
administration, the Bush Doctrine should be understood as a move away from a 
politics of hegemony, from Gramsci’s war of position, toward a politics of direct 
intervention and coercion, Gramsci’s war of manoeuvre, or what Monten describes as 
a move from “exemplarism,” in which the U.S. leads through its ability to sustain 
multilateral international relations which are productive of U.S. interests, toward 
“vindicationalism,” in which the president, declaring himself “the decider,”17 
embraced singularly unilateral policies. As we see above, the Bush administration’s 
relative abandonment of due process after 9-11, with regard to civil and other rights, 
represented a sea change for privacy. Whereas privacy had historically existed in a 
more careful balance between the state’s compelling interests in security and 
individuals’ rights, privacy under the Bush Doctrine (and the Reagan-era politics of 
security which inform it), exists in a binary opposition with security. Privacy is a thing 
to be sacrificed in the name of security. By the end of the second term of the Bush 
presidency, the moment of total, expansive hegemony produced by the 9-11 attacks 
and which helped to engender the sweeping changes to privacy and other civil 
liberties was fundamentally transformed. The practices defined by and enacted 
through the Bush Doctrine helped to squander the administration’s role as moral and 
intellectual arbiter of domestic and international policy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  In 2006, President G. W. Bush termed himself “the decider” in an interview 
wherein he defended his choice to unilaterally reject the public outcry to replace 
Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense: “I hear the voices and I read the front page 
and I hear the speculation. But I’m the decider, and I decide what’s best” (Stolberg, 
2006, para. 5).    
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As a concerted departure from the Bush Doctrine, The Obama Doctrine can be seen 
as an attempt to return to the politics of hegemony, favoring multilateralism, and 
declaring its intent to wield moral and intellectual leadership in both domestic and 
international political theatres. The Obama Doctrine does not eschew the concept of 
American Exceptionalism outright, however, but seeks to reclaim it and persuade the 
domestic and international community that an exceptional America need not be 
conflated with a mitilarist, expansionist geopolitics. President Obama has sought to 
defend his approach to exceptionalism as a balance: “I see no contradiction between 
believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world 
towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, 
depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we can't solve these problems 
alone” (qtd. in Dish, 2010). Unlike the Bush Doctrine, the Obama Doctrine is not a 
fully formalized statement, but can be extrapolated from the administration’s 
discursive positioning in a number of key speeches by the president and other key 
administrative officials, through the enactment of particular policies and practices, 
and finally through the laws, policies, and practices enacted, extended, or repealed by 
the president and the individuals who serve under him.  
 
An important early document in that formulation is a 2007 essay by then-candidate 
Barack Obama in Foreign Affairs magazine, entitled “Renewing American 
Leadership,” in which the president outlined a policy which represented a rejection of 
several of the foundations of the Bush doctrine. The U.S. must, he argued, protect 
domestic and international civil rights, embrace multilateralism and pursue improved 
domestic and foreign relations through a more transparent and conciliatory foreign 
policy. The U.S. must “by deed and example, [lead and lift] the world,” so that 
America is “again called to provide visionary leadership” (2007, p. 2). In order to lead, 
the U.S. must “[end] the practices of shipping away prisoners in the dead of night to 
be tortured in far-off countries, of detaining thousands without trial, of maintaining a 
network of secret prisons to jail people beyond the reach of law” (p. 2). “This is our 
moment, the essay concludes, “to renew the trust and faith of our people—and all 
people—in an America that battles immediate evils, promotes an ultimate good, and 
leads the world once more” (p. 2). In the essay he specifically addresses the role of 
intelligence in counter-terrorism work, arguing that any successful strategy must 
leverage radical advances in technology and explore new practices and approaches 
capable of addressing the differences in the geopolitical landscape after 9-11. This 
includes the development of “technologies and practices that enable us to efficiently 
collect and share information within and across our intelligence agencies” (p. 2). 
Strikingly, the Obama administration shares with the Bush (and arguably Reagan) 
administration(s) the goal of a unified intelligence network—albeit for fundamentally 
different reasons. The creation of this new hegemony relies not primarily on offensive 
military might, but on the construction of a namespace which will allow it to build 
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American security through Big Data. It hopes to balances security and liberty (albeit 
prioritizing security) by leveraging a policy of total information awareness to provide 
more granular control through a variety of tactics, meant to demonstrate restraint and 
leadership on the geopolitical stage: working more closely and multi-laterally with the 
United Nations with regard to international conflicts; replacing large-scale military 
intervention with targeted drone strikes; closing a number of CIA-run prisons in 
Europe; ending the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and effecting a stable transition; 
ending the policy of perpetual war, specifically the “War on Terror.” The goal of total 
information awareness is the lynch pin, the sine qua non of this foreign policy shift to 
a limited, defensive but proactive leadership on the global stage. If we read the 
Obama administration’s foreign policy (i.e., the Obama Doctrine) as an articulation, 
it shares many nodes with the Bush Doctrine, but disarticulates from it its strong 
neo-conservative ideology, rearticulating a weaker form of American exceptionalism. 
However, if it rejects a policy of perpetual ground war, the embrace of total 
information awareness may simply mean the articulation of a perpetual, and largely 
secret cyber-war.  
 
Two additional important statements constituting the Obama Doctrine and 
indicative of the importance of the security/privacy binary are represented by two 
speeches given by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton immediately following the leaks 
of classified U.S. information by Julian Assange through the Wikileaks website. In 
Clinton’s speeches, first at the Newseum, and weeks later at George Washington 
University, she delivers the Obama administration’s interpretation on the relation of 
information technologies to the development of secure democracies, as well as its 
understanding of the relation of economic and political security balanced against 
privacy and other civil liberties. She suggests that foreign policy in the twenty-first 
century must acknowledge that cybernetic forms of economic and political control are 
paramount to national security and economic success. She argues for a transparency 
that can encourage a global democracy, through the freedom of information and of 
digital assembly provided by an ‘open’ internet. She claims the internet as a distinctly 
American space, granting the United States the right and responsibility to police it. 
“[A]s the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the internet itself, 
we have a responsibility to see them used for good. To do that, we need to develop 
our capacity for what we call, at the State Department, twenty-first century statecraft” 
(Clinton, 2010). While governments should protect the “privacy of citizens who 
engage in non-violent political speech” and who “use the internet for peaceful 
political purposes,” this free flow of information does not pertain to groups such as Al 
Qaeda who use the internet to “promote the mass murder of innocent people across 
the world.” The internet, she argues, should be used as a tool to track down terrorists 
who engage in such hate speech. This involves the outreach and funding of academia, 
industries and NGOs to create a “standing effort that will harness the power of 
connection technologies and apply them to our diplomatic goals” (Clinton, 2010).   
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Like the Bush administration, then, the Obama administration has defended the 
surveillance programs in place, arguing that privacy and security represent a relation 
that must be delicately balanced—albeit heavily balanced in favor of security. In an 
interview with Charlie Rose, the president defended his foreign and domestic 
intelligence policies: “My job is to both protect the American people and to protect 
the American way of life, which includes privacy” (Obama, 2013). The legal 
safeguards now in place, he argues, must strike the appropriate balance between 
security and privacy, particularly with regard to what the administration regards as a 
growing threat of cyber-attack, which Defense Secretary Robert Gates called a “huge 
future threat…[and] a considerable current threat” (Montalbano, 2010, para. 2). 
Clinton’s earlier speeches display this same rhetoric of balance: “Without security, 
liberty is fragile. Without liberty, security is oppressive.  The challenge is finding the 
proper measure:  enough security to enable our freedoms, but not so much or so little 
as to endanger them.” While Secretary Clinton describes a perfect balance between 
liberty and security, Obama’s understanding of this balance has demonstrably 
changed since assuming presidency. For example, in 2005, while still a senator, 
Obama resoundingly critiqued the government’s surveillance overreach with regard to 
the secretive nature of FISA. Citing the inability of citizens to have substantive legal 
recourse to challenge overbroad “fishing expeditions” represented by the FBI’s 
National Security Letters, he called intrusive government surveillance “just plain 
wrong” (Wheaton, Kim, & Cascarano, 2013). In 2007, then-candidate Obama 
critiqued the Bush administration for erecting a false choice between liberty and 
security, promising to:  
 
provide our intelligence and law enforcement agencies with the tools 
they need to track and take out the terrorists without undermining our 
constitution and our freedom. That means no more illegal wiretapping 
of American citizens. No more national security letters to spy on 
citizens who are not suspected of a crime. No more tracking citizens 
who do nothing more than protest a misguided war. No more ignoring 
the law when it is inconvenient…This administration acts like 
violating civil liberties is the way to enhance our security. It is not. 
There are no shortcuts to protecting America. (Wheaton et al., 2013) 
 
President Obama’s actions demonstrate a different ideological position and a different 
rhetoric. National security letters have not abated, and in fact have kept pace with the 
Bush administration’s numbers. On average, each year from 2008 to 2013, 
approximately 19,000 national security letters were delivered seeking information on 
nearly 8,200 individuals. In response to the privacy criticisms, and particularly the 
Snowden revelations, Obama claims to have modified the legal framework in ways 
that redress the shortcomings he earlier outlined in the Bush administration’s 
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approach, and lessen the overreach of the government. However, his stance now 
reveals the same binary approach to privacy and security he critiqued so stridently in 
2005:  
 
I think it’s important to recognize that you can’t have a hundred 
percent security, and then also have a hundred percent privacy and 
zero inconvenience. We’re gonna have to make some choices as a 
society.…I think, on balance, we have established a process and a 
procedure that the American people should feel comfortable about. 
But again, these programs are subject to congressional oversight and 
congressional reauthorization and congressional debate. And if there 
are members of Congress who feel differently, then they should speak 
up. And we’re happy to have that debate. (Wheaton et al., 2013) 
 
However, having indicted six government officials so far for leaking sensitive 
information—already twice the total of all previous administrations, the Obama 
administration has been accused of pursuing a policy of retribution for administrative 
leaks so aggressive it has produced a chilling effect on the press. Moreover, promises 
made by the Obama campaign to promote government transparency, outlined in 
several reform agenda documents, were removed two days after Snowden leaked 
government documents. Among the language removed was the following quote, 
which clearly contradicts the administration’s policy on whistleblowers: 
 
Often the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in 
government is an existing government employee committed to public 
integrity and willing to speak out. Such acts of courage and patriotism, 
which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer dollars, should 
be encouraged rather than stifled. We need to empower federal 
employees as watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners in performance. 
(Butler, 2013, para. 6) 
 
And, after it was discovered that the Department of Justice had obtained at least two 
months of phone records of various journalists at the Associated Press without 
suspicion of specific crimes, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney was asked by 
ABC White House Correspondent Jake Tapper how the administration’s stance on 
transparency could possibly “square with the fact that this administration has been so 
aggressively trying to stop aggressive journalism in the United States by using The 
Espionage Act to take whistleblowers to court” (Calderone & Froomkin, 2012, para. 
24). President Obama later responded “I am troubled by the possibility that leak 
investigation may chill the investigative journalism that holds government 
accountable. Journalists should not be at legal risks for doing their jobs” (Remarks by 
President at National Defense University, 2013). Comparing his rhetoric to empirical 
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evidence, however, the New York Times editorial board responded with a vote of no 
confidence, claiming that the Obama administration had “now lost all credibility on 
this issue,” and calling the government “reckless in its assignment of unnecessary and 
overbroad surveillance powers” (Editorial Board, 2013).  
 
In his 2013 interview with Charlie Rose, Obama declared: “What I can say 
unequivocally, is that if you are a U.S. person, the NSA cannot listen to your 
telephone, and the NSA cannot target your emails, and have not, by law and by rule, 
unless they go to a court and obtain a warrant and seek probable cause. The same way 
it’s always been.”18 However, as I demonstrate above, the history of privacy legislation 
does not stand on a solid body of tradition but more properly represents a struggle 
between dominant and subordinate political blocs in which privacy plays a greater and 
lesser role by turns.  “We don’t have to sacrifice our freedom in order to achieve 
security,” argued President Obama. “That’s a false choice. That doesn’t mean that 
there are not trade-offs involved in any given program, any given action that we take. 
So all of us make a decision [emphasis added] that we go through a whole of security at 
airports. That’s a trade-off that we make” (italics mine). But when the president refers 
to “all of us,” he seems to imply a consensus that belies both the truth of the public 
privacy crisis, and the truth of the broad powers enacted in the name of the Executive 
Branch after the events of 9-11. By framing the distinction between national security 
and civil liberties in terms of priorities, Obama is clear about the fact that security 
trumps liberty. When Rose asserts, “[Y]ou’ve certainly indicated…that the number 
one responsibility of a president is national security, to keep the American people 
safe,” the president responds, “[security] is my number one priority because if I don’t 
get that right, obviously, we don’t get anything right.” However, like the Bush era 
rhetoric it mimics, the notion that without security there might be no liberty must be 
understood as a similarly false choice. The ideology at work in this statement is one 
which continues to support the security state. Remembering the lessons of Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), we might ask just how secure protagonist Winston 
Smith felt without liberty?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  After President Obama’s stalwart refusal to acknowledge more extensive, and 
certainly unconstitutional surveillance programs—the existence of which continue to 
leak through Edward Snowden’s revelations in the popular media—it is indeed telling 
to hear him cavalierly describe the evasions necessary to government leaders and 
high-level officials in the service of national interests. When Rose asks about the 
Chinese president’s response to accusations of corporate espionage, President Obama 
responds, “You know, when you’re having a conversation like this [accusing a foreign 
leader of cyber-spying], I don’t think you ever expect a Chinese leader to say, ‘You 
know, you’re right. You caught us red-handed. We’re stealing all your stuff and every 
day we try to figure out how we can get into Apple.” 	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Just as it took the Watergate scandal to inform the public of the surveillance practices 
of the current administration, the Snowden revelations have encouraged both state 
and commercial actors to address privacy issues. “I think it's clear that some of the 
conversations this has generated, some of the debate, actually needed to happen,” 
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told a defense and intelligence 
contractor trade group. “If there's a good side to this, maybe that's it.” (Ackerman, 
2013, para. 6). In September, 2013 FISC Judge Dennis Saylor has ruled that the 
White House must declassify and release by early October any legal opinions relating 
to section 215 of the PATRIOT Act written after May 2011 reasoning that the 
release would contribute to a public debate engendered by Snowden’s release of 
information regarding specific practice of the FISA Court. 
 
The Snowden revelations have also had an effect on global geopolitics. Several 
countries have raised objections to U.S. surveillance practices. Brazilian president 
Dilma Rousseff canceled her visit to the White House based on the discovery that the 
U.S. had been spying on her emails and the emails of other top PETROBRAS 
officials, which, she argued, amounted to nothing less than industrial espionage. 
Rousseff has since announced plans to build an undersea fiber-optic cable to obviate 
the problem of surveillance of Brazilians’ data, the majority of which pass transits 
U.S. jurisdiction, and requiring commercial actors such as Google and Facebook to 
store data on servers located on Brazilian soil. Additionally, Brazil’s state-owned 
postal service Correios has begun work on an encrypted national email system which 
would also eliminate the possibility of U.S. snooping (More in Sorrow Than Anger). 
The EU justice commissioner Viviane Reding wrote to US Attorney General Eric 
Holder over concerns that US espionage might have serious global consequences. The 
New York Times published an open letter from Russian President Vladimir Putin to 
the American public and its leaders in which he critiqued the Obama administration’s 
embrace of American exceptionalism, and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa 
compared Obama’s embrace of exceptionalism to the ideological stance of the Nazi 
party during the Second World War (Ecuador’s Correa). In October, Brazil joined 
Germany in drafting a U.N. resolution supporting privacy in digital spaces. The 
resolution will declare deep concern over “human rights violations and abuses that 
may result from the conduct of any surveillance of communications…[including] 
extraterritorial surveillance of communications, their interception, as well as the 
collection of personal data, in particular massive surveillance, interception and data 
collection” (Brazil and Germany). And finally, most recently it was discovered that 
the NSA had tapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone for more than a 
decade—well before Merkel was elected to the office of Chancellor—with full 
knowledge of the president, reports say (US bugged).    
 
A number of commercial actors have also spoken out against the state’s surveillance 
practices and the legal framework which prevents them from speaking publicly about 
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requests for customer data. To date, a coalition of 85 companies has launched the 
Web site petition Stop Watching Us, demanding: congressional inquiry into the 
NSA revelations, congressional reform of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, revision 
of the FISAA, the creation of an investigative committee which might recommend 
legal and regulatory reform on U.S. surveillance practices, and the holding 
accountable of those public officials responsible for enacting and prosecuting these 
policies. Yahoo CEO Marissa Mayer has complained publicly that she worried about 
incarceration or being labeled a ‘traitor’ if she failed to comply with government 
requests and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has, likewise, publicly distanced 
himself from the government, arguing that it failed to balance protection of citizens’ 
freedoms, the economy, and the rights of commercial actors. Speaking at the 2013 
TechCrunch Disrupt Conference, Zuckerberg said “Frankly, I think the government 
blew it” (Geron, 2013, para. 1). Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsoft have all 
filed suit against the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court demanding to be 
released from the gag order imposed on all recipients of National Security Letters. 
Umbrella privacy organization Privacy International has asked the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development to investigate top telecoms, including 
Level 3, British Telecom, Verizon, Vodafone Cable, Viatel, and Interoute to disclose 
the nature and extent of their cooperation in releasing consumer data to GCHQ  
(Telecom Firms). Six of the larger telecoms, including AOL, Apple, Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo have authored a letter in support of the The USA 
Freedom Act, legislation introduced by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Patrick Leahy and PATRIOT Act author Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, aimed 
at reining in the U.S. intelligence community’s sweeping surveillance powers by 
requiring greater transparency and substantial reforms for FISA, particularly enabling 
service providers to report more information about the number of requests for data 
they receive.  
 
The pressure to address the government’s overreach on surveillance and other civil 
liberties by government actors, commercial actors, privacy partisans, and a concerned 
public only strengthen the hegemonic crisis faced by the current administration (of 
which I have more to say in chapter five) and engender strong possibilities for 
challenging the construction of the namespace and the total information awareness 
that underwrites it. The Obama Doctrine represents a move toward rejecting coercive 
tactics, reestablishing political hegemony through gaining the consent of the public to 
accede to the state’s intellectual and moral authority. Leveraging the administration’s 
demand for the subordinate bloc’s consent may help an informed public and press to 
challenge the administration, as it did during the Watergate scandal, to do better by 
its citizens. Lane (2011) has argued that just like the Food and Drug Administration, 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Radio Commission, the Aviation 
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency, the issue of privacy 
protection demands federalization (p. 257). It may be the case that only through a 
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standardized bureaucratic apparatus with the power to make policy for both state and 
commercial actors—and especially to enforce it—will the rearticulation of the 
namespace (i.e., the disarticulation of the ideology of total information awareness as a 
viable mode of domestic and international control) be possible.  
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the rise of the security state relies on the policies 
and protocols of total information awareness at the level of the state. In the next 
chapter, I address the hegemony of a culture of total transparency which has been 
widely adopted by the public through its embrace of that product sold by commercial 
actors, an ‘ambient findability’, which may in fact represent the most tendential line 
of force in the articulation of the namespace.  
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Chapter 4. Privacy and Convenience in the Information Economy 
 
4.1 Ambient Findability   
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the articulation of actors from the Executive, 
military, and intelligence branches of the U.S. federal government which actively 
pursues the policies and practices of large-scale dataveillance as an intelligence 
strategy originally termed total information awareness. In this chapter, I examine 
articulating dataveillance practices, policies, and protocols in the commercial sector, 
described in aggregate by one of its proponents as ambient findability. The constituent 
practices, policies, and protocols which constitute the economico-cultural ideology of 
ambient findability must be understood as both analogous to those practices which 
constitute the state’s total information awareness, and as significantly underwriting it. 
While the practices and policies of state and commercial dataveillance regimes differ, 
each relies on the social acceptance of a dual proposition: The transformations to 
communication practices, and social life, wrought by the ubiquity of networked 
digital communication technologies provide greater security and convenience, 
guaranteeing citizen-consumers ‘safer’ and ‘better’ lives; the guarantee of greater 
security and convenience must be purchased by the acceptance of less personal privacy 
in citizen-consumers’ relations with state and corporate actors. Observes Yahoo’s 
Head of Privacy Ann Toth, “Data collection online, the collection and use of that 
information, gives enormous benefit to consumers. Right now advertising makes the 
internet free and consumers want a free internet. I think that’s pretty clear” (Glaser, 
2011). The powerful line of force articulating these state and corporate interests in 
mining the data of consumers produces the contemporary conjuncture I term the 
“namespace.” As we saw in the last chapter, the namespace doubly serves the state, 
which can leverage commercial dataveillance practices (both legally and illegally) to 
supplement their own dataveillance practices. In this chapter, I examine the 
commercial dataveillance practices, the corollary rise of an information economy, and 
the new marketing and advertising paradigm which supports it.  
 
In the commercial sector, then, the public’s acceptance of large-scale dataveillance 
relies in part on the popularity of ambient findability, the dominant ideology in a “fast 
emerging world where we can find anyone or anything from anywhere at anytime,” 
according to Peter Morville (2005, p. 6). What I am calling the namespace represents 
for Morville “an inflection point in the evolution of findability” as the public and 
private sectors leverage ubiquitous computing technologies to generate myriad, 
massive (frequently interconnected) databases filled with the largest digital collection 
of knowledge in human history—to include as well the public and personal data of 
consumer-citizens. In Morville’s eponymous O’Reilly title, Ambient Findability, the 
Web 2.0 phenomenon is held aloft as an essentially unmitigated social good. The 
increasing ubiquity and availability of consumer data is cited as a cause for “hope and 
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inspiration” and is indicative of “the reality of progress” (p. 6). For Morville, ambient 
findability describes the confluence of the technological, economic, cultural, and 
psychological to create a vast digital information enclosure (p. 6) that empowers the 
individuals with radical new literacies, as well as economic and social opportunities: 
“Most importantly,” he exhorts the reader, “findability invests freedom in the 
individual” (p. 6-7). Requiring the tracking and recording of individuals’ digital 
footprint, ambient findability ostensibly offers a trade-off; it offers to meet and even 
predict their needs by offering them custom-tailored experiences. “The promise of 
personalization is simple…the benefits to the user are clear. No more searching” (p. 
115).  
 
However, after a similar promise made by Google CEO Eric Schmidt at the 2010 
IFA Conference in Berlin, Schmidt drew harsh criticism by Consumer Watchdog 
over his failure to consider the consequences to privacy in the future role he imagined 
for Google: “We can suggest what you should do next, what you care about,” argued 
Schmidt. “Imagine: we know where you are, we know what you like” (Tsotsis, 2010, 
para. 6). At the 2010 Washington Ideas Forum, he phrased the same statement 
somewhat differently, adding: “With your permission you give us more information 
about you, about your friends, and we can improve the quality of our searches. We 
don't need you to type at all. We know where you are. We know where you've been. 
We can more or less know what you're thinking about” (Thompson, 2010). This 
allows the ostensibly benevolent Google to match your digital footprint to your 
interests in real-time—particularly those interests which collectively define you as a 
consumer.  
 
Ambient findability clearly presents more than simple convenience, then, it represents 
an architecture of control which constrains and influences behavior as much as it 
maps it. In Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” he describes the 
architecture of control engendered by a simple identification card. “Felix Guattari has 
imagined a city where one would be able to leave one's apartment, one’s street, one’s 
neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but 
the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what 
counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person's position—licit or 
illicit—and effects a universal modulation” (1992, p. 7). Imagine that card held nearly 
every personally identifying aspect of your identity. Some nascent version of that 
universal modulation is already in place through the protocological architectures of 
control developed by the major players in the telecommunications industry. In fact, 
the major social networks and telecommunications providers inhabiting the web are 
responsible for the development of the code and protocols transforming the Web 
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today. In HTML5: Up and Running (2010), Mark Pilgrim1, a developer advocate for 
Google, suggests that a slight diminution of privacy represents the price we must pay 
for the transparency and access of an HTML5-fueled ambient findability which will 
pay broad social, cultural, and economic dividends in the long run. “It’s your job to 
provide as much data as possible,” he argues, “Let the rest of the world decide what to 
do with it. They might surprise you!” (Pilgrim, 2010). “The winners in an HTML5 
world, agrees Brett McLaughlin in What is HTML5? (2011) “are those who stop 
fearing being stolen from, and actually start handing out their candy to every kid on 
the block” (McLaughlin, 2011). And in fact, the inventor of HTML, Sir Tim 
Berners-Lee, weighs in on the side of openness for economic reasons: “Lots of 
governments make money by selling data….When you look at so many things, I 
mean what was the return-on-investment of the Web? You can’t put a number on it, 
but everybody thinks, oh, so many things we couldn’t have done without it. Same 
with all this data. When you put it out there, it just makes life so much easier for 
people. Their life just picks up, you know? It goes faster. It goes more efficiently, the 
country goes better…It’s difficult to do the math, but when people have done it, it’s 
been often very persuasive that really, making the data available for free is very much, 
economically, the best thing to do” (Berners-Lee, 2011).  
 
Arguably, the advent of social networking has greatly contributed to the public 
embrace of ambient findability as a cultural good, reshaping our digital 
communications with other individuals, organizations, and the government in a large 
number of ways—many of which we have yet to fathom. For example, “We write,” 
argues Morville, “not just to communicate, but to enhance our own personal 
findability” (p. 142).2 Perhaps one of the most perfect expressions—an ideological 
                                               
1 Ironically, without ceremony or explanation, on October 4, 2011, Mark Pilgrim has 
“withdrawn from digital life,” as Eric Meyer put it, deleting his Github, Google+, 
Reddit, and Twitter accounts. The only explanation, to date, have been universal 
agreement to respect his apparent wish for privacy. This was affirmed by a final 
cryptic tweet by Jason Scott, which read: “Mark Pilgrim is alive/annoyed we called 
the police. Please stand down and give the man privacy and space, and thanks 
everyone for caring. The communication was specifically verified, it was him, and 
that’s that. That was the single hardest decision I’ve had to make this year” (qtd. in 
“Searching”).  
2 While it would be difficult, in the face of the popularity of social networking, to 
deny the last claim, it does not follow that desires by younger “netizens” to share their 
lives in online spaces, are necessarily informed decisions. As Frau-Meigs warns, 
“Young people have no recollection of the tyranny of public opinion nor of the public 
pressure for social conformity…nor do they fathom the risks that homesteading on 
the cyber-frontier could lead to cyber-lynching, as reputation building can derail into 
denunciation and defamation” (p. 91). 
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paean, really—of ambient findability can be found in a recent Sprint commercial for 
the iPhone 5, entitled “I am unlimited: Picture Perfect,” in which the concept of a 
‘network’ is portrayed in images as the natural interconnection between universe, 
planet, ecosystem, organism, and computer technology. The commercial means to 
invoke the values of harmony and human freedom as the narrator triumphantly 
intones: “The miraculous is everywhere. In our homes, our minds; we can share every 
second in data dressed as pixels. A billion roaming photojournalists uploading the 
human experience and it is spectacular. So why would you cap that? My iPhone 5 can 
see every point of view, every panorama, the entire gallery of humanity. I need to 
upload all of it. I need—no, I have the right—to be unlimited!” Here, the ability to 
share our every personal detail online is not a duty, but a right—ideologically linked 
to, and arguably conflated with, the concept of human freedom and liberty. The 
grand narrative represented in this single commercial is in fact strikingly ubiquitous in 
the popular media. Because privacy is weighted against compelling social goods, 
because it is contextual, decided by the publics it defines, the voices of the those with 
the strongest interest in promoting it must be the loudest. The continual public 
statements on privacy by those promoting ambient findability can thus be seen as 
motivated by the need to continually reinforce the message of ambient findability as a 
social good. When asked by interviewer Leslie Stahl if he is “trying to turn everything 
we do on the web into a social function,” Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg answers: 
“I think that we’re really gonna see this huge shift where a lot of industry is and 
products are gonna get remade to be social.” In such statements, Zuckerberg inhabits 
the voice of the expert commenting upon a social phenomenon that he in fact helps 
to architect through the creation of digital code and protocol, cultural and economic 
practices through the interface of Facebook (and all of the more than 100,000 Web 
sites it interfaces with). Social networking, we are told continuously by these ‘expert’ 
service providers, means that to be a truly ‘social’ animal means to share everything 
online.       
 
Although the growth of social networking has slowed to roughly 4% in the three 
years since 2010, overall media market penetration on average has risen from 
approximately 45% to 65% in the last five years. The internet and other mobile digital 
forms of media lead television, radio, and print media across all demographics 
(Universal-McCann, 2012, pp. 16-20). Globally, the average consumer owns an 
average of four devices capable of connecting to the internet. While almost 80% of 
these consumers owned a personal computer, 44% owned smart phones and 14% 
owned a tablet (Universal-McCann, 2012, pp. 57-62). Public privacy concerns have 
also risen by several percentage points. “Our research shows that concerns about 
sharing personal data online [sic] is real and building” (Universal-McCann, 2012, p. 
29). One study found that in the USA, Spain, the U.K., Canada, Poland, and Japan, 
privacy was more important than the opportunity to network socially. However, 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Korea demonstrated the opposite trend 
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(Universal-McCann, 2012, p. 33) with the ability to network socially outweighing the 
possibility of privacy violation.  
 
Without invoking the argument that social networking represents a technocultural 
juggernaut that cannot be stopped, we must acknowledge the cultural pervasion and, 
in fact, the very real benefit of social networking, of transparency, and of social 
connectivity broadly. As I mentioned in my first chapter, and Morozov’s challenge 
notwithstanding, the Arab Spring can be seen as one positive effect of the collective 
intelligence and political activism that emerges when communities of people connect 
virtually. Certainly, people use social networking Web sites and applications for a 
growing range of social, cultural, economic, and political purposes, including 
organizing their schedules, making personal and professional contacts, shopping, 
consuming news and entertainment, self-publishing, engaging in political debate, 
engaging in religious practice, and a host of other activities newly shifting to digital 
spaces. Many people spend large amounts of time updating their online presence 
(62%) and updating their status (52%) (Universal-McCann, 2012, p. 30). Sites like 
Alice.com are harbingers of the new economics of this age of social networking. 
Alice.com allows consumers who volunteer their personal information and 
consumption habits in return for which manufacturers supply these consumers with 
cheaper and often free products about which they share their information (Gerzema 
& D'Antonio, 2011). However, these ostensibly free services are ‘purchased’ through 
the information we provide in order to ‘sign on’ to their Web sites (through the 
necessary step of creating a site profile, the information contained in which 
immediately becomes the property of the parent site) to accept their services. In order 
to discover the degree to which our personal information has been monetized on the 
Web, The Disconnect Web site, which offers tools and tips for protecting individual 
privacy while Web browsing, offers a tool to estimate the monetary value of the 
information provided on an individual’s Facebook page.3 This sale of personally 
identifying information to data brokers and/or the in-house use of that information, 
both of which are typically used to drive targeted advertising to the user, constitutes 
the bedrock of the information economy that has, as yet, emerged as the only 
demonstrably successful means (besides direct billing) for monetizing Web service to 
date. 
 
4.2 The Information Economy 
 
While lines of direct causal determination would be impossible to draw, the 
articulation of emergent digital communication technologies, changing interpersonal 
communication habits, changing domestic and global economic practices, and 
                                               
3 As reported in the Huffington Post, staffers who used the tool reported a range from 
$143.27 to $394.63 (Palis, 2012). 
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changing geo-politics have produced a namespace constituted in and by dataveillance. 
In the commercial telecommunications sector, this has been coterminous with the rise 
of what many theorists term an information economy (Langenderfer & Miyazaki, 
2009). The importance of the revenue stream generated by the information economy 
to the larger U.S. economy was recently underscored by President Obama, who 
mentioned both social network mega-corporations Google and Facebook in his 2011 
State of the Union address, as milestones of American invention and ingenuity: 
“Thirty years ago we couldn’t know that something called the internet would lead to 
an economic revolution…We’re the nation that put cars in driveways and computers 
in offices, the nation of Edison and the Wright brothers, of Google and Facebook.  
In America, innovation doesn’t just change our lives, it is how we make our living.” In 
the speech, the president ties the success of Google and Facebook to nothing less 
than the economic revitalization of the American economy. The state’s commitment 
to the development of ambient findability (and it own analog—total information 
awareness) months earlier in a speech given by Secretary of State Clinton at the 
newseum. The speech, entitled “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” (Clinton, 2010) also 
vaguely tied digital connectivity to economic prosperity: “A connection to global 
information networks is like an on-ramp to modernity…There are 4 billion cell 
phones in use today. Many of them are in the hands of market vendors, rickshaw 
drivers, and others who’ve historically lacked access to education and opportunity. 
Information networks have become a great leveler, and we should use them together 
to help lift people out of poverty and give them a freedom from want.”  
 
For the state, the promise of ambient findability represents not only a strengthening 
of the commercial sector (as greater numbers of individuals engage in internet 
commerce), but also offers the promise of massive data stores that the state may tap 
with near impunity. There remain relatively few laws structuring data collection and 
protecting personal privacy in the private sector. And since 9-11, the government has 
increased its purchase of consumer information for law enforcement purposes. 
Individual credit accounts make up the backbone of the contemporary digital dossier. 
Rule (2007) calls the U.S. credit reporting system, a $4.6 billion industry, constituted 
by the near-monopoly of a small number of companies including Experian, Equifax, 
and TransUnion, “a manifestation of surveillance virtuosity unsurpassed by any other 
system, government or private” (p. 97). The online advertising industry estimated at 
$36 billion for 2011 and has continued to rise steadily and is estimated by the Wall 
Street Journal to reach $67 billion by 2016 (“Finding Value”). The advertising model 
on the internet and for each of the larger social networks is targeted advertising. It 
was, in fact, Google that developed targeted advertising, reshaping the entire internet 
economy in the process.  
 
This emerging online economy, worries Mark Andrejivic, “increasingly seeks to 
exploit the work of being watched,” as consumers are “recruited to participate in the 
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labor of being watched to an unprecedented degree by subjecting the details of their 
daily lives to increasingly pervasive and comprehensive forms of high-tech 
monitoring” (2002). These new forms of sharing might best be understood to 
represent Deleuzian forms of social control through continual modulation of the self. 
“The power in question is not the static domination of a sovereign Big Brother, but 
that of a self-stimulating incitement to productivity: the multiplication of desiring 
subjects and subjects’ desires in accordance with the rationalization of consumption” 
(p. 231). Andrejivic describes a primary driver behind the new information economy 
as a form of labor derived from the ability of service providers to monitor consumers 
through the technological power and sheer ubiquity of ICTs, and through the appeal 
of convenient and ostensibly “free” services. But customization also allows for 
customized pricing. As with customer loyalty cards, the number and type of a 
consumer’s purchases are tracked. Providing a service provider with information about 
which products are most purchased, likely provides them with information about 
which products should cost the most. “The process of naming everything in the 
universe turns out to be a prelude to enfolding it into a monitored totality subject to 
the manipulations and ministrations of marketers…an omniscient gaze for the 
purposes of convenience and profit” (pp. 102-103).  
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is one state organization responsible for 
protecting consumer interests. In its report Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change (2010), the FTC called for powerful “do not track” mechanisms to be 
built into Web browsers. FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, addressing mounting 
privacy concerns at the 2011 Berkeley Browser Privacy Mechanisms Roundtable, 
outlined the importance of adopting a new model of privacy protection that can 
account for the ways in which changes in the amount and uses of data has changed 
the way consumers use technology and the importance of the industry’s ability to 
address these changes with alacrity and openness. We have moved, she argues, from a 
notice and choice model which placed the burden on consumers to choose from among 
what were often myriad confusing, sometimes obfuscating, incomprehensible choices, 
to what she calls a harm-based model which was “reactive” and is only useful in 
addressing breaches in privacy, such as security breaches and identity theft, after the 
fact. The harm-based model, she notes, also fails to recognize breaches which are 
difficult to quantify in terms of monetary damages, such as social stigma or 
embarrassment. The state of consumer privacy protection today is represented by the 
following realities: Collection of consumer data is ubiquitous, both on and offline; 
consumers remain ill-informed and ill-prepared to make informed choices about data 
collection; privacy emerges as an overarching concern for consumers, yet targeted 
advertising is responsible for many of the received benefits to consumers; the 
distinction between personally identifiable and non-personally identifiable 
information is blurring as technological systems, organizations, and individuals 
articulate in ways that may inadvertently violate the privacy of individuals.  
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The FTC report attempts to develop a set of best practices (heavily leveraging the 
Fair Information Practice principles developed in the 1970s) to address these realities, 
including: Promoting privacy by design—the principle that a concern for consumer 
privacy should drive the design of systems not offered as afterthoughts; aligning levels 
of security are commensurate with data sensitivity; ensuring the collection of data is 
restricted to only those data required; ensuring that those data retained only as long as 
needed. Consumer choice should be effected, it argues, through mechanisms which 
uses simplified language while remaining informative and meaningful to consumers. 
The interface/mechanisms of privacy should be judged by five indicia: Ease of use; 
effectivity and enforcibility; universality of industry participation; consumer ability to 
opt out of data collection; and interface persistence of consumer choice with regard to 
data collection. Brill ended with a warning to the browser industry suggesting that a 
self-regulatory response to these requirements would be sufficient if advertising 
industry shows that it is willing to honor consumer choices. “It’s still [the FTC’s] 
position that if the industry does not act quickly and sufficiently, we will ask congress 
to take up this issue.” In response to the FTC’s report, Google, Mozilla, Apple, and 
Microsoft have added Do Not Track functionality into their browsers. Unfortunately, 
however, the FTC has no power to enforce these recommendations among data 
brokerages. Internet privacy issues are generally taken up by the FTC which is 
empowered act only when a citizen has been defrauded by a service provider.  
 
4.3 Data Brokerages 
 
Hagel and Rayport (1997), predicted a privacy backlash would accompany the 
ramping up of data mining of consumers. However, they suggested that rather than 
being strictly concerned about their privacy being violated, consumers might be more 
concerned by a lack of remuneration for their information. They coined the term 
“infomediaries” to represent the emerging data brokers who might help consumers 
aggregate their own data, and negotiate on their behalf for payment for their 
information. “Businesses have generally assumed,” they write, “that information is a 
resource waiting to be claimed, like land in the western United States during the great 
land rush of the mid-nineteenth century” (p. 53). One company, the now defunct 
Lumeria, Inc., proposed to do this by building a unified uber-profile that would drive 
targeted marketing by reimbursing the consumer for the info they provided. The 
platform would allow users to monitor and correct their own data. Lumeria would 
take a small commission, for which it would store and manage the data transactions, 
as well as facilitate legal action when third parties violated consumers’ privacy.    
 
Infomediaries have not emerged as a private service designed to protect consumers. 
Unfortunately, instead, we have hundreds of what Nissenbaum terms “omnibus 
information providers,” or more commonly in popular parlance, simply “data 
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brokerages.” Affirming Hagel and Rayport’s description of consumers as a resource to 
be mined, Nissenbaum sees the burgeoning array of data brokerages as “evidence of a 
spiraling feedback loop: the availability of vast repositories of digitized records of 
personal information spurs demand in all walks of life, demand spurs further supply, 
and so on” (p. 49). Data brokerages provide their clients (typically advertisers, and/or 
law enforcement agencies) personal, professional, and financial information, 
aggregated from a wide range of sources, about millions of individuals. The Dataium 
data brokerage, for example, can tie a consumer’s real life identity to his or her 
browsing profile it builds from analyzing the links he or she clicks on. Applying 
advanced analytics to that data, Dataium builds a user profile which it sells to 
advertisers or vendors who gain additional knowledge, and thus leverage, over the 
consumer in order to influence their behavior.  
 
The Wall Street Journal surveyed the top 1000 most popular websites and found that 
at least 75% used such tracking software. Among the largest data brokerages, 
ChoicePoint is known to work closely with government agencies, frequently selling 
consumer data to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Choicepoint’s security 
record is not spotless, however. In 2006, the company reached a $15 million 
settlement with the FTC after it was discovered that it mistakenly sold information to 
a crime ring of identity thieves (Campanelli, 2006). The most important way that 
data brokerages function (often entirely surreptitiously—you will likely not have 
heard the name of most of the brokerages such as Axciom) is through embedding 
cookies, small data files, on user computers. Retargeting, remarketing, or 
remessaging, is an analytics service that uses the cookies they store on users’ machines 
in the following way: Once a user visits a site with a retargeting “pixel,” a very small 
bit of code which writes a browser cookie into one’s device upon simply visiting the 
Web page. That cookie can be read by and thus provide information from, any 
company or organization whose Web site a consumer visits which has contracted with 
the same data brokerage (and thus whose retargeting pixel they have embedded in 
their Web page, as well). The result is that a network of companies share visitor data 
through the cookies that share your information when you visit a partnering site in 
that network. Google uses their personalized retargeting pixel to drive their adwords 
service for sites that participate in their Adsense brokerage. Microsoft performs 
“remessaging” for sites that participate in the Microsoft Media Network. 
Retargeting/remessaging is a powerful way for consumers to return their product to 
visibility, then, even after you’ve navigated away from the original company or 
organization’s Web page. Remarketing/remessaging has been traditionally difficult on 
mobile devices which do not accept cookies. One company, Drawbridge, is 
developing an solution which employs statistical analysis to map anonymous location 
signals to various devices owned by the same user. By triangulating a user’s mobile 
device identities based on location and usage patterns which correlates behavior across 
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devices, the company purports to be able to identify unique individuals with a high 
degree of precision and thus directly target that user with ads on their mobile devices.  
 
As the information economy has matured, the next logical step toward being able to 
market greater number of goods directly to individual consumers has been the move 
by these telecommunications and other Web service providers to require their 
customers to use or associate their real names in their Web surfing. The famous New 
Yorker cartoon depicting a dog using the internet and smugly declaring to another dog 
“On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog,” no longer rings true. Research by the 
Wall Street Journal has shown that during the login process on 70 popular websites, at 
least a quarter of the time information about the user was passed along to third-
parties (Valentino-Devries, 2010). Google and Facebook have both recently shifted, 
requiring the association of users’ real names, ostensibly in the name of greater 
convenience. It cannot be denied, however, this such a move also serves to cement 
further the practice of the creation of consumer digital dossiers which can increase the 
fidelity of the targeted marketing analytics engines.    
 
4.4 Social Networking 
 
Thus, while explicit acts of surveillance are troubling, the more insidious and 
troubling challenge to traditional notions of privacy is present in the particular 
formation of a culture of ambient findability pervading the social formation. A major 
driver in shaping this cultural phenomenon, are the telecommunications service 
providers—especially those centered around providing social networking services. In 
fact, renewed interest in privacy may be due in part to the constant swirl of negative 
publicity surrounding a continuing series of privacy violations to users of their 
products and services. The two most important examples, here, are the Facebook and 
Google corporations, in no small part because of the sheer scale of the societal way in 
which they contribute to the transformation of the lived social reality of hundreds of 
millions of people around the globe.  
 
Since the launch of Facebook in 2004, the social networking site has become one of 
the largest companies in the United States, estimated at $100 billion dollars. In under 
a decade, the popular social networking website has garnered nearly three-quarters of 
a billion users worldwide and continues to see steady, rapid growth during 2011, with 
profits estimated at $4.2 billion, nearly double that of 2010 (“Facebook IPO”). 
Google is likewise a story of rapid growth and financial success. The global 
multinational has grown into a telecommunications leviathan, absorbing other smaller 
tech companies and now encompassing nearly all digital communication services, 
essentially reinventing advertising, email, television, radio.  
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Both Facebook and Google have had major complaints by both Privacy Partisan and 
watchdog organizations as well as governmental inquiries. Facebook’s history of 
privacy violations is so egregious that it has come to define, for many, its very mission. 
Facebook violations of user privacy were first uncovered in an expose by the Wall 
Street Journal in 2010. At one point, all of the 10 most popular apps transmitted user 
data to third parties without users’ awareness or permission (Steel & Fowler, 2010, 
para. 6). In 2011, ten of the largest advocacy groups signed an open letter to 
Facebook CEO Zuckerberg requesting radical changes in its opaque and unstable 
privacy policy:  The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Center 
for Democracy and Technology, Center for  
Digital Democracy, Consumer Action, Consumer Watchdog, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy Activism, Privacy Lives, 
and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. In May of 2011, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center filed a complaint with the FTC against Facebook on grounds 
that its privacy policies are both too opaque and protean for consumers. It has 
violated German privacy laws by mining Facebook’s users’ contact lists to send 
unsolicited emails inviting participation in Facebook to user’s contacts. After 
purchasing the popular photo-sharing service Instagram in 2012, Facebook suddenly 
changed the terms of service to allow the sale of users’ uploaded images to third-
parties; they were forced to reverse the policy when users complained.  
 
Google, too, has had its share of privacy critiques.  Google has violated the privacy 
laws of several countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Spain, South Korea, and Germany and is reportedly facing investigations in 
more than 20 countries worldwide after the wifi-equipped cars it employs for its 
Street View application inadvertently captured information from user’s unsecured 
wireless networks (Halliday, 2011). Prompted by Google’s transformation of its email 
into a more social networking application called Buzz in 2010. While Facebook’s 
privacy violations reach three-quarters of a billion people globally, it remains confined 
to a single application. As influential as Facebook is, Google’s power and influence is 
rapidly and easily outstripped it. Google’s privacy violations dwarf Facebook’s because 
it reaches into and across a potentially much broader media spectrum. Like Facebook, 
it has had its share of privacy snafus—none of which have gone unnoticed in the 
media and popular press. The Former CEO of Google Eric Schmidt is infamous for 
his cavalier and vaguely threatening pronouncements on Google’s plans for 
eliminating not only an irrelevant notion of privacy, but of consumer choice. “[O]ne 
idea is that more and more searches are done on your behalf without you needing to 
type. I actually think most people don’t want Google to answer their questions. They 
want Google to tell them what they should be doing next ” (Jenkins, Jr., 2010, para. 
10). Hearkening back to 1984, Schmidt’s suggestion chillingly echoes one of “the two 
great problems which the [Ingsoc] Party is concerned to solve…how to discover 
against his will, what another human being is thinking” (Orwell, 1949/1992, p. 159).  
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4.5 The Californian Ideology 
 
“It is difficult to overlook,” remarks Elliott Sperber in his article “The California 
Ideology Becomes Hegemonic,” “that …[the] oligarchs of the Tech Industry begin to 
exert more control over national policy” (2013, p. 3). This is precisely what my 
research demonstrates in this chapter. In their now famous 1995 polemic “The 
Californian Ideology,” Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron critique the rise of what 
they see as a “global orthodoxy” that mixes cybernetics, free market economics, and 
counter-culture libertarianism empowered to obviate alternative futures which do not 
match its libertarian bent. The Californian ideologues argue for a “’Jeffersonian 
democracy’ in cyberspace,” which they draw under the sign and the aegis of the “hi-
tech free market” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, p. 2). Juxtaposed against this claim, 
the explanation by Google founder Larry Page of Google’s project to digitize the 
entire world’s books seems telling: “Do you really want the whole world not to have 
access to human knowledge as contained in books? You’ve just got to think about that 
from a societal point of view.”4 The Californian ideology “reflects the disciplines of 
market economics and the freedoms of hippie artisanship. This bizarre hybrid is only 
made possible through a nearly universal belief in technological 
determinism…[through which] the new information technologies would realize their 
ideals” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, pp. 2-3). Influenced by the New Right, they 
argue, the New Left embraced a new form of liberalism—an economic liberalism 
which elevates the “liberty of individuals within the marketplace,” (Barbrook & 
Cameron, 1996, p. 3) in which “each member of the ‘virtual class’ is promised the 
opportunity to become a successful hi-tech entrepreneur” (Barbrook & Cameron, 
1996, p. 4). The Californian ideologues reject big government, and foreground the 
power of markets, as the only possible means to assure the “full flowering of 
individual liberty within the electronic circuits of Jeffersonian cyberspace”—a liberty 
available only to the “resourceful entrepeneurs who are the only people cool and 
courageous enough to take risks” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, p. 4). Written well-
before the rise of Facebook and Google, “The Californian Ideology” provides a 
faithful picture of the ideology behind the emergence of ambient findability. “In 
many cyberpunk novels and films,” they write, “this asocial libertarianism is expressed 
by the central character of the lone individual fighting for survival within a virtual 
world of information” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, p. 5). The hero of the narratives 
embraced by those who embody and enact the Californian ideology through their 
technocultural designs, thus appears analogous to the heroic character I describe in 
the second chapter. This narrative thus underwrites the radical changes to privacy 
                                               
4 The eventual digitization of all the world’s books is a project Google is known to 
have begun without consulting a single publisher or other relevant authority on 
copyright or intellectual property. 
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going on around us by valorizing individual and heroic responses over responses based 
on an understanding of agency as a process of rearticulation of a variety of economic, 
cultural, political, and technological forces and phenomena. The cultural hegemony 
of an emerging impulse to openness, connectivity, mobility, and transparency (for 
consumers rather than state and commercial actors) articulates to the state’s larger 
project of political hegemony, for many reasons, but certainly among them the 
Snowden revelations as well as the continuing disaffection with the privacy violations 
of the telecommunications and social networking providers, that hegemony is now in 
crisis.  
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Chapter 5. Rearticulating the Namespace 
 
5.1 Hegemonic Crisis 
 
Americans entering the second decade of the new millennium have come to live in a 
nascent surveillance society. The conjuncture I term the namespace is constituted in 
and through ideological and material forces in the form of discourses, economies, laws 
and policies, technical architectures, codes and protocols, and cultural practices that 
articulate to form a surveillance regime constituted in and through the articulation of 
ideologies of total information awareness and ambient findability. According to Frau-
Meigs (2010), our “cyberist moment” represents a continuing historical shift toward 
invasive new forms of social control as we shift from an identity politics favoring 
acceptance and diversity in the 1980s, to a morality politics of control and regulation 
in the 1990s, to our present politics of security in the new millennium, during which 
we witness a regime of unprecedented surveillance coterminous with radical advances 
in computer technology and associated cultural and economic practices (p. 81).  
 
In the new security state, particularly powerful public (government) and private 
(commercial) forces align under the sign of a new transparency, openness, and social 
connectivity which promises to engender new possibilities for personal and 
professional growth, economic prosperity, more democratic political participation, 
and national security. These same forces articulate in ways that enable new forms of 
privacy and other civil rights violations. The articulation of powerful state and 
commercial actors forms a dominant political bloc for which a major point of 
articulation has become a shared desire to reframe strong privacy protections as a 
quaint or irrelevant value—even one that impedes progress. A Diminution of privacy 
thus serves particular commercial actors by bolstering their ability to obtain and sell 
individual’s personal data in what has become a multi-billion dollar information 
economy which has allowed many service providers to successfully monetize Web 
commerce. State actors subject this data to complex analytics for discerning and 
predicting patterns that might expose possible anti-state activity.  
 
The articulation of this political bloc represented a powerful moment of temporary 
hegemony after the terrorist attacks of 9-11. However, hegemony is always a 
temporary settlement of the forces involved in ideological struggle. The namespace 
conjuncture is constituted in and by several lines of force that challenge the hegemony 
of the state-commercial bloc. According to Gramsci, when contradictions accumulate 
across a conjuncture, the dominant typicaly bloc experiences a crisis of hegemony, 
which represents a moment when the dominant bloc, has failed to successfully enact 
its political program/agenda or been forced to move along the gamut from consent to 
coercion (Hall et al., 1979). In moments of hegemonic crisis, no longer are the 
mechanisms that guarantee assent obscured and/or naturalized; rather, they are 
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spotlighted by an accumulation of contradictions that foreground the process of 
ideological struggle. At the height of the hegemonic crisis, the state “exhibits more 
plainly than it does in its routine manifestations what it is and what it must do to 
provide the ‘cement’ which holds a ruptured social formation together” (Hall et al., 
1979, p. 217). The contradictions at work in the namespace include but are not 
limited to: the U.S. and global economic crises, spurred in part by the failure of major 
U.S. banks; the expense and toll in human lives of several (arguably failed) U.S. 
military campaigns; the revelations that the U.S. disregarded its own constitution and 
other international agreements in both imprisoning and torturing citizens without 
due process, and spying en masse on its own citizens; and the realization that 
commercial telecommunications service providers have directly or indirectly, through 
agreement and compulsion, supported the de facto creation of a global 
telecommunications surveillance regime. 
 
This latter feature of the namespace represents one particularly strong and self-
evident contradiction, which can be seen in the way state actors have tended in past 
decades to simply bypass or challenge (both legally and illegally) restrictions and 
prohibitions on particularly intrusive forms of surveillance—i.e., essentially annexing 
the commercial telecommunications industry as a wing of its security apparatus. The 
articulation of these contradictions belie the boon of the new security and 
convenience provided by dataveillance and has spurred the subaltern fraction to an 
acute if nascent political consciousness of the problematic of privacy. Certainly in the 
popular and academic media, the prominence of these contradictions has encouraged 
more critics to recognize the politics of the namespace as the relation of powerful 
interests both in the public and private sector. “Were Big Brother to come back in the 
21st century, he would return as a public-private partnership,” notes one Guardian 
reporter (Ash, 2013, para. 1). These media are increasingly beginning to recognize 
and foreground the binary of security/privacy in which privacy represents the 
subordinated value. A July, 2013 poll by ABC News and The Washington Post indicates 
that by a margin of 57%-39%, the public sees it more important to violate individual 
privacy than to protect it, in order to protect against the threat of terrorism. While 
still a significant majority, what is important to note is the degree to which that 
margin has been rapidly narrowing. The number of people who question government 
privacy invasion in the name of security is 10% points higher than in previous 
ABC/Post polls of 2003 and 2006. While 42% of those polled say the NSA 
surveillance is increasing security, 47% do not see it as contributing to Americans’ 
security, with 5% seeing it as contributing negatively (Cohen & Balz, 2013). Because 
the hegemony of the dominant bloc relies on the consent of the subordinated bloc, 
and that consent seems to be significantly diminishing, the moment is thus ripe to 
contribute to the counter-hegemonic struggle to rearticulate the namespace in ways 
that strengthen privacy and other civil rights, to explore the alternatives to an 
information economy in which consumers are commoditized and mined for their 
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personal information, and to resist those calls for a state organized around a 
surveillance-driven security politics. 
 
As an example of the dynamic and contingent nature of struggle that characterizes the 
uneasy settlement of political hegemony, and of the political opportunity available to 
the subordinated bloc in the process of re-articulation, I point to the contemporary 
example of the changing American Republican party. This example speaks to the 
possibility for political change in noting how the dominant bloc, in winning the 
consent of the subordinate bloc, must agree to certain concessions. The granting of 
such concessions is never simply nominal, notes Jones (2006), and always produces 
the possibility of instability and change within the dominant bloc itself. During the 
last two election cycles, the Republican Party has sought to attain a more expansive 
hegemony by articulating to itself a demographic of conservative, white, middle class, 
often evangelical Christian voters. During the 2004 election, the party actively 
continued to draw upon the conservative religious element it had come to understand 
and characterize as its base. This strategy, over two election cycles, from 2000-2008, 
represented more than simple capitulation, since to articulate a subordinate group to 
itself and thus win its consent, the dominant bloc must “thoroughly recreate itself,” 
writes Jones: “A truly hegemonic group or class really must make large parts of its 
subalterns’ worldview its own” (2006, p. 46). After articulating to elements of this 
conservative demographic, the Republican party thus found itself to some degree 
mediated by a populist political wing which described itself as the Tea Party. The Tea 
Party was able to successfully claim a large number of seats in the House of 
Representative. And, in fact, counted with their supporters, the Tea Party can be seen 
to represent a significant force in the Republican party. Through hegemonic struggle 
the Tea Party has worked to rearticulate the Republican party itself. As Williamson et 
al. note, this poses a problem for Republican moderates, in that Tea Party republicans 
have pushed the party so far to the right ideologically that non-Tea Party Republicans 
are now seen as closer to Democrats than to their Tea Party compatriots (Williamson, 
Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011). This example demonstrates the possibilities for political 
agency inherent in the hegemonic process, for although a bloc must struggle to 
carefully maintain its hegemony, that process has the capacity to transform the 
dominant bloc itself.  
 
With regard to privacy, this presents a hope for directly engaging with the dominance 
of the dominant state-commercial bloc in the namespace. Privacy partisans must be 
able to leverage the intensity of the privacy crisis toward substantial political change, 
to harness the collective outrage expressed at the self-evident contradictions between 
what the U.S. proclaims as its economic, political and technological ideals and those 
it enacts. Such work begins through recognizing the dominant bloc’s tenuous hold on 
the position of moral and intellectual leadership, discovering those points of 
articulation vulnerable to rearticulation, and working to shift those connections, 
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linkages, and alliances to a more positive and just effect. In this way, privacy partisans 
may open the dominant bloc to making concessions, and perhaps, like the Republican 
party, to significant rearticulation. Shane Harris (2010) suggests that, as we are 
significantly distanced from the events of 9-11, the type of security crisis which 
promotes jingoist nationalism and helps cement political hegemonies, now is the time 
to press for political change:  
 
I think that now in the relative calm before another attack is the time 
to start asking these hard questions about how we strike this 
balance…If there is another attack on the United States on the order 
of 9-11, this question about balancing security and liberty will become 
strictly academic. The government will come down decisively on the 
side of security because that’s what it knows how to do. It will collect 
[private information] on a scale we’ve never seen. It will be clumsy. It 
will be driven by urgency and by fear. And then you will see, I believe, 
many of the infringements on individual liberty that many of us have 
only worried about to this point.  
 
Below, I explore some of the ways that those interested in defending and 
strengthening privacy rights can begin to engage with privacy in the namespace, 
which I’ve only begun to map in this dissertation. I examine individual praxis—
immediate action average citizen-consumers (those with no special training in the 
issues of privacy) might take in their own lives, through engaging directly with 
technical practices. I then move to the ways in which these same individuals might 
engage in collective praxis—working at a more conjunctural level in concerted 
political and economic ways. Finally, I suggest ways in which the contributions of 
academics and other professionals might develop an expert praxis, rearticulating the 
namespace conjuncture through education.  
 
5.2 Individual Praxis 
 
It does not necessitate adopting the myth of the solitary, rugged, everyman versus the 
monolithic social structure, which I describe in chapter two, to recognize that 
individuals can and should engage with the privacy crisis at the level of their everyday 
lives. One way to work individually for privacy, is to begin to educate oneself about 
privacy issues, being careful to contextualize the seductive but overly reductive 
narratives I describe therein. Books by what Hall et al. (1979) term primary definers 
are valuable, of course, in coming to understand the perspective of the dominant bloc. 
Like Google Chairman Eric Schmidt’s book, which I describe in the second chapter, 
the work of privacy apologist Jeff Jarvis in What Would Google Do?: Reverse-
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Engineering the Fastest Growing Company in the History of the World (2009)1 and Public 
Parts: How Sharing in the Digital Age Improves the Way We Work and Live (2011) is 
instructive at least in the drawing the extreme boundary of resistance to stronger 
privacy rights. Juxtaposed together, each represents a clear example of the Californian 
ideology I describe in the previous chapter—an ideology easily challenged when we 
think with articulation. In this same vein, the dramatic irony in dystopic action films 
such as The Conversation (1974) and Enemy of the State (1998) may play a hortative 
role, warning us of the dangers of a transformed and diminished privacy right and 
calling us to action. However, intellectually we must recognize the influence of 
market, industry and other forces which work to simplify the narratives of popular 
media (and particularly action films). In the news media, reductive narratives can be 
recognized as those accounts which rely on trite metaphors and simplistic models of 
social control, which portray agency as the property of individual actors rather than 
the complex interplay between technological, cultural, political and economic forces, 
practices and ideologies. Reductive accounts are frequently instructive in single 
dimensions, sometimes providing important facts, but must be balanced against 
counterclaims, and ideally, juxtaposed against accounts that recognize the complex 
interplay of forces in any social determination. Narratives that moves us away from 
thinking with articulation, toward an heroic narrative of individual agency—one lone 
hero against a technological juggernaut—we must be careful to acknowledge the 
rhetorical pathos of these social science fictions and problematize them.  
 
Kevin Roose (2013) details some of them in his New York Magazine article “The 
Surveillance-Free Day,” in which he attempts to live surveillance-free for 24 hours 
while still engaging in the activities common to the urban dweller, such as shopping 
online, sending e-mail and tweeting, using his mobile phone, and taking public 
transportation. The sizable list of preparations required to obscure his digital 
footprint included hobbling wi-fi and transmission capability for most of his digital 
devices and turning off completely those digital devices which could not be stopped 
from transmitting data. To ensure his privacy while staying digitally connected, he 
downloaded an application called Wickr to encrypt and auto-erase texts and photos 
posted to the Web. He enrolled in a Web service called “HideMyAss,” which 
provides a private Virtual Private Network (VPN) to obscure his browsing history and 
other network activity. Unable to use a credit card, which are legally tracked by 
corporations and the government, he used the anonymous digital currency Bitcoin. 
For encrypted email, he signed up for a free Hushmail account, and for Web surfing 
he opted to download Tor, a browser which encrypts its Web searches. Finally, and 
most absurdly, to combat surveillance by the network of CCTVs which pepper the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Jarvis’ title, in which the term “Google” is substituted for “Jesus,” is apt—as his work 
generally demonstrates, he understands Google and its work as nothing short of 
messianic.	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urban landscape, he constructed and wore a battery-powered baseball hat with 
infrared light bulbs meant to obscure his face from those cameras using infrared 
lenses. Of course individuals need not go to such lengths to ensure they have more 
privacy when using the myriad information and communication technologies in their 
lives. Educating oneself about the types and extent of the data being sent by the 
technologies you use, is a strong first step. It is also important for individuals to be 
aware of what options they may control in disabling or opting out of the intrusive 
tracking from government and telecommunications providers, and to investigate the 
protective privacy policies and settings on all major Web sites, apps, and services they 
use.  
 
While no doubt a fascinating experiment, it is important to recognize the limited 
application of an approach like this. Working as an isolated individual who must 
construct his own anti-surveillance technology is impractical for all but a handful of 
the techno-savvy. His essay thus fails to contribute useful thinking about the 
possibilities of rearticulating the namespace itself, about how our vast technocultural 
assemblage might be otherwise. Roose does recognize the articulation of state and 
corporate interests and his own willing participation in the diminution of privacy: 
“Most of the surveillance I’ve encountered today isn’t part of a vast conspiracy. In fact, 
a lot of it has been explicitly authorized by law, and by decisions I’ve made 
consciously. I’ve known for years that Google’s algorithms scan my Gmail in-box in 
order to show me more targeted ads, and I’ve been aware for weeks that Facebook has 
cooperated with the NSA. And yet, even after learning about PRISM, I kept logging 
on, because I like having free, useful web services” (2013, para. 7). Ultimately, 
however, his article exemplifies the media’s tendency to understand the privacy crisis 
through the lens of a panoptic model of surveillance, narrating for us his urban 
odyssey as the story of one man’s struggle against monolithic surveillance forces, 
rather than a techno-cultural assemblage that we might politically engage with. 
 
Informed by more nuanced accounts, individuals will be better prepared to engage 
directly with the information and communication technologies and practices in their 
own lives while contextualizing the degree to which individual action can be 
politically effective. For example, most individuals are too connected to their banks, 
telephones, computers and other networked electronic devices and services to move to 
a remote wilderness, eschewing all modern convenience for the sake of privacy. Such 
measures are both unattractive and simply impractical for the broad public whose 
social lives are constituted by an interconnectivity which is deeply mediated by ICTs. 
However, for those who wish to remain digitally interconnected while protecting 
their privacy, there are solutions. Under the current articulation of the namespace, 
individual praxis (of a more pragmatic and non-heroic nature), remains necessary to 
safeguard those privacy violations that are an immediate and preventable result of 
users’ failure to learn to change the settings and defaults of technological switches, 
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settings, and practices established by the commercial actors who see consumers as 
resources to be mined. 
 
5.3 Collective Praxis 
 
However, as the recent revelations of the state’s willingness to simply ignore legal and 
technological safeguards in their promotion of the security state, and thinking with 
articulation, we should recognize the need for a strong collective praxis, as well. We 
move beyond the everyday concerns of the individual into a broader political and 
economic action by engaging with larger social and political collectives. Because the 
state is not a monolithic material ideological structure, government actors can be seen 
and encouraged to support privacy reforms and resist government overreach—and 
this form of interaction remains a useful for of individual political praxis. For 
example, Senator Russ Feingold, chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on 
civil rights, has spoken out against government overreach in this area: “‘Trust us’ 
doesn’t cut it when it comes to the government’s power to obtain Americans’ sensitive 
business records without a court order and without any suspicion that they are tied to 
terrorism or espionage” (Miga, 2007, para. 6). Senators Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, and  
25 other senators have collectively plied the Obama administration to declassify and 
release information on the extent of the NSA surveillance. In September, 2013 
senators Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, Richard Blumenthal, and Rand Paul crafted the 
Intelligence Overview and Surveillance Reform Act to end the warrantless dragnet 
collection of phone records of U.S. citizens. This bill would amend FISA Titles IV 
and V to prohibit the bulk collection of email and telephone records of U.S. citizens, 
respectively. It would amend a number of National Security Letter statutes to both 
prohibit the bulk application of National Security Letters, and to ensure greater 
transparency from the government in its use of National Security Letters. It would 
also reform Section 702 of the USA PATRIOT Act by eliminating the “back door 
searches” loophole (thus requiring the government to obtain warrants); prohibit the 
collection of ancillary information not specifically the communications of the 
investigation’s target; specifically address and outlaw the practice of targeting the 
communication of foreign individuals in order to surveil a U.S. citizen(s) known to be 
in communication with that individual; place stronger limits on information collected 
unlawfully by the government; create an independent Constitutional Advocate who 
can balance the court through the imposition of an adversarial role; require the U.S. 
Attorney General to declassify those FISC rulings which represent significant 
interpretations of the law or the U.S. constitution; permit Constitutional challenges; 
permit citizens impacted by surveillance to petition the court for redress; permit 
private companies to reveal information about their disclosure of customer records 
and increase government reporting; authorize the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB) to subpoena and compel the testimony of government 
officials (“Domestic Surveillance Reform,” 2013). By focusing on those elected 
 
 
 
 
104 
	  
officials assigned to select committees which deal with privacy concerns, and those 
officials who have shown publicly they support privacy and mean to resist the 
emergence of the surveillance state, citizen-consumers may engage politically.  
 
For individuals less familiar with the maze-like hierarchy of government influence, 
the assistance of privacy partisan groups is an effective way to navigate the maze of 
political activism. The privacy crisis has spurred the growth of the number of 
organizations that pursue policies of transparency and equity with regard to 
government and corporate actors, document and fight privacy violation, and attempt 
to theorize an emerging surveillance society, both in the U.S. and abroad. These 
organizations include: The American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democracy 
and Technology, Center for Digital Democracy, Consumer Action, Consumer 
Watchdog, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Privacy Activism, Privacy Lives, Big Brother Watch, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 
Global Information Liberty Campaign, and perhaps the largest organization, Privacy 
International, which emerged in 1990 as an umbrella organization of over 100 
individuals and organizations from several countries, including Austria, Bulgaria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, and 
Switzerland. These organizations, most of which are non-profit, non-government 
organizations, marshal personnel and resources to lobby Washington, write amicus 
briefs, and sue for greater privacy protections. Citizen-consumers can contribute to 
any group that encourages responsible uses of information technology, particularly 
those which foreground the importance of privacy and other civil liberties, through 
membership, which often provides an educative benefit, through financial donation, 
and/or through contributing their own expertise. By expertise, let me make clear I am 
not invoking the technical super-hacker who works surreptitiously within the system 
both to subvert code, and to reify the system itself. This was the dream of the 
cyberpunk ideology, which, as I note in my fourth chapter, underwrites the 
Californian Ideology’s determinist understanding of the relation of technology to 
culture. The expert praxis I envision must represent an embrace of transparency, must 
abandon assumptions about technology and culture with regard to determination. 
Experts must leveraging knowledge, skills, and ethics before and during the creation 
of code, machine, and practice.  
 
5.4 Expert Praxis 
 
Expertise is one of the most powerful elements of political praxis. Gramsci recognized 
that hegemony is derived in part through the media’s resourcing of members of the 
dominant bloc to stand as experts. The Web has opened out traditional circuits of 
discursive power to experts (and amateurs alike) who may now construct blogs and 
other analogs of traditional media. The Web has enabled greater sharing of expertise, 
even among those with fewer financial resources and access to media outlets, allowing 
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individuals to organize by leveraging the collective intelligence of entire communities. 
Contributing expertise in an open forum is one vital way to get involved politically. In 
order to engage with the experts of the dominant bloc—those who are first in setting 
the terms of the debate around privacy—the subordinate social fraction must 
encourage its own intellectuals to articulate to the namespace, as it is currently 
articulated, their own ideologies.  
 
One example of such a forum is Groklaw.net, an award-winning blog which provided 
a space to join experts (and other interested and knowledgeable parties) in law to 
those in technological fields in discussion on subjects which benefitted from the open 
discourse between specialists in these two fields, engendering debates over free and 
open source software (FOSS), patents, and intellectual property, among others. 
Groklaw ran from 2003 to 2013, when it closed citing the revelation of the 
government’s ability to monitor private emails with relative impunity. Such 
government powers, argued founder Pamela Jones, prohibited sensitive work that 
required confidentiality, abolished the basic human right to live free from constant 
surveillance, and represented de facto proof that the surveillance state was a fait 
acompli: “There is now no shield from forced exposure” (Jones, 2013, para. 29).  
 
Several other privacy-centric sites have recently closed, citing the same reason. In a 
message that supplanted the company’s homepage, encrypted email provider Lavabit 
(in the news recently as Edward Snowden’s email provider) explained their reason for 
closing after ten years: “I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become 
complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years 
of hard work by shutting down Lavabit…	  I wish that I could legally share with you 
the events that led to my decision…the first amendment is supposed to guarantee me 
the freedom to speak out in situations like this. Unfortunately, Congress has passed 
laws that say otherwise” (Estes, 2013). Implied in this open letter is that Lavabit’s 
owners have been legally bound under provisions in the PATRIOT Act from 
disclosing their receipt of a National Security Letter. While the decision of these sites 
to discontinue service was understandable, it only strengthens the hegemonic bloc by 
lessening the counter-hegemonic discourses and services available. The increase of 
counter-hegemonic discourses is more important than ever, under a burgeoning 
security state.  
 
On the other hand, the destruction of company-held data before the state can claim it 
should not be seen as an act of cowardice, but an act of moral conscience. The closure 
of Lavabit was immediately succeeded by the stunning elimination of a major product 
line by company Silent Circle, a company which until recently offered a secure email 
service. After the Snowden revelations, and inspired by his courage, the company 
took a moral stand and eliminated its database of user information in the interest of 
privacy. CEO Michael Janke explains their rationale: “We knew that metadata was 
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just as dangerous as email content regardless of if the contents of an email are 
encrypted…We were literally sitting on a treasure trove of data that was highly 
valuable to many, many nations and intelligence agencies of the world. We made the 
pre-emptive decision to just scorched-earth it” (Gewirtz, 2013, para. 7).  
 
Silent Circle’s actions raise the question of civil disobedience. While it is often more 
than simply inconvenient for those Davids who take the brunt of retaliation by public 
and private Goliaths—Lavabit and Silent Circle abandoned entire revenue streams—
this type of civil disobedience represents a relatively powerful form of political praxis. 
In the case of George Christian, executive director of a 27-member Connecticut 
library consortium, it was successful counter-hegemonic ideological struggle, when 
Christian, and other unnamed librarians, refused to comply with a national security 
letter to obtain patrons’ computer records. Christian et al. were successfully defended 
by the ACLU, and ultimately were never required to turn over patrons’ records, nor 
were they penalized by the government for their non-compliance. This points to the 
possibility of political resistance by collectives of expert individuals willing to fight 
together for privacy rights against unconstitutional government practice (Cowan, 
2006).   
 
5.5 War of Position 
 
In Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don’t (1996), George Lakoff 
has argued for understanding the importance of the ideological dimension in political 
struggle. Lakoff suggests that after Goldwater’s defeat in the 1964 U.S. presidential 
election—a solid blow to the social popularity of conservative ideology—conservatives 
embraced a new strategy for encouraging and strengthening a new generation of 
conservatives through rearticulating the educational and media landscape in their own 
interests. This strategy was built upon tapping wealthy conservative donors to endow 
academic chairs, institutes, and organizations for teaching conservative business 
practices. Independent conservative think tanks with total autonomy would also need 
to be created outside of academia, they realized. To develop rigor and respectability 
for their ideological program, conservatives would need to create publications, 
journals, magazines, and to purchase media outlets outright to help disseminate a 
conservative ideology directly. The limited hegemony of the conservatives is a direct 
effect of a concerted effort over nearly half a century—a forty-year “war of position” 
as Gramsci would describe it—in which conservatives have successfully re-articulated 
the political landscape through a process both infrastructural and ideological, both 
material and discursive. Among these various conservative factions (e.g., 
fundamentalist Christians, libertarians, fiscal conservatives, social conservatives, neo-
conservatives, etc.) some are more powerful than others, but all are articulated 
together, Lakoff argues, under a single point of articulation: an ideological vision of 
the Christian God as a strict father-figure, and a clear understanding of just what that 
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ideology means and how it translates to political life. The problem for liberal 
progressives who want to resist this model, he suggests, is that, unlike the 
conservatives, they are not well-organized and cannot clearly elucidate and articulate 
just what their own ideology is and how it translates to political life.  
 
The long-term ideological struggle Lakoff describes between conservatives and 
progressives, is—or should be—analogous to the ideological struggle between the 
dominant bloc, and subordinate social fraction which it seeks to articulate to itself, 
over privacy, civil rights, security, and surveillance in the contemporary namespace. In 
order to fundamentally rearticulate the namespace, I argue, involves finding and 
deploying means for dis-articulating and re-articulating the forces that empower the 
hegemonic bloc. Thinking with articulation helps us to recognize that the successful 
approach by the conservative bloc (i.e., rearticulating the political landscape through 
the educative function) might similarly succeed for privacy partisans through the 
creation of a bloc constituted in and by counter-hegemonic discourses, institutions, 
alliances, etc. This bloc should be made up of both academics and those from private 
industry.  
 
The need for diverse expertise is clear, particularly at the juridico-political level 
wherein law and policy are enacted and enforced. As I argue in the third chapter, the 
repeal of the PATRIOT Act is a necessary first step to restoring the protections 
which it renders inert. That single step, however, must exemplify a larger concerted 
effort to unify an active political bloc to support the restoration of privacy and other 
civil rights. For example, the putative problem of the preponderance of insular, 
corporate-funded lobbyists must be adressed if counter-hegemonic struggle is to have 
an effect. Corporations frequently allocate staff resources to write amicus briefs and 
other educative materials for congressional and other policy bodies. Like the 
conservatives, progressives and privacy partisans must find ways to ensure their 
expertise and orientations inform the policies being engendered which serve the 
dominant politics. Policy decisions which are based on the intersection of technology 
and culture, for example, require a nuanced understanding of the interrelation of 
each. Steeves (2008), for example, found that the Canadian Supreme Court’s failure 
to understand the complexity of privacy in online spaces may have “limit[ed] the 
court’s ability to protect us from surveillance technologies that negatively affect our 
dignity, autonomy, and social freedom” (p. 334). Informed by a technological 
determinism which elevates technology as the central actor, and failing to consider 
the shifting social habits of a changing technocultural landscape, the court, she 
argues, failed to protect the privacy rights of Canadian citizens. The application of 
particular theories and methods of social science, agues Steeves, would allow courts to 
make more just decisions, informed by the strong analysis of complex social-technical 
systems and human behavior.   
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The same educative expertise must be leveraged to inform our own legal system. For 
example, speaking at the 2011 Fourth Circuit Judicial conference, Chief Justice John 
Roberts was asked about familiarity with, and any specific court policies on, social 
media and other Web technologies. Roberts replied:  
 
I don’t think any of [the justices] have a Facebook page or “tweet,” 
whatever that is [emphasis added]…The impact of the new technology 
on substantive law is really quite significant…But that too is nothing 
new. I mean you think of the Supreme Court’s dealing with the wire 
tapping cases when wire taps were the new thing. The first decision 
says ‘Well, of course that’s not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment…then the court came to have some experience with it 
and reversed itself…It’s one of the great things, again, with the law 
clerks. They come in and they know how all this stuff works and what it 
means and they’re a nice resource for kind of educating those of us who are a 
little behind the curve [emphasis added]. 
 
Roberts’ answer is troublesome in several respects. It seems to indicate he is both 
unfamiliar with and dismissive of the cultural, economic, and certainly political 
import of social networking. While it is true that rulings shift based on changing 
social, cultural, political and technological changes, and that the justices of the high 
court cannot be expected to be expert in subjects beyond the law, Roberts’ response 
indicates that the court receives its understanding of the workings and significance of 
modern information and communication technologies serendipitously, from incoming 
law clerks, who are themselves no more likely to be critically prepared in this area. 
And in Roberts’ case, such knowledge must be nugatory, since he disclaims any 
knowledge of Twitter, one of the world’s largest social networking platforms—a 
platform involved for example, in the social transformations represented by the Arab 
Spring. Especially in light of the revelations of government surveillance of 
commercial communications providers I discuss in chapter three, it is difficult to 
imagine that Roberts has not been briefed about the significance of social networking 
to the U.S. government, and to the U.S. economy. Roberts’ response thus points to a 
particular rhetorical exigency that might be addressed by the bloc of interdisciplinary 
experts I suggest above who are able to work with those in commercial and state 
sectors to inform those making U.S. policy and law.  
 
One of the important ways in which we might build this expertise is by providing an 
inter- or cross-disciplinary education which can help students successfully negotiate 
the complexity of the contemporary namespace. While many young people often 
already have a relatively strong literacy in the practices of consumption and 
production of digital forms of culture, they may not have naturally internalized a 
critical approach to the complex literacies of the multiple ICTs which pervade their 
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daily lives, nor intuitively recognize the ways in which mainstream media producers 
serve the powerful interests of economic and political actors. Even for those who do, 
it’s important to recognize, as I point out in chapter two, the ideological power of the 
technical and cultural architectures, protocols, and codes through which political 
reality is mediated and constructed for them. It is thus important to rethink 
traditional disciplinary curricula through the lens of articulation, in ways that might 
better demonstrate for students the importance, for example, of thinking culture, 
technology, law, politics, and ethics together, as deeply imbricated, deeply articulated. 
While I agree with Luke (2002) that “the challenge for new media pedagogy is to 
connect students’ everyday interactions and experiences with media technologies, to 
classic questions of equity, privacy, fairness, openness, access, power, and so on—to 
give the students the critical vocabulary and tools to think with and to encourage 
them toward more active and principled media use and participation,” to do this 
means engaging students at the point of mythologizing which typically accompanies 
any discussion of technoculture by “sustain[ing] the constructive affirmative energy of 
the myths, while pointing the way beyond simplistic hype,” or what we might 
describe as engaging directly with the dominant codes on offer (p. 561). I provide an 
example of this type of work in my second chapter.  
 
In order to truly engage with the discursive myths and social science fictions 
mediating our relation to new media, we must understand the role played by 
particular digital codes and the logical and material architectures and technologies 
which accompany them. To understand the meaning of the rise of networked 
computing, and associated socio-cultural phenomena such as social networking, 
involves understanding the Web as an articulation across the social formation, notes 
Langlois (2005), as “socially shaped and culturally distinct through a renewed focus 
on its technological characteristics” (p. 579). We do this by understanding it, she 
argues, as a conjuncture—an “assemblage of technocultural layers,” both those which 
culturally contextualize and shape it, and the technical architectures which structure 
it.  
 
A starting point for examining the layers that constitute the Web is 
the analysis of the different cultural values that are encoded within the 
technical objects and processes that form the Web….[T]he protocols 
that make the Internet an open network are also the ones which allow 
for something like surveillance to exist. Furthermore, the actors in 
charge of defining the protocols and rules of the Internet 
communication can also be criticized for representing specific interests. 
(2005, pp. 575-576) 
 
Frameworks such as articulation theory, actor-network theory, and others that 
approach the socio-political as conjuncturally determined provide a rich means of 
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understanding the way in which social and technical architectures, codes, and 
protocols structure and are structured by the emergence of networked digital 
computing, and are complicit in strengthening or weakening particular cultural and 
social values as well.  
 
Cory Doctorow points to the way in which privacy articulates technology advances in 
networked computing to political and corporate interests of power in his 2008 speech 
to the American Library Association conference, entitled “Privacy: Is it time for a 
Revolution?”  
 
One of the kinds of laws we write is code—software code—when we 
build networked societies and systems, we end up evolving the political 
systems that will come out of them; they’re interrelated and one grows 
out of the other naturally…So really when we start talking about a 
society in which people no longer get to choose the circumstances 
under which we disclose our information, we’re talking about a society 
in which we all end up living under the thumb of a politburo, whether 
or not that’s a politburo that’s embodied by faceless bureaucrats or 
simply as the outgrowth of our technology, it’s not a society that I 
think we should want to live in.  
 
Technical systems which fail to acknowledge the importance of individual privacy, he 
concludes, cannot fail to produce political systems in which privacy is simply obviated 
as well. In the same vein, Bruce Schneier (2013), security expert and fellow at 
Harvard’s Berkman Center for Society and the Internet has called publicly for the 
political intervention of expert praxis by engineers whom he urges to engage 
politically with the digital architecture by both monitoring and disclosing when they 
are called to act unethically by corporations or governments. “If you work with 
classified data and are truly brave, expose what you know. We need 
whistleblowers…There’s safety in numbers, and this form of civil disobedience is the 
moral thing to do.” He also exhorts engineers to promote open source designs which 
are less likely to be surreptitiously hacked by the government. “We need to demand 
that real technologists be involved in any key government decision making on these 
issues. We've had enough of lawyers and politicians not fully understanding 
technology; we need technologists at the table when we build tech policy.” Of course 
the slight but necessary modulation of Schneier’s important observation here is that 
technologists must enter into dialogue with those who make policy and law in a spirit 
of negotiation. Each perspective must inform the other. Both engineers and 
politicians must come to understand the ethical, moral, social, political, and cultural 
dimensions that in our contemporary moment have contributed to the emergence of 
the namespace.   
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5.6 Cultural Studies 
 
Suggesting the articulation of a politically-active subordinate bloc constituted in and 
by experts who would leverage the diverse disciplinary knowledges, theoretical and 
methodological frameworks of the complementary fields of its members is nothing 
revolutionary. In fact it represents the historical impetus and the continuing promise 
of the field of cultural studies. Cultural studies has, since it’s inception, been a critical 
project, navigating between the academy and society at large. Cultural studies is 
defined by its ethical commitment to make social and political change. It recognizes 
the opportunity to resource its work from within the ‘elite’ academy. However, 
because cultural processes do not map easily or perfectly onto methods of academic 
inquiry, for cultural studies theorists any critical project “has to be out, and away and 
into more dangerous places!” (Johnson, 1986, p. 43). Cultural studies negotiates these 
two demands through the productive tension between the interdisciplinary and 
counter-disciplinary impulses which define it. Cultural studies understands the 
conjuncture as the level at which the production of concrete knowledge is best 
employed for political struggle and change (Grossberg, 2010). This necessitates an 
interdisciplinary approach in the continual questioning of which objects are most 
relevant to study and which tools most effective for studying them. The theory of 
articulation is used to make that critical selection from an impossibly large and 
complex socio-historical context. No single discipline can profess the adequate tools 
and scope to map the diverse and heterogeneous elements that articulate to form a 
complex conjuncture such as the namespace. Cultural studies’ methodological toolkit 
must be inter-disciplinary enough to borrow, responsibly and with due respect to 
carefully policed institutional and disciplinary boundaries, those theories, methods, 
and practices with which it can best make a study of particular phenomena in their 
relevant contexts.  
 
Cultural studies must also be counter-disciplinary if it hopes to resist the canonical 
and curricular reification that accompanies institutionalization, allowing itself to 
remain flexible and viable as a practice by articulating to institutions and 
organizations outside the traditional structure of academia. In this way it hopes to 
remain “critical” and deeply committed to an examination of political, economic, 
social, and cultural flows of power articulated to any social or institutional structure, 
text, event, or cultural phenomenon it chooses to study. Lawrence Lessig’s widely 
cited Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace 2.0 (Lessig, 2006) represents a strong 
example of conjuncturally-oriented, interdisciplinary work that understands the 
deeply imbricated nature of culture, technology, law, and politics. In Code, Lessig 
describes the way in which cybernetic architectures and protocols (metonymically, 
“code”) are bound to the architecture of social design. Codes and protocols may be 
designed in ways that empower users by, for example, protecting informational and 
decisional privacy; they may also be designed, he warns, in ways that promote regimes 
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of surveillance and control by, for example, enforcing regimes of strict identification 
and a security culture of authorization. The latter road leads toward the namespace.  
 
Contemporary legal scholar Julie Cohen, whose interdisciplinary work on privacy 
draws from several fields (among them cultural studies), describes the challenge and 
reward of such interdisciplinarity:  
 
We need to ask about the properties of the field and the properties of 
[the subject] and that requires insights from disciplines that law often 
doesn’t pay attention to because they seem messy and alien, like 
cultural studies, science, technology, and society, [and] surveillance 
studies—they have ‘strange’ terminology, ‘weird’ jargon, ‘no numbers’, 
‘everything’s a moving target’…so some work is required there, and it 
can be somewhat of a drag. But simple analytical framing is only a 
virtue if you’re talking about something simple. So, I think we need to 
learn a new language to do information law and policy the right way.  
 
With its focus on social flows of power, and its impulse to discover and deploy those 
frameworks and tools best suited to addressing the problematics of particular 
conjunctures, cultural studies and other interdisciplinary models of scholarship, offer 
us a powerful model of the intellectual networking that must happen across diverse 
fields if we are open to informed debate with those in the dominant bloc about the 
importance of privacy.    
 
Because of its focus on conjunctures and social formations, the field of cultural studies 
provides a useful orientation for mapping outward to more global articulations and 
conjunctures. While the scope of this project limits my mapping, centering it on the 
articulation of American forces, phenomena, law, technology, etc., the burgeoning 
influence of globalism on economic, political, and technological realities demonstrate 
that concerns over privacy are far more global scope than I have been able to represent 
here. For example, I have not had space to explore the particular economic 
dimensions of the problematic, such as the commodity chain that articulates 
repressive foreign regimes to the U.S. surveillance technology companies that create 
and/or sell surveillance systems. Frameworks such as articulation thus allow us to 
imagine problematics like privacy as more complex than simply matters of law, 
business, or technology alone. As Nissenbaum and Solove both rightly point out, we 
must approach privacy contextually, in terms of concrete ‘privacy problems’. I want to 
suggest, however, that this may ultimately mean moving beyond a focus on singular 
surveillance technologies and practices, toward a focus on the larger articulations and 
conjunctures to which these are undeniably linked.  
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While addressing the ways in which the TSA’s policies of airport screening violate 
personal privacy is important, it should found a mapping work which prepares us to 
answer questions about intra- and international problematics. For example, how are 
the changes argued by the U.S. as necessary to rebalance security and privacy 
articulated to its role as a world police authority? How have U.S. policies perhaps 
promoted a global political climate in which terrorism becomes a political strategy 
against which it must continually contend? Questions about the problematic of 
privacy and the emergence of the namespace have, then, far larger reach than the 
question of whether U.S. intelligence agencies surveil individuals’ email metadata in 
the war on terror. They are sizable political questions about national security and 
global geo-politics, such as what it means to abandon perpetual ground war for an 
inevitable perpetual cyber-war, hinted at in Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 20, 
in which are outlined “Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO)” which “offer 
unique and unconventional capabilities to advance US national objectives around the 
world with little or no warning…and with potential effects ranging from subtle to 
severely damaging” (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013, para. 2). The problematic of 
privacy thus engenders for me the question of whether it is possible to imagine, let 
alone engineer, a world in which we’re not in a technological arms race, a future 
which doesn’t resemble a human face being stamped on by a boot. 
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